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NYĀYAMAÑJARĪ
OF
JAYANTABHAṬṬA
(Āhnika-I)

English Translation
by
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Preface

I have great pleasure in presenting the English Translation of the first *Āhnika* of *Nyāyamañjarī* of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa occupies a unique position in the history and development of Indian Philosophy in general and Prācīna Nyāya in particular. The author himself informs that the text was written in a cave where he was put by the King of that time. *Nyāyamañjarī* is an encyclopaedic exposition of the Prācīna Nyāya. While writing this, Jayanta has taken into account all the relevant views of almost all the systems of Indian Philosophy prevalent at his time. He has presented views of his opponent so elaborately and clearly that some times it is easier to understand the opponents from Jayantá's *Nyāyamañjarī* than from the original texts of the opponents. Jayanta, the Poet-Logician, has unique capacity of presenting clearly the issues in a very beautiful Sanskrit.

Dr. Janakivallabh Bhattacharya had translated this text into English and one part of his translation is already published. I took up the project of translating *Nyāyamañjarī* into English again because Dr. Bhattacharyá's translation is based on a very corrupt Sanskrit text published by Chawkhamba. When the Oriental Institute, Mysore, published another edition of *Nyāyamañjarī* and again when the L.D. Institute, Ahmedabad published the *Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga* of Cakradharaya, I realised that a fresh attempt to translate this text into English in view of

these new materials is an absolute necessity. I hope to present the entire *Nyāyamañjarī* in English *Āhnika* by *Āhnika*. I shall welcome all suggestions to improve upon the present translation.

I thank Dr. (Mrs.) Nirmala Kulkarni and Dr. (Mrs.) Ujjwala Panse for helping me in correcting the proofs. I also thank Indian Books Centre for having come forward to take up this project of publication of the English translation of *Nyāyamañjarī* of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa.

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Pramāṇa

1. Obeisance to Śiva in whose self there is eternal Bliss, knowlede and divine faculties for ever (such as *aṇimā, laghimā,* etc.) whose desire itself is the effort to create the sentient universe from Brahman to the *stamba*-grass (or, by whose mere desire the creation of the universe from Brahma to the stamba-grass comes into existence.)
2. I pay obeisance to goddess Bhavānī whose hair are decorated with the digit of the lord of the night (i.e. the moon), who is a river of nectar which is capable of removing the sorrows of the world of transmigression.
3. Obeisance to the god Gaṇeśa whose feet are full of the rays of the gems of the crowns of the gods and demons and who is like the Sun with reference to the darkness of obstacles.
4. The words of the sage Gautama which are purified by the cries of words of 'well done' uttered by Śiva and which are the main source of the gems of the logical formula, are pre-eminent.
5. Let the wise and honest people have a dip in this flowing river Sarasvatī (i.e. Nyāyamañjarī) which is eager to meet the ocean of the doctrine of Gautama (i.e. let them study thoroughly this Nyāyamañjarī which intends to discuss the doctrine of Gautama.)

6. Though tired of tasting i.e. enjoying the essence of various merits, let the mind of the wise men be sympathetic towards this attempt of ours by a mere glance at least.
7. This fine essence (i.e. Nyāyamañjarī) is extracted (from the herbs) from the herbal forest of Nyāya (śāstra formula), it is extracted like butter from the milk of the science of Logic.
8. How are we capable of conjecturing (i.e. creating) something new? (i.e. I am not composing any new subject as such) here, one should consider merely the novelty in the presentation.
9. (Ladies), who decorated several times their hairs with garlands of the same flowers before, do take interest in preparing the garland (with the same flowers) in a new fashion.
10. Or, the good people who are not taught (i.e. who do not know) the means to reject the request of a humble petitioner appreciate even such a thing which is devoid of good quality.
11. Therefore, let the learned ones who are engaged in roaming happily in the garden of Śāstra put on their ear this bunch of flowers (i.e Nyāyamañjarī treatise) for a long time (i.e. let them read this work carefully for a longer period).
12. The tree of the Nyāya-system which is brought up by Gautama and which is heavily loaded by a lot of fruits which give thick nectar - like juice is spread widely.
13. We, of light activities, are (so to say) lame to climb that tree and we are not able even to look at the grandeur of it.
14. This attempt of explaining (the Nyāya-system) includes only a bit of a part of that tree; but the kind people may appreciate only that much.

15. Good people feel happy with even a few merits of others but they never feel so even with innumerable merits of their own; wonderful is, indeed, the nature of these people!!
16. The writers while showing their works to the learned and honest men observe their face with the cheeks marked by the signs of horripilation or thrill arising due to their gradual thinking over the excellent theme of the work and thus they feel happy and fortunate.

Here, people who first think and then act and who are desirous of the wealth namely, the ultimate-goal (of salvation) and who do not think that the ultimate goal can be achieved without the means to know the means of that goal, first of all, search for the source of knowing the means of that (goal). The way to achieve the ultimate goal is of two kinds such as the *seen* and the *unseen*. In the case of seen goal, a person takes effort even in the absence of any injunctive sentence for eating etc. whose nature of being the means is known through the reasoning of pros and cons long established through the activities of elderly persons desirous (of eating) etc. There is no necessity of injunctions like "The dirty should take bath" or "The hungry should eat."

In the case of the unseen result such as heaven and salvation only, however, the sacred scripture alone is the light for people whose knowledge is covered by the dense darkness of natural ignorance. That alone is our divine eyes to see all the real means. We do not have, like *Yogins,* other means such as the knowledge got through Yogic meditation. Therefore, we must know the *Śāstra* (to know the means to achieve the ultimate human goal).

That, (Śāstra) is of fourteen kinds which the learned call as fourteen *vidyāsthānas.* They are the four Vedas such as the Atharva Veda the first, the Ṛgveda the second, the Yajurveda the third and the Sāmaveda the fourth. These four Vedas are

of the nature of directly preaching the means of attaining the ultimate goal through such statements as "One desirous of heaven should perform the *Agnihotra* (sacrifice),"[1] "One should know the Self" etc.

The *Smṛti*, propounded by Manu etc, too teach means (to attaining the desired goal) such as the rites *aṣṭakā*, (a *śrāddha*-ceremony to be performed on the 8th day of three months) *śikhākarman*,[1] *prapāpravartana* (i.e. making arrangement for distributing water to the travellers) etc.

That the rites, the enjoining sentences of which do not contain any mention of result, do have some result will be discussed in the chapter which discusses the meaning of the injunctive suffixes; the entire sense of the śāstra (i.e. all that is taught by *śāstra* rites etc.) aims at desired results in attainment of the desired goal, and not in mere performance of those rites.

The *Itihasas* and the *Purāṇas* also mostly elaborate the Vedic meanings (sacrifice and rites) by narrating stories etc. Thus it is said—

One should support the (implication of) the Veda by *Itihāsa* and *Purāṇa*. The Veda is afraid of such person who has studied very little (thinking that) 'he will deceive me' (the Veda), (i.e. one who has not studied the *Itihāsa* and *Purāna* will present a distorted meaning of the Veda). cf. Maha Bha 1.1.265.

Therefore, since the Vedas, the Purāṇas and the Dharmaśāstras deal with the preaching of the means of attaining the desired goal, they are *vidyāsthānas* (i.e. the source to know the means of attaining the goal). Auxiliaries to the Veda such as Grammar, Astronomy, Phonetics, Metrics and Nirukta have the status of *vidyāsthāna* through the explanation of words, etc. which are helpful (in determining)

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1. Tai S. 1.5.9

the meaning of the Vedas. Their very name (i.e. 'auxiliary *Vedāṅga*) reveals that they follow the Vedas.

As without enquiry it is impossible to determine the meaning of the (apparently) uncogent Vedic sentences, the Mīmāṁsā-system which discusses the meaning of the Vedic sentences functions as the part (auxiliary) of the mine of the Vedas and therefore it has the status of a *vidyāsthāna*. So says Kumārila-Bhaṭṭa :

When *dharma* is being known by means of Veda, the *itikartavyatā* - portion will be covered by the Mīmāṁsā-śāstra.

Therefore, Mīmāṁsā is not taken as the seventh *Vedānga* because it is a part of the Veda as it is very close to the Vedas. Vedic words when accompanied by critical discussion are capable of expressing their own indepedent meaning. The Nyāya-system on the other hand, is the main pillar of all the systems because it is the means to establish the authority of the Vedas. How can the (good, wise and honest) people have faith in the performance of Vedic rites which require much expense of wealth and effort if they loose faith in the Vedas the authority of which have been questioned by the bad and ill logic framed by the (anti-Vedic) logicians ? Moreover, when the king (i.e. the Vedas) himself has lost his power and grandeur what can be done by his servants (i.e. the *vidyāsthānas* such as Māmaṁsā etc.)? Therefore, this *Nyāya-sāstra* propagated by Gautama which is capable of teaching the *Nyāya* (i.e. *pañcāvayavānumāna*) which affirms the greater faith in the authority if the Vedas by cutting into pieces the propositions of all the ill-motivated logicians (i.e.the Buddhists etc.) is the source of establishment (of all other śāstras) and therefore, it is the greatest *vidyāsthāna*. *vidyāsthānatā* of the 14 śastras means their being the means to know the means of obtaining the desired goal; *vidyā* means knowledge, that knowledge, of course, is not the knowledge of pot etc., but the knowledge of the means of *puruṣārtha*; thus, *vidyāyāḥ sthānam* means the basis i.e. the substratum i.e.

the means of knowledge. Moreover, that (knowledge of) character of being the source of knowledge of the means of *puruṣārtha* is possessed by some (śāstras) directly and of some through some other mans (i.e. indirectly). Therefore, these fourteen *śāstrās* are called the fourteen *vidyāsthānas.* As it is said –

Purāṇas, Nyāyaśāstra, Mīmāṁsā, Dharmaśāstra, together with the six Vedāṅgas, and the four Vedas are the sources of knowing the means of *purusārtha* and also of *dharma* (merit).

It is also stated elsewhere ——

The six Vedāngas, the four Vedas, the Mīmāṁsā, the Nyāya, the Purāṇas, and the Dharma-śāstras are the fourteen Vidyāsthānas.

In the first verse what is meant by the word *Tarka* and in the second one what is intended by the word *Nyāyavistara* is this *śāstra* (= Nyāyasūtra of Gautama) alone. Nyāya i.e. Tarka (logic) i.e. Anumāna (inference) is explained in this sāstra only. Because, what sort of skill in the art of teaching of *anumāna,* after all, do the propagators of *Saṁkhya-, Jaina -,* and *Bauddha* - systems, have, or how much protection can their logic afford to the authority of the Vedas? Therefore, that is not worthy of counting here (in the list of 14 *vidyāsthānas*).

Although the Bauddhas hold their neck erect due to the pride that they are expert in handling the principle of *anumāna,* still, since their logic is against the Vedas, how can that system be included in the *vidyāsthānas* as the *Vedas* etc.? What sort of skill in employing *anumāma* do these Bauddhas have will b^ shown later at every step. The followers of *Cārvāka*-system are pitiable indeed and therefore, they are surely worthy of being discarded (from consideration). Thus where is the scope to count here their bad logic?

In spite of the Vaiśeṣika-system being well known amongst the people in the form of Saṭtarkī (system having the Six

padārthas) because they are only followers, by the words *Tarka* and *Nyāyavistara* this very (= Nyāyaśāstrā) system is intended.

This very Ānvīkṣikī, is counted as the Nyāya System among the four *vidyās* such as 'the three Vedas (i.e. Ṛk, Yajus and Sāman), mercantile law, and judiciary'. Investigation (*anvīkṣaṇam*) of a perceived object by perception and words verbal testimony is anvikaṣā i.e. inference and a system which elaborates this is Anvikṣakī (i.e. the Nyāyaśāstra).

Now, if *vidyā*'s are four in number (Ānviksikī, etc. stated above), how are they stated as fourteen? (i.e. they should have stated as sixteen by including *vārtā* and *daṇḍanīti*). There is no contradiction. Since *vārtā* (mercantile Law) and *daṇḍanīti* (Judiciary) are meant for the seen purposes i.e. for the purpose of this material life, they cannot be included in the group of *vidyās* preaching all the desired goals and since the *trayī* i.e. the Vedas and *anvikṣikī* are also mentioned in the group, *vidyās* are fourteen only.

Now, if the purpose or goal or Nyāya-system is the establishment of the authority of the Vedas, there is no need for such a system because the Mīmaṁsā - system serves that purpose. In Mīmaṁsā as the meaning of the Vedas is discussed so also the authority of the Vedas. True; but that (= discussion of authority of the Vedas) is subordinate one.

The discussion of the meaning of the Vedas is the main object of Mīmāṁsā. These *vidyās* have different functions. Mīmāṁsā is known as Vākyārthavidyā (i.e. it deals with the meaning of Vedic sentences) but not as Pramāṇavidyā (which deals with the means of valid knowledge). Moreover, the Mimāṁsakas are not capable of finding out the way which is capable of protecting the authority of the Vedas, because they loiter hither and thither adopting wrong ways where their movement is blocked by spreading or piling up huge thorns of ill logic (of the Bauddhas). We shall narrate this later. Moreover, even perception etc. do not get the status of

pramāṇa without being firmly corroborated by other *pramāṇas,* what to talk of words which depend on them (i.e. perception etc.)! Words when accompanied by significative power simply signify the relation between the words and the meanings. That alone is within its capacity. But so far the confirmation of those meanings etc. (such as real or unreal) is concerned, they (i.e. the words) have to depend on the person who utters those words. Therefore, words are authority only when they are uttered by reliable persons (*āptas*), otherwise not. This also is going to be discussed in this *(Nyāya) - śāstrā.*

Well, (before Gautama) by which system was the authority of the Vedas established? Very little you have said . Who explained the meaning of the Veda before Jaimini? Who derived the words before Pāṇini? Who composed the metres before Piṅgala? Since the very creation of this world these *vidyās* (systems) are also there like the Vedas; only when we want to refer to the collection or abridgement and elaboration, those collectors and elaborators are called as composers.

When the authority of the Vedas is taken for granted without any argument by good people i.e. those who believe in the Veda, what is the point in taking trouble to discuss it? No. It (the discussion) is necessary in order to remove doubt and misunderstanding (about the authority of the Veda). Because this *śāstra* is (composed meant) for one who is doubtful or who has wrong conception about the authority of the Veda. Similarly, *Mīmāṁsā* is not written for one who already knows the meaning of the Veda, as it is said - *Jaimini - sūtra* and its commentaries are not meant for those who know the Veda by other means.

People are of four types: ignorant, having doubts, having wrong conception and having correctly determined knowledge. Among them the sage (= Gautama) having the correctly determined knowledge, through this *Nyāyaśāstrā,*

provides knowledge to the ignorant, clears the doubt of a person who is in doubt, and removes the misconception of a person who has it; therefore, that this śāstra is composed only for them is befitting.

Wherefrom this sage (= Gautama) got this correctly determined knowledge? Here is the answer. He has correct knowledge, let him have so due to penance or due to worship of god or due to the study of other śāstras; what if?

In that case, whatever is his (Gautama's) source such different *śąstras* to obtain that (i.e. the settled mind), from the same source we can have the knowledge of that. Therefore, what is the need of the *Nyāyaśāstra* of Gautama?

This objection gets automatically turned down because the purposefulness of the composition of this *śastrā* is established through its abridgement and expansion. It has already been stated that people are of various minds; whose ignorance, doubt and misunderstanding are removed by this *śāstrā,* for them alone this śastra is purposeful and therefore, the sage Gautama composed this *Nyāyaśāstra.*

The first *sūtra* of which is as follows :

By the knowledge of the real nature of the means of valid knowledge, the knowable, doubt, purpose, example, established conclusion, the members of syllogism, indirect argument, decisive knowledge, to know truth without any prejudice, argument for victory, destructive argument, fallacious reason, dialectic quibbling, futile respondence, and vulnerable point one obtains the ultimate good (i.e. salvation).

(Objection)

Now, (we ask) what for this first *sūtrā*? (Reply) what a question!! If one has to compose a *śāstrā* one has to start it, as a matter of sequence, with some sentence since uttherances come one after the other. (Not only that) without writing the

first sentence it is impossible to write the second one and so on and so ultimately the composition of any work itself would become impossible.

(Objection) Well, it is not that I don't know what you have said :

(What I mean is) What is to be explained in the śāstra let that alone be (straightaway) explained. What is the purpose of stating at the beginning the subject matter dealt with it and its aim. (Reply) we reply as follows :

It is but necessary to have the first sentence (= sūtra) in order to state the subject-matter and its purpose so that those who will listen to it (or read it) will have the continuous inducement and enthusiasm.

Wise men whose inclination to act is lost due to the absence of the knowledge of the result and the subject-matter, would not show even a little interest in listening to (or reading) a treatise.

Who, if he is wise, will take effort in an act if the subject-matter and purpose of that are not known? Kumārila Bhaṭṭa also says :

As long as the purpose of a *Śāstra* or of an act is not stated who will accept it (i.e. nobody follows it.)

Objecton :

Now, let us consider, wherefrom at the beginning do the listeners (or readers) get the knowledge of purpose? Is it from this very (first) sentence (the first *sūtra*) or from the (logical reasoning) (or inference?)

Now, when the athoritativeness of this sentence itself is not yet proved, how can it be capable of determining the purpose?

If you say that (after listening to a sentence) one will act due to some doubt, then one can also do so i.e. can go to

perform a sacrifice (mentioned in a Vedic sentence) with doubt and in that case there is no need for this (system).

If you say that one can know the purpose by inference or by reasoning that is possible only after the whole *śāstra* is studied, not otherwise. Again, if after knowing the purpose one is inclined to study the *śāstra* there is interdependency such as after knowing the *śāstrā* one comes to know the purpose of studying the *śāstrā* and after knowing the purpose of the *śāstrā* one gets interested in listening to (or studying) the *śāstrā.*

Reply

The following is the answer to your argument:

From the first sentence (= here *sūtrā*) the listener (or the reader) gets the knowledge of the purpose of reading the *śāstra* and with a doubt (about the purpose that he may get the result) he goes to lisen to (or read) the *śāstra.*

It is unlikely that people with a doubt about the undesirable result will go to perform the highly complicated and pains taking sacrifices (mentioned in the Vedas) if the authority of the Veda is not established.

On the other hand, it is but proper (to think) that people will take initiative with regard to an act (like studying this *Nyāyaśāstra*) which is easy to pursue because it does not involve huge expenditure of wealth, and any great effort. It yields huge (i.e. most desirable) result (salvation) but requires comparatively very little labour.

Wise men studying this *śāstra* will come to know within a couple of days whether this *śāstra* has some result or no result.

If, however, at the very first step one starts hairsplitting criticism, that will be the cause for stopping all further activities.

A patient consults a physician and follows his advice; but if he (the patient) starts doubting his (doctor's) advice his disease will only increase (and he will not get any remedy).

Therefore, knowning the purpose together with the subject-matter (of the *śāstra)* from the first sūtra one should study the *śāstrā* with a hope that it will bear fruit.

Some who interpret (the purpose of) the first sentence in the following manner, a sentence the meanings of the constituent words of which cannot be related like the sentence *daśadādimādi* etc. is unacceptable. Not only that, even a cogent sentence the meanings of the constituent words of which can be related, if it is purposeless, is also unacceptable, like the sentences enquiring whether crows have teeth or not?' Thus, (in the above mentioned cases) rejection (of sentences) is due to not knowing the purpose etc. which is in invariable concomitance with acceptibility. And, therefore, one who questions the composition of the *śāstra* under the pretext that there is no purpose is hereby replied and satisfied by the first sentence expressing purpose etc.

Even according to them, it amounts to the fact that the stating of the purpose of the *śāstra* alone is the implication or purpose of the first sentence. And by stating that (purpose) alone the absence of knowledge of *vyāpaka* is removed and thereby the doubt (objection) i.e. the śāstra should not be studied) is also removed.

Some contend that the first sentence produces doubt or feeling of possibility, also known as *Tarka* about the result which is the cause of action.

Even that is possible only through stating the purpose. Because doubt or the feeling of possibility about the object of which is the purpose, is the cause of activities (प्रवृत्ति) and it is to be generated by that (purpose). Therefore, in the production of that (doubt or feeling of possibility about the

result) the stating of the purpose of the *śāstra* is the function of the first sentence. Doubt, of course, is caused by the nature of things only. (Now, if one asks that when doubt itself can produce a desire to act in man what is the necessity of postulating another factor such as *sambhāvanā* for the same purpose? We say, it is necessary) because there are two kinds of sentences uttered by a man (such as sentences uttered by an honest man and those uttered by others). (That is why we find that) people do get more faith or feeling of more possibility in a purpose uttered) by a man who is honest and of purity and good conduct.

Therefore, it is nothing but proper to say that to state the purpose alone the first sentence is composed. Thus, whatever is the cause for the activity of a hearer (or a reader) it is proper to state that first because there is nothing else than the knowledge of purpose which can induce a man in action.

Nevertheless, it is also necessary to state the subject-matter for the explanation of the purpose which is achieved through that and also for the concentration of the hearer's (or reader's) mind.

The relation between the *śāstra* and the result as well as the subject-matter is inferred by *Arthāpatti* and it is established by the very mention of that (i.e. the subject-matter and the result) and as such it is not stated here expressedly.

(To put it in simple words) the relation between the subject-matter and the *śāstra* is of the nature of *vācya* (that which is to be explained) and *vācaka* (that which explains) and the relation between the *śāstra* and the ultimate good (i.e. the result or purpose) is of the nature of *sādhya* (which is to be achieved) and *sādhana* (the means of achievement). Both are established by the very mention of their substratum or base (i.e., the result and the subject-matter).

Enumeration of the sixteen *padārthas*

The sixteen *padārthas* such as *pramāṇa* etc. upto *nigrahasthāna* mentioned in the first *sūtra* constitute the subject-matter. What exactly they are will be stated later on. The *pramāṇas* such as *pratyakṣa* (perception) etc. are the means to determine (or know) the objects. The soul etc. is to be known by that (perception etc.). Doubt means the knowledge of various (contradictory) attributes (with reference to one and the same object). *Prayojana* (purpose, result) means attainment of good and removal of bad and the means for that. *Dṛṣṭānta* (examle) means that in which is determined the invariable concomitance of the probans or reason. *Siddhānta* (established conclusion) means that which is possessed of generality or specific feature and which is accepted on the basis of proof (i.e. *anumāna*).

Avayavas (members of syllogism) are those such as *pratijñā* (the thesis) etc. which constitute the (five) sentences of Inference for others. *Tarka* (*reductio ad absurdum,* indirect argument) means the assertion of possibility in an doubtful matter object due to finding a favourable cause in one (out of two) views (*pakṣa*). *Nirṇaya* (decisive knowledge) means the knowledge of fact or truth produced by the knowledge of means. *Vāda* (discussion) is that which results in determining the true nature of an object by persons having no prejudice (i.e. without any prejudice).

Jalpa (argument for victory) is that which is an exchange of arguments of participants desirous of victory and which is aimed at testing the capacity (of the participants). A variety of *Jalpa* is *Vitaṇḍā* (destructive arguments). *Hetvābhāsas* (defective probans) are those probans which are not real probans but which appear like probans. *Chala* (dialectic quibbling) means setting aside one's argument by altering the meaning (of words).

Jāti (futile respondence) means taking objection for which the reason put forward is just a reflexion of reason and not a sound reason. And *nigrahasthāna* (vulnerable point, defeat) means not revealing of the real object and revealing of the opposite (i.e. unreal) one.

In the *vigraha-vākya* (for the compound of the first sūtra containing the sixteen *padārthas*) some of the words (= the *padārthas*) should be taken as ending in singular number and some words in plural as per the mention (of those words) in their definition-*sūtras* which are to be stated later. The words *pramāṇa, avayava* and *hetvābhāsa* should be put in plural in the *vigraha-vākya* and the rest in the singular because they are used as such in their definition *sūtras*. In this way it is also clearly shown that both *uddeśa* and *lakṣaṇa* have the same object.

This compound (containing sixteen *padārthas*) is an *Itaretara-dvandva*-compound.

The sixth case-ending expresses relation in general in the expression *pramāṇādīnām tattvam.* (The essense of *pramāṇas* etc.). In the expressions, *tattvasya jñānam* (knowledge of the real nature of the *padārtha.*) and *niḥśreyasasyādhigamaḥ* the two generative case-endings (i.e. *tattvasya*, and *niḥśreyasasya*) are for objective case because *tattva* and *niḥśreyasa* are objects since it is *tattva* which is to be known and it is *niḥśreyasa* which is to be attained.

Well, if the first *sūtra* is grammatically explained in the above-mentioned way, (there is the contingency of an *asamarthra-samāsa* (a weak compounding) in the case of the form *tattvajñānāt* because the word *tattva* is dependent on the words *pramāṇa* etc. (which are in another compound expression) and therefore it being *asamartha* there. That is why it is said that that which depends on something else is weak. Moreover, it (*tattva*) is not the main idea (in the compound *tattvajñānāt*). (Had it been the principal idea)

even though it is dependent on something else-the compounding would have been possible as in the case of the expression *rājapuruṣaḥ śobhanaḥ* (where although the word *puruṣa* is dependent on or related with the word *śobhana*-but as it is the principal idea-the compounding such as *rājapuruṣa* is possible). (It is not the case here). As in a *ṣaṣṭhītatpuruṣa*-compound the second member is the principal one here (in the compound *tattva-jñāna*) the word *jñāna* alone is the main and the word *tattva* is subordinate. Therefore, as in the case of the expression *ṛddhasya rājñaḥ puruṣaḥ* absence of compounding is proper [no compounding is possible], [similarly no compounding should have been done in the case of *tattvajñānāt* and it should have been put as *tattvasya jñānāt*].

Well, knowledge too depends on *pramāṇa* etc. because that (*pramāṇa*) is the object of that (i.e. knowledge).

No. It is not true because that expectancy (of having an object) is satisfied by the word *tattva* (so *pramāṇa* etc. should not be the object of knowledge here). The *vigraha-vākya* itself proves this *tattvasya jñānam.* Therefore, the word *tattva* itself now becomes dependent as the question arises *kasya tattvam* (whose *tattva*?).

Thus, as the word *tattva* becomes subordinte and thereby as it becomes dependent no compounding (such as *tattvajñānam*) is possible. Some argue in the above manner. They suggest *karmadhāraya* - compound instead of *tatpuruṣa* (for *tattvajnāhāt*) and offer the *vigraha-vākya* as *tattvañca tajjñānamca* (which is *tattva* as well as knowledge).

This also is incorrect because knowledge itself cannot be divided into *tattva* (real) and *atattva* (real). In fact, the nature of knowledge such as *tattva* or *atattva* is due to the (nature of) object. Therefore, in this case of ours knowledge has *tattva* as an object; knowledge itself is not of the nature of *tattva.* After all what is *tattva*? It is a cause for the usage of a word (in a

particular sense) which is the true nature of *bhāvapadārtha* and *abhāvapadārtha* determined by different means of valid knowledge. The derivative sentence for the word *tattva* is as follows:

Tasya bhāvaḥ tattvam (the nature of that (object) is *tattva*).

That (*tattva*) again, is determined by the knowledge. Thus, the knowledge which determines that (*tattva*) is called *tattvajñāna* (knowledge of *tattva*). Moreover, when knowledge itself assumes the form of *tattva* it becomes an object of another knowledge. In fact, those are *pramāṇa* etc. the *tattva's* which are to be determined here. Therefore, stating the first compound form separately from the compound form *tattvajñāna* is proper.

This is not proper to state it in a different way simply because (normal) compounding (षष्ठी तत्पुरुष) is not possible in this case. Moreover, such compounds are very often found used because the components of those compounds do not lose their capacity of being compounded. For example, *Devadattasya gurukulam* (Davadatta's Guru's *family*). [Here though the word *guru* is dependent on *Devadattasya* still compounding has taken place because the word *guru* is *nityasākāṁkṣa* (always dependent)].

Therefore, whether it is *upasarjana* (subordinate) or *anupasarjana* (non-subordinate i.e. principal) (as fixed by the grammarians) is, actually speaking, not the criterion of such compounding, (rather the criterion should be as follows).

If the meaning of *vigrahavākaya* is the same as that of the compound form (got out of that *vigrahavākya*), compounding can take place.

This criterion very well fits in here (i.e. the meaning of *pramāṇādīnām tattvasya jñanam* is equal to that of *pramāṇādīnām tattvajñānam*). Even the grammarians have

allowed compounding in such expressions. For example, (Patañjali himself) has written. *Atha śabdānuśāsanaṁ, Kesāṁ śabdānāṁ, laukikānāṁ vaidikānāñ ceti* (Here begins the teaching of words; of which words? words belonging to classical Sanskrit and Vedic Sanskrit).

Therefore, it is but proper to interpret as per the (Nyāya) *bhāṣya* the construction of the first *sūtra* with three sixth case-endings (such as *pramāṇādīnām tattvānām jñānān niḥśreyasasya adhigamaḥ*).

Now, you should tell us how the knowledge of the *tattva* of the sixteen *padārthas* is the cause or means of attaining the salvation. If you say that this *śāstra* is meant for establishing the authority of the Vedas then state only that much. What is the point in stitching the rugs of the sixteen *padārthas* (i.e. what is the purpose of stating all of them). We reply as follows :

We shall show later that the knowledge of the twelve kinds of *prameyas* such as *ātman* 'soul' upto *apavarga* is the direct means of attaining salvation without taking help of any other knowledge. It is but necessary to state the *prameya* because through the knowledge of the real nature of things the incorrect knowledge gets eradicated and once that is eradicated the *saṁsāra*[1] which is due to the incorrect knowledge is automatically eradicated (and the *jīva* is freed). That the knowledge of the *prameya* such as *ātman* etc. is the means of attaining salvation is known only through the Vedas.

To establish the authority of that (*Āgama*), again, depends on the inference; and as inference requires a probans or reason, *āptoktatva* (being a statement of a believable person i.e. God) which is *avinābhāvi* (having invariable relation) is supplied as that probans. It will be shown later.

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1. That is, the cycle of birth and death.

Perception is employed in order to know the invariable concomitance between the probans (*āptoktatve*) and the probandum *prāmāṇya*). What other reason can be supplied in order to cross (i.e. get rid of) the ocean of the fallacy known as *anavasthā*.[1]

As the result mentioned in the sentences of *Āyurveda* etc. is seen (realised) directly the utterance of a believable person is taken as the *pramāṇa* (means of valid knowledge).

Upamāna is also useful in some cases; therefore, as the prameya, are to be stated, similarly all the four *pramāṇas* are to be explained. Although the (remaining) *padārthas* such as *saṁśaya* (doubt) etc. can be included in the *pramāṇas* and the *prameya,* they are mentioned separately because they are the cause for the operation of inference. It has been already shown how inference is useful for attaining the desired goal by establishing, first of all, the authority of the Vedas.

Inference does not operate either in the case of an unknown object or in the case of a definitely known object. But it does operate in the case of a doubtful object. Therefore, *saṁśaya* is the cause of inference.

Inference does not operate with no reference to the purpose. Example, on the other hand, is given in order to know the invariable concomitance.

Siddhāntha (established conclusion) also helps the operation of Inference through removing the fault of *āśrayāsiddhi* (unestablishment with regard to the substratum) by establishing the subject.

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1. If *āptoktatva* (being a statement of a reliable person; here, of the god) is not taken as the *hetu* and something else is taken as the *hetu* then since that something is not yet established as authority, it will have to be established as so and for that some other thing is to be supplied as the *hetu* which, again, is to be established by some other *hetu* and so on. Thus the endless regression.

Well, when you describe the *dharmin* (i.e. the *pakṣa*) which is the object of Inference as doubtful (i.e. having the doubt about the existence of probandum) by the word *saṁśaya* (already posited in the first *sūtra*), the fault of *āśrayāsiddhi* gets automatically removed. (Therefore, what is the point in positing *siddhāntha* separately ?).

True. But it will be shown later that Inference operates also with reference to certain thing (subject) even when there is no doubt about it. Therefore, as there is no restriction that Inference can operate in a doubtful subject only, it is necessary to state *siddhānta* also separately.

For stating the Inference the *avayavas* (= the five sentences प्रतिज्ञा etc.) are of utmost help with reference to Inference for others. This is what is said by the logicians.

Well, when *siddhāntha* (established conclusion) and *dṛṣṭānta* (example) can be known from *pratijña* and *udāharaṇa*, what is the necessity of positing them (*siddhānta* and *dṛṣṭānta*) separately?

If you argue this way then we say: what is the need for postulating even Inference when its probans can be established by its (second) member. Let it be so. What harm is caused to us?

It is not so (i.e. you cannot do without Inference) because when *abhidheya* i.e. the Inference is to be stated only then there is the scope for the members of syllogism which explain it (i.e. Inference) and therefore, the object (the purpose) of those *avayavas* i.e. the Inference is to be stated first. Otherwise, (i.e. if the object or the purpose is not stated) a *śāstra* would end just after mentioning the *avayavas*. (Therefore, what for these *avayavas* are is also to be stated).

Tarka makes one *pakṣa* weak out of the two *pakṣas* which appear to be equal but actually are not equal and which are the objects of doubt and it helps the *pramāṇa* i.e. Inference

which has the other *pakṣa* as its *viṣaya* by easily setting aside the opponent's argument through removing the doubt about the capability of probans in establishing the probandum. Therefore, it is also stated separately. That is employed in *vāda* in order to show freedom from prejudice. Inference does not materialise unless one *pakṣa* (out of the two) is determined. Therefore, *nirṇaya* helps the operation of that (inference) since it leads to the completion of Inference. Otherwise, who will begin such an inference which does not end and which does not result in a conclusion?

Well, when the import of *nirṇaya* is understood by the word *tattvajñāna* itself, it is not necessary to state *nirṇaya* separately. After all, *nirṇaya* is *tattvajñāna* only (i.e. what is conveyed by *nirṇaya* is also conveyed by *tattvajñāna*). True. But the knowledge of the real nature of the sixteen *padārthas* is also possible by means of other *pramāṇas* and it is never the cause of completion of Inference. Whereas this *nirṇaya* which is produced by way of scrutinising the faults of probans is the cause of completion of that (Inference). This cannot be had unless it is stated separately.

Well, the *nirṇaya* as desired or intended by you can be had from the word *anumāna*. That is wrong. *Nirṇaya* is the result of *anumāna* (Inference) and not *anumāna* itself.

Since a *karaṇa* is a means without stating the *nirṇaya*, that inference without the result cannot conclude (i.e. it cannot produce *anumiti*).

Then, (we say) *nirṇaya* (by *arthāpatti*) will be presumed by both the word *tattvajñāna* and *anumāna*, because Inference ends in *tattvajñāna*.

No. Unless *nirṇaya* is stated that *anumāna* ends in *tattvajñāna* cannot be established because there will be the contingency of *tattvajñānā-bhāsa* fallacious knowledge arising due to *liṅgābhāsa* fallacious reason.

Well, since Inference is preceded by (i.e. caused by) doubt, it will lead to established conclusion, because of its being capable of so. Therefore, *nirṇaya* becomes known by the words *saṁśaya, anumāna,* and *tattvajñāna.*

No. What you say is incorrect because although Inference is preceded by doubt, there is a possibility of arriving at a wrong conclusion arising out of wrong doubt. Nor there is such a hard and fast rule that an Inference must be preceded by a doubt. Therefore, in order to see that an Inference in a particular (i.e. established) conclusion, it is proper to state *nirṇaya* separately. Enough of the discussion!

In *vāda* is discussed the Inference which reveals the truth through producing the knowledge of things by removing doubts or through making one accept an already established thing. Therefore, *vāda* should be employed (by the teachers) with unprejudiced disciples or with their unprejudiced class-mates.

Jalpa and *vitaṇḍa,* however, are sometimes used even by an umprejudiced person in order to protect the knowledge of truth in the heart of a simple-minded man by consoling that simple-minded man who is frightened by the huge false blames framed by the bad logicians. This we will discuss later.

Hetvābhāsās (wrong probans) are useful to the Inference by helping differentiate the real Inference (from the wrong inference). Because once the nature of unreal probans is known, the real probans which are other than the real ones are easily known.

Well, we find a reverse case here because when real probans is known, the unreal probans which are other the real ones can be established. True, it is so. Still in order to use the probans one should know both such as real probans are to

be employed and unreal ones are to be rejected. That the unreal probans which are already counted in the *nigrahasthānas* are again being stated separately is with this idea that they will be utilised in *Vāda.*

Chala, jāti, and *nigrahasthāna* help *jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā.* It is possible to avoid the use of those (*chala* etc.) whose nature is known in one's own sentence, sometimes to use them there and to reply to those (chala) used by others etc. (by *chala* etc.).

Therefore, those also are to be known since they are the parts of *jalpa* and *vitaṇda* and this is why they are stated separately.

Otherwise (i.e. if *chala, jāti,* and *nigrahasthānas* are not taught separately) can those who are expert in puffing up *vitaṇḍā* and who are made talkative by mere a bit of the part of wrongly learnt bad logic be won over?

So that people who are the blind followers should not go to the wrong way being cheated by them, the kind-hearted sage Gautama has taught *chala* etc.

Therefore, the *padārthas* such as *sāṁśaya* (doubt) etc. should be taught as such for the knowledge of the authority of the Veda which is to be determined or established by Inference which is based on them (*saṁśaya* etc.)

Therefore, this *ānvīkṣikī vidyā* (the science of logic) which gives all the desirable results through (establishing) the authority of the Veda, is counted as one of the *vidyāsthānas.*

The *Bhāṣyakāra* has also said :

A *vidyā* discussed is like a lamp with reference to all the *śāstras,* the means for all actions (i.e. purpose), and the base for all sacrifice etc.

Thus, the sage Gautama showed this path of (obtaining) salvation by stating the sixteen *padārthas*. Even though there are some other *padārthas* they are not stated here because they are not useful for (ensuing) the path of salvation.

There are three functions of this *śāstra* such as *uddeśa*, *lakṣaṇa* and *parīkṣā*. Enumerating the *padārthas* by name is called *uddeśa*. The delimiting property (*dharma*) which settles the *tattva* (the nature of a *padārtha*) of the already stated *padārthas* is known as *lakṣaṇa*. The discussion or the test such as whether the *lakṣaṇa* (definition) is befitting with the defined (i.e. the *padārthas*) or not is called *parīkṣā* (test).

Well, there is also a fourth function (of a *śāstra*) such as *vibhāga* (division) because it is mentioned as such in the different *padārthas* such as *pramāṇa*, *siddhānta*, *chala* etc. True, but this *vibhāga* is automatically established in the different *padārthas* mentioned in the first *sūtra*. Since the nature of *uddeśa* is not removed *uddeśa* itself is that (*vibhāga*) because stating by general term (i.e. by *pramāṇa*, *prameya* etc.) is *uddeśa* and stating by specific term (such as *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, etc.) is *vibhāga*. Moreover, the *Bhāṣyakāra* also uses it (difference) as *uddeśa* only. Thus, in the *ākṣepabhāṣya* he says *ayathārthaḥ pramāṇoddeśaḥ* (the division of *pramāṇas* is not proper and in the *samādhānabhāṣya* he says *tasmād yathārtha eva pramāṇoddeśaḥ* (Therefore, proper is the division of *pramāṇa*). Therefore, only three are the functions (of the *śāstra*).

There enumeration of subject-matter must be done first because there cannot be any *lakṣana* (definition) for a thing or *parīkṣā* (Test) of that definition which is not stated (by name).

There is sequence even in the case of general and particular definitions, because unless there is a general definition there is no scope for a particular definition. *Parīkṣā*, however, comes after the definition is established and

therefore, it is known after stating the nature of that (definition).

There is no sequence, however, for *vibhāga* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa.* First a general definition may be stated and after that *vibhāga* or first *vibhāga* and then the general definition. Thus, here the *uddeśa* is explained.

We will explain here (in Nyāyamañjari) the definition-*sūtras* only. The matter dealt with by the *parīkṣāsūtras*[1] will be shown as far as possible at the time of describing the definitions and their *utility.* (Therefore,) no effort will be taken to explain separately the *parīkṣāsūtras.* After the first *sūtra,* the second *sūtra* such as *duḥkhajanma* etc. is not explained here in this work because it is of no help for defining (*pramāṇa* etc.). Since it forms the part of *apavargaparīkṣā* (critical discussion about the nature of salvation), it will be determined (= discussed) in that connection.

The definition of (*pramāṇa*) (= means of valid knowledge)

Since it is is order, the *sūtra* which deals with the general definition of *pramāṇa* and its discussion is being explained now.

Perception, Inference Analogy and Words are the *pramāṇas* i.e. the means of valid knowledge.

Here, let us discuss the following questions: What is a means of valid knowledge? What is its nature? What is its definition? And then will follow explanation of the *sūtra.* The questions raised above can be answered as follows :

A *pramāṇa* is an assemblage of factors which are of the

1. *Parīkṣā-sūtras* are those *sūtras* which examine whether a given definition is a correct definition.

nature of both knowledge[1] and non-knowledge[2] which produce infalliable or non-illusive and undoubtful knowledge of things. "An assemblage which is of the nature of knowledge and non-knowledge, is the nature of *pramāṇa.* Being the means of infalliable and undoubtful knowledge of things is its definition.

Well, the word *pramāṇa* is derived as 'that by which something is known.' Thus it has an instrumental derivative structure underlying. The instrumenal case is, again, defined as *sādhakatama* (i.e., that which is the most required in producing the result) and the suffix *tama* means 'most,' 'excellence.' This 'excellence' is, again, relative.

If there are other cases (*kārakas*) in addition to this then alone it can be taken as 'the most helpful' since in that case it can have 'excellence' in comparison to those other cases. But as 'assemblage' is singular in number and as no other productive factor i.e. additional *kāraka* is found, in comparison to what its excellence is to be established? Moreover, with respect to what object 'assemblage is to be taken as a means? That which is to be known itself becomes

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1. For example, the epistemological process of the perceptual knowledge will be as follows :
   (soul + mind+eyes + the pot + light)
   (indeterminate knowledge of pot)
   (determinate knowledge of pot)
   Thus, one of the factors which produce the perceptual knowledge is of the nature of knowledge namely, the indeterminate knowledge of an object.
   Similarly, the factors generating the inferential cognition consist of knowledge also, namely the *vyāptijñāna, parāmarśa,* etc.
   Likewise, *Upamiti* also requires *sādṛśyajñāna* as its generating factor which is of the nature of knowledge.
   In the same manner, verbal knowledge also requires the knowledge of word, rememberance of the meaning.
   Also cf. *Nyāyamañjarigranthibhaṅga Viśeṣaṇajñānāder bodhasvabhāvasya tatra anupraveśāt bodhābodhasvabhāva ity uktam.*
2. Eyes etc. in the case of perception and object etc. in the case of Inferential, Analogical and verbal cognitions are of the nature of non-knowledge.

'assemblage' because it is also included in the 'assemblage.' Thus, object becomes an instrument. In that case every knowledge will be turned objectless, because the object is included in the *pramāṇa* itself like eye etc. Who cognizes the object through assemblage? Even the knower is included in that (assemblage). Thus, the statement that "the nature of things is included in the four kinds such as the knower, object (which is to be cognized) and cognition" is hereby contradicted. Nor the people approve the instrumentality of 'assemblage,' without the instrumental case-ending added to it. Nor we meet ordinary people saying we see with 'assemblage,' on the contrary they say 'we see with a lamp,' 'we see with eyes.' Therefore, 'assemblage' is not the instrument and since it is not the instrument it cannot be the means of a valid knowledge and thus it is not the actual nature of the means of valid knowledge.

We meet the above objections as follows :

Becasue of the very fact that an instrumental case is defined as 'the most helpful case in producing the result' and because of the fact that the word *pramāṇa* is of instrumental derivation, it is but proper to take 'assemblage' alone as the means of valid knowledge. In no other case excepting that (= assemblage) there is any possibility of fitting in of the meaning of the suffix *tamap*. Moreover, when this is the situation that if all the cases are present the result occurs, but the result does not occur even if only one of them is removed to which excellence' can be given? The 'excellence' cannot be given to one when all are equally engaged in producing the result.

Now, if one argues that being directly conected (with the object) is the 'excellence,' he is mistaken; because those which help the bringing out of the result remaining indirectly connected with the object do remain cases (*kāraka*). Moreover, in generating knowledge, being away from the result which can be a productive factor without being

connected (i.e. not being closely connected) because knowledge is produced at the mutual contact of all, the sense-organ, the mind, the object etc.

Now, if producing the result all at once is taken as 'the excellence,' this can be sometimes attributed like Instrumental to objective also. Thus, the sudden flash of the lightning in the night of *amāvāsyā* having huge darkness due to the layers of series of dense clouds produces the knowledge of a beautiful woman (i.e. makes her visible) and thereby gets 'the excellence' in producing such a knowledge; but to see her is not possible if the woman is not there even though all other *kārakas* are present there. If she comes then alone seeing (her) is possible. In this way the object (= the woman) will become the instrumental since it possesses 'the excellence.' Therefore, excellence is that which invariably produces the result and which is of the nature of that without which the result cannot be produced. One of the *kārakas* constituting the assemblage cannot be said to have that excellence. But this excellence can be easily attributed to 'the assemblage.' In other words, if the asemblage is present the result is as good as accomplished. Therefore, that (assemblage) alone has the excellence.

Now, the main knower and knowable too have the excellence of being that without which the result (*pramiti*) cannot be produced because without the relation of *pramiti* they (knower and knowable) cannot be called the knower and the knowable. This is why we explain 'one who knows is a knower' and 'that which is to be known is the knowable.' It is true. But the knower and the knowable get prominence when they are related to *pramiti* got through assemblage, and if the assemblage is not there there is no *pramiti* and therefore, the knower and the knowable become secondary.

Thus, since without assemblage there is neither cognition nor excellence assemblage alone is the instrument.

To the objection that with reference to what 'assemblage'

is an instrument-our answer would be-with reference to all *kāraka* cases included in the assemblage. Assemblage is a property of cases. It never destroys their (= of the cases) casehood because even at the time of assemblage we recognise their nature (of being a *kāraka*).

Well, if this assemblage is different from all the cases how is it that it is not cognised separately? And if it is identical with the cases, there is then the contingency of putting an end to the usage of nominative, accusative etc. because, in that case, all the cases would become Instrumental case only.

What you have said is not true because the property such as closeness of all the participating cases (i.e. the assemblage) is directly cognised. If the cooking pot, water, fuel, rice etc. are kept in different places hardly one can have the knowledge of assemblage, but one can certainly have that when they (i.e. pot, water, etc.) are assembled together. Therefore, although the assemblage does not produce any other result than the result produced by the group of cases as the threads produce a cloth, still there is certainly the assemblage which is of the nature of collection or group, or totality. Hence it (= assemblage) has the instrumentality in comparison to the cases. Therefore, there is no point in asking with reference to what (*prameya*) assemblage is the instrument. Since the cases involved do not lose their forms even at the time of assemblage, the assemblage is the instrument with reference to a particular object which is one amongst the cases. Therefore, the *pramiti* (valid knowledge) is not without an object. By this the knower also is shown separately. Thus all the four categories are hereby established.

To the objection that none uses instrumental case-ending with *sāmagrī* (assemblage), the following is the answer :

The word *sāmagrī* means collection or assemblage. That (assemblage) never becomes the object of usage without those cases which are being assembled. Therefore, no such

usage such as *sāmagryā paśyāmi* (I see with the assemblage) is found. But that we find instrumental case-ending added to *dīpa* (lamp), sense-organ (eye etc.) is due to the imposition of the nature of the assemblage namely the nature of being invariably productive of the result. Similarly, in other cases (i.e. in the case of Locative) by the imposition of its nature to the assemblage) we get the usage *sthālyā pacati* (he cooks by the pot). Therefore, in comparison to the participating cases the assemblage becomes the Instrument and it is the means of valid knowledge.

Others take objection to the above statement. They say 'assemblage means all the cases together. Dual nature - of those cases is not proper. When they are separate they remain as Accusative etc. Again when they are brought together they become Instruments. What sort of rule is this! Therefore, a case producing *invariable* knowledge of objects is the Instrument and that is conveyed by the Instrumental case-ending such as *dīpena paśyāmi* (I see by the lamp), *cakṣuṣā. nirīkṣe* (I see by the eyes), *liṅgena buddhye* (I understand by the inferencial mark), *śabdena jānāmi* (I know by the words) and *manasā niścinomi* (I determine by the mind)!

Now, only three cases are possible in the above mentioned view. Of course, in the case of knowing what you have said is quite all right. But in the case of cooking etc. if the substratum of action (i.e. rice), and the other helping factors are taken into account one will have to point other cases also such as Locative etc.

By taking in to account the specific helps such as bearing (rice) which is the substratum of the act (of cooking).

In the case of knowing, however, no difference of either mind or lamp or eyes is realised and therefore all of them (together) are accepted as the Instrument. If you ask what is the meaning of the suffix - *tamap* in them (i.e. what is the nature of the excellence in them), we say definitely there is some (excellence). The very fact that even forgetfully

people never use instrumental for nominative and accusative and thus they never produce sentences like *aham mayā jānami* (I know by me), *ghaṭena ghaṭaṁ jānāmi* (I know the pot by the pot), and the very fact that they use eye, mind, lamp, words, probans etc. in instrumental show that they find difference between eyes etc. (as the one side) and the nominative as well as the accusative (on the other). This very difference is their excellence.

Thus, the means of valid knowledge, the knower, the knowable, the knowledge all these four are the necessary factors of worldly activities. Therefore, what we have said that assemblage which consists of knowledge or non-knowledge (such as eye, light, etc.), which produces the undoubtful and correct knowledge of things and which is different from the agent and the object is the means of valid knowledge is hereby established.

Those who take knowledge itself as the means of valid knowledge do not have critical mind or out-look. Knowledge, in fact, is the result of the means of valid knowledge and not the means itself. The word *pramāṇa* means instrument since it is derived as *pramīyate aneṅa iti* 'by which something is known'. *Pramīyate,* again, means 'knowledge is produced.' Moreover, people do use such sentences as *pramāṇād avagacchāmaḥ* 'we know by the means of valid knowledge.' Thus they too accept Instrument only as *pramāṇa.* When, however, the word *pramā* (knowledge) is paraphrased as *pramāṇa,* it (= the word *pramāṇa*) means 'the result of *pramāṇa* (= the means of valid knowledge).' Moreover, the knowledge which is the result of defective means and which is of the nature of doubt or misapprehension does become the means of valid knowledge with reference to infering the soul and the mind or with reference to determining the qualification of soul because it produces the knowledge of the qualified object. On the other hand, if a knowledge, which is, although an *invariable* etc. (i.e. undoubtful). Knowledge, does not produce any result, it

never becomes a means (of valid knowledge). That result is different from means and it is of the nature of valid knowledge alone will be explained when we will discuss the definition of perception.

Even if it is accepted that a means must produce a result which should be different from the means, still *pramāṇa* remains 'of the nature of knowledge' only.

This is incorrect. If this nature (i.e. the nature of knowledge alone) of *prāmāṇa* is accepted, there would arise a contingency of rejecting the (Instrumentality of) words, probans, lamp, sense-organs etc. which are of the nature of non-knowledge and which are known as Instruments by the whole world. Similarly, a knowledge when included in the assemblage does become a *pramāṇa* as the knowledge of adjunct in the case of the perception of some possessed of that adjunct, as the knowledge of probans in the case of infering the probandum, as the observing (knowledge) of similarity in the case of analogy, as the hearing (knowledge) of words in the case of knowing the meaning of those words. That is why, we have said that *pramāṇa* is the assemblage which consists of knowledge and non-knowledge.

Some others, again, accept that knowledge and object which depend upon the same assemblage, (means) are mutually related as *grāhya* (which is to be known, the object) and *grāhaka* (which is the means of knowledge) and therefore, knowledge itself is the means (of valid knowledge). (They further elaborate this as follows).

Objects are momentary. They help the activities of this world by producing a chain of momentary (objects and knowledge) depending on material cause as well as the auxiliary cause. When knowledge is produced, knowledge is the material cause and the object is the auxiliary cause; when object is produced (in the next moment) object is the material cause, knowledge is the auxiliary one. Knowledge,

again, is produced by both knowledge as well as object. Similarly, object is produced by both object as well as knowledge. Therefore, knowledge alone is *pramāṇa* there because it is always with the object since it depends on the same assemblage (i.e. means such as knowledge and object).

What you say is uncogent, because (if your view that knowledge alone is the means is accepted then) there will arise a contingency of taking even that knowledge as *pramāṇa* which does not produce any result. Moreover, with reference to an object you want to take (mere) knowledge is the means, as you, yourself, have said in the *Pramāṇavārtika* that knowledge (which is of the form of reflection of an object) by intermediate course (i.e. by invariably revealing the objects) appears to be as if it has function with reference to its own object. Therefore, as this (second) momentary object which is the first knowledge is produced by the immediately preceding momentary knowledge and object, but it (the second *arthakṣaṇa*) be the object of the first momentary knowledge and not (of that which has come into existence simultaneously with it).

Well, where does the question of its (= of the second momentary object) objectness come when it is invariably associated with the knowledge by their being simultaneously produced and by their being produced, by the same causes?

Funny indeed is your view! Then you should tell me what is the cause of the rule regarding the revealable and the revealer of two things having the same causes for their production and which have come into existence simultaneously.

(No; that is not our concept of *grāhya* and *grāhaka*. According to us) knowledge is of the nature of illumination and therefore, it is *grāhaka* whereas object is of the form of inanimate things and therefore, it is *grāhya*.

(If you say so then I ask) where from do they (knowledge

and object) get their distinctness (i.e. one is *prakāśasvabhāva* and the other is *jaḍasvabhāva*) when both have the same causes?

(If you argue that) since there is a difference in the material cause and the accessory cause (in the production of knowledge and object i.e. in the production of knowledge, knowledge is material cause and object is accessory cause and in the production of object, object is the material cause and knowledge is the accessory cause) there is distinction in the knowledge and the object. That will be refuted in the *Kṣaṇabhaṅgabhaṅga* (the doctrine of momentariness of things) section.

Those (Yogācāras) who took knowledge of the form of the object to be the *pramāṇa* (means of valid knowledge) think that the invariable association between knowledge and the object is feasible only when the knowledge (i.e. the *pramāṇa*) has in it a reflexion of that (object). Because, if the nature of knowledge is taken as having no particular form then-since it (*nirākārajñāna*) is common to all sorts of knowledge such as that of a blue thing or of a yellow thing etc. and since productive nature is also there in eyes etc.-there is the contingency of its over-application.[1]

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1. That is to say, there would be no way to tell that knoweldge would reveal particular objects distinctly, since there is no *jñānakarmaniyama* possible. Both this *niyama* is possible if *sākāra jñāna* is taken as *pramāṇa*, because it can reveal the object the form of which it has in it.
   And as such there would be the contingency of revealing all objects at a time because knowledge is without any form of any object. To this the Naiyāyikas reply that object produces the knowledge of it and therefore the knowledge would reveal only that object and as such *jñānakarmaniyama* remains intact. Over this the Buddhists say : according to Naiyāyikas eye etc. are also *janakas* and therefore they should also be revealed by their *nirākāra* knowledge. Therefore, over-application.

They (Yogācāras) being desirous of establishing the knowledge having only one form[1] speak in the above manner. They too will be refuted when we will be refuting their *Vijñānādvaita* - theory. It will also be shown later that knowledge of form of the object cannot be both *grāhya* (object) as well as *grāhaka* (means). Moreover, for these Buddhists who are the propagators of knowledge having a particular form of object as the means) the object itself does not probabily *exist.* If it is positive it should be either inferred or perceived?

(We say) it cannot be inferred because there is no invariable concomitance between the object which is outside and the *sākāra*- knowledge which is inside the mind.

(We ask) :

Where did the Buddhists for whom the wordly objects are always inferrable and never perceivable) see or realise the knowledge of invariable concomitance such as if there is an object there is the knowledge of the form of that object and if that object is removed the knowledge has no form?

Nor, the objects can be perceived according to their theory because no body realises two forms at a time (one of the *sākāra* knowledge which is the means and the other of the object). If it (i.e. realisation of two forms of knowledge) is accepted there would arise the contingency of the fallacy known as *anavasthā*. Thus, since the form of an object cannot be realised by the knowledge (the means) which has no form or reflection of that object), it (the object) is realised by the knowledge having the form or reflected of that object. Now, that form of knowledge (of that object) also becomes an object of some other knowledge and as such it is to be realised by some other knowledge having the form of reflection of that earlier knowledge. This knowledge of the earlier

1. According to Yogācāras neither there are objects outside nor there are different forms of knowledge inside the mind. Knowledge has only one form. This knowledge they call *ālayavijñāna*.

knowledge also requires some other knowledge having a particular form for its realisation and so on and so forth. Thus, the *anavasthā.*

(The *anavasthā* can be shown in another way also). As an object cannot be realised by a knowledge having no form, it (the object) offers itself to the knowledge which will reveal it and thereby becomes one with knowledge. (In that case there is no object left outside.) Therefore, another object is to be postulated or inferred. That too, being an object, becomes one with the means (knowledge) in order to make it (knowledge) *sākāra.* Therefore, what remains even at this step is simply a knowledge having a particular form. It again requires an object and therefore another object is to be inferred and so on and so forth. Thus the *anāvasthā.*

[In answer to your objections such as-if knowledge is *nirākāra* (i.e. having no form of an object) the rule that at-a-time only one object (such as *nīla* etc.) would be revealed cannot be formed-we have said that] the rule can be formed because according to our theory the object is a *janaka* (producer) of its knowledge and therefore, the knowledge will reveal only that object which is the object of that knowledge.

[On this you argued that as object is a *janaka,* eyes etc. are also *janakas* and therefore, they (eyes etc.) should also be revealed by the knowledge.] To this we say it is the nature of the knowledge which reveals only the object and not the *karaṇa* (i.e. eyes etc.).

We can as well ask you on this point that even in your case of *sākāra* knowledge how is it that the knowledge gets the form of the object and not of the eyes etc. which are auxiliary means according to you? Therefore, your objection and your own position both are similar. All this will be discussed in detail later.

As in your theory of *sākāra*-knowledge a *pramāṇa* is not different from the result, it is a bad theory.

The followers of Bhāṭṭa-school say that those propagators of (*sākāra-*) knowledge (i.e. the Buddhists) who take knowledge to be both *pramāṇa* (means) as well as the *phala* (result) are worthy of being refuted. We (the Mimāṁsākas) accept the result called *arthadṛṣṭatā* (perceptibility of objects) which is different from the knowledge. Knowledge is inferred by that (*dṛṣṭatā*). *Jñāna* is, however, of the nature of action. Action, (i.e. *dhātvartha*), again, is inferred by the result because no result can occur without the action of the doer. The contact of the *kārakas* results into action (*vyāpāra*) only. Otherwise if action is not there in the *kārakas* with reference to what should the *kārakas* come in contact? Moreover, unless the *kārakas* come in contact with each other they cannot produce any result. *kāraka* can be designated as *kāraka* only when it is connected with the action. Otherwise, (i.e. if it is not connected with the action), a thing will remain only with its form and it cannot be called a *kāraka*. And it will result in stopping the activities of the people because one who wants a particular result will actually not go for a thing which is not going to produce any result. Thus, the *kārakas* such as rice, water, fire, pot etc. the forms of which are already established come in contact with each other with reference to the *sādhya* i.e. cooking only which is the meaning of the root (*pac*) and once they come in contact they produce the action (*vyāpāra*). Similarly, when the soul, sense-organs, mind, and the object come in contact the action called *jñāna* (knowledge) is produced. That (*vyāpāra*), of course, is not perceived, because it reveals the outside object only and there is absence of realisation of two forms (of the objects).

Although that (*jñānarūpa vyāpāra*) is not revealed by any other knowledge still it is a *pramāṇa* as the eyes are not revealed by any (knowledge) still they are *pramāṇa*. That (*vyapāra*) is inferred by the probans such as the result which is

of the form of *viṣayaprakāṣatā.* Therefore, the *Bhāṣyakāra* has said :

Nobody gets the knowledge of an unknown object, but if the object is already known one does get the knowledge of it by *arthāpatti.* The author of the *Ślokavārttika* also says :

Otherwise i.e. if *jñānarūpa-vyāpāra* is not there (in the *ātman*), perceptibility of an object is not possible; from this the *arthāpatti pramāṇa* (means) is postulated. after seeing the object.[1]

Therefore, this action of the knower which is inferred by the result and which is termed as *jñāna* etc., is the means of valid knowledge. The sense-organs produce that knowledge (i.e. *jñānarūpa vyāpara*) and therefore, they are also treated as *jñāna.* In fact, they are not directly treated as so (i.e. they are not the direct means of perception, only indirectly they are the means of perception).

Here are the answers. Alas, being afraid of whom these *śrotriyas* (i.e. the Mīmāṁsakas) have been so much confused? As a matter of fact, non-eternal knowledge cannot be *parokṣa* (= beyond perception). When we say 'the object is known' it is always seen that the object is along with its knowledge and unless there is the cognition of (The object is realised alongwith) its adjunct *viśiṣṭa-jñāna* cannot be had, as in the case of the knowledge of a 'white cloth' (where unless the white colour is known, the knowledge of white cloth is impossible).

What a fear! (i.e. the Mīmāṁsakas need not have been afraid of the Buddhists) because they could have easily refuted those Buddhists for whom there is no object by saying that at the time of the knowing of an object there is no knowledge of *vijñāna* (i.e. *jñānarūpa-vyāpāra* in the ātman because

1. That is to say at the time of seeing an object there is no knowledge of *jñānarūpa vyāpāra* in *ātman.*

according to the Mīmāṁsākas this *vyāpāra* is inferred after the seeing of the object and therefore they could have said that *pramāṇa* and *phala* are different).

The view that *jñāna (rūpavyāpāra)* is of the nature of action and therefore, it is beyond perception is wrong. Because knowledge is not of the nature of action; rather, it is of the nature of the result. Moreover, (granting that knowledge is of the nature of action), if the action residing in a substance (i.e. *ātman*) which can be perceived it (= action) can also be perceived. And according to the followers of Bhāṭṭa - school the soul is perceived. Therefore, what harm did it (= the soul) do to you that you are calling its action as *apratyakṣa?*

You cannot, as well, say that there is in the outside *kārakas* (i.e. objects) some imperceptible action other than the *vyāpāra* such as *parispanda* (movement) which is again different from the five kinds of action such as *utkṣepaṇa* (upward movement) etc. If that (action) is there, it should be either eternal like *jāti* (= generic or class attribute) or non-eternal like colour which is a property of an object. Now, if it is accepted as eternal there is the contingency that objects will always produce results since they are always associated with action. Or if it is accepted that action is produced by the *kārakas,* that action being an effect should be produced by other *kārakas* having *vyāpāra* and thus the *anavasthā* (endless regression). If you argue that the *kārakas* without any vyāpāra in them produce action, then, as the *niṣkriya kārakas* can produce the action, they can as well produce the result and hence what is the need for postulating action between the *kārakas* and the result?

Well, the word *kāraka* is derived as *karotīti* (that which does or produces) - because a *kāraka* cannot be called a *kāraka* unless it is associated with action. [Therefore, we cannot get rid of *kriyā*. *kriyā* is necessary].

The derivation of *kāraka* as *karotīti kārakam* (as pointed out by you) is correct.

But that (*kāraka*) produces only the result and not the action.

Well, when you say *karoti* (produces) that action (*vyāpāra*) is automatically expressed. For example, in the expression *Caitraḥ kaṭaṁ karoti* (Caitra produces the mat) as the agent expressed by the word *caitra* and the object (mat) expressed by the word *kaṭa* cannot be denied or rejected similarly the meaning of the root *kṛñ* (i.e. vyāpāra) cannot be denied because in association with that alone *Caitra* etc. can be designated as *kāraka.* To this view following is the answer :

The state of being a *kāraka* is not caused by the association with the action which is beyond the reach of the sense-organs because action being *atindrīya,* the nature of *kāraka* produced by the association with that action (*atindriya vyāpāra*) cannot be known and as such there will arise the contingency of stopping of the wordly activities; because without knowing that nature of a *kāraka* caused by the association of (*atīndriya)* action how will people desirous of result go to collect that (*kāraka*)?

According to my view, however, the nature of a *kāraka* is not something which is *atīndriya.*

The state of being a *kāraka* means the association of something as it is with the other factors helping the production of result.

Determining (i.e. knowing) only that much those who are desirous of result go to collect that (*Kāraka*) and those who collect that obtain the result also.

(The Mīmāṁsakas ask what is the use of an actionless thing being associated with its helping factors? (The Naiyāyikas also ask) what is the use of a thing with action being associated with its helping factors?[1]

1. That is, when a *kāraka* has already action in it, it will directly produce the result without the help of any other helping factor.

Therefore, (we, the Mīmāṁsakas, say) it is the action alone which is produced by all *kārakas* put together.

Then (we, the Naiyāyikas also say) what harm did the result do to you? Let that be produced directly by them put together.

To your statment that 'one cannot deny the meaning of the root *kṛñ* (i.e. *vyāpāra*) we reply that the meaning of the root *kṛñ* is nothing but the movement which is of the nature of action perceived in worldly objects. As a matter of fact we never deny the action which is seen and which is of the nature of movement because we perceive in each *kāraka* the various action such as burning etc. But what we say is there is no action which is beyond the reach of the sense-organs.

Well, what you have said-that *pāka* (cooking) is the meaning of the root *pac* (i.e. the *atindriya vyāpāra*) and that must be accepted as different from the visible actions such as burning etc. because without that the result cannot be produced and if it is not there with reference to what should the *kārakas* be associated with each other-is wrong. You consider the meaning of the root i.e. the *atīndriya vyāpāra* as *sādhya.* (We ask you) is that produced by all the *kārakas* put together or by each *kāraka* independently?

If the first view is accepted then each *kāraka* separately will become actionless and when each *kāraka* becomes actionless how can they produce action in a group?

If the second view is adopted then there will arise the contingency of the production of result by each *kāraka* independently because each one will be associated with the action of cooking and thereby it will not depend on any other *kāraka* for the production of the result. Moreover, the *kārakas* do not unite with each other aiming at the meaning of the root (i.e. the action) of that type (i.e. the *atīndriya* action).

Only two courses are possible for the propagators of the theory that the *kārakas* unite with each other aiming at the (*atīndriya*) action; (1) the *kārakas* already possessed of the action unite with each other or (2) after their being united they produce the action.

If it is accepted that they (*kārakas*) possess action even before being united then what is the use of their being united? Thus, the *kārakas* even separately will produce the result.

If, on the other hand, it is accepted that the action will be produced after the union of the *kārakas*, then, again, arises the contingency of each *kāraka* being action-less. Thus, the pieces of wood will not burn unless they come in contact with the cooking vessel.

(To this the Mīmāṁsakas reply): Elsewhere when you fixed the pieces of wood burning there) the pieces of wood simply burn but do not cook. (To this the Naiyāyikas reply) what you say is incorrect because even in contact with the cooking vessel the pieces of wood burn only and they are not found doing something else. Therefore, since there is nothing *atīndriya*-action the *kārakas* unite aiming at the result (and not at the *atīndriya*-action).

(Then the Mīmaṁsakas ask) well, if you say that the *phala* (the action of cooking) also is established, then what sort of union of all those *kārakas* the nature of which is already established can be there? (As a matter of fact, according to you) the action of cooking is established, the forms or the natures of the *kārakas* are also established and therefore, there will be no union of the *kārakas* (i.e. there is no necessity of the union).

Naiyāyikas then say *phala* is not already established for us, rather it is to be established. (Then the Mīmaṁsakas say) if *phala* (action) is *sādhya*, that (*phala* i.e. action) is action only which is different from the visible action. (Naiyāyikas reply)

you should not say so because *phala* (result) cannot be called *kriyā* (action). Here, cooked rice is the *phala* (result) and not the action. If, however, you want to term *phala* (result) as *kriyā,* then we do not quarrel (with you on this point).

(Mīmaṁsākas, then, ask) the Naiyāyikas : if the action of cooking is nothing but the individual actions of the individual participating *kārakas*) what is, then, *pāka(kriyā)*? It is not proper to deprive the root *pac* of its primary meaning.

Here is the answer : *Pāka* (cooking) is nothing but the movement (action) of all the *kārakas* such as *Devadatta* (the agent) etc. put together, producing (distinguished by) the particular result (such as *viklitti*) and that itself is the meaning of the root *pac.* Those very actions of the pieces of wood, cooking vessel etc. which are of the nature of burning, holding etc. appear only as that (i.e. as simply burning, holding etc.) when they are separately there; but when they are put together, they appear in a different form as *pāka* etc. being dstinguished by a particular result and they are designated as such. Thus, as we say *Devadattaḥ pacati* (Devadatta cooks) similarly we find the usages such as *kāṣṭhāni pacanti* (the fire-woods or pieces of wood cook), and *sthālī pacati* (the pot cooks). Even in the visible action of Devadatta also such as stirring by ladle etc. the physical action of Devadatta is preceded (i.e. caused) by the action of the soul (and therefore, you will have to accept *atīndirya vyāpāra* in Devadatta in addition to the visible *vyāpāra*). (To this the Naiyāyikas say) no, it is not like this. There is no action of the soul; in fact, that (soul) becomes the cause of the physical actions due to its (of the soul) having the quality such as the positive or negative volitional effort caused by desire or hatred respectively.

Therefore, the result is produced by the group of *kārakas* having action; and no action other than the visible one is found in them.

(When this is the situation that) the *kārakas* (put together) such as Devadatta (the agent) etc. have actions (in them); (the result such as) the cooked rice is achieved; only this much is seen here; and not any other action.

It should be noted that by this above-mentioned argument the view that the meaning of the root *kṛñ* (in the sentence *pākaṁ karoti*, which is a paraphrase of *pacati*) i.e. the volitional effort called *bhāvanā*, which is the action of the soul and is understood as the prominent meaning of a sentence is also set aside because there is no action in the soul. (Then the Mīmaṁsākas ask: how do you call the soul the agent? The Naiyāyikas reply) The soul's possessing a particular quality such as the volitional effort alone is its being the agent. Knowledge etc. being qualities cannot be termed as *vyāpāra* (action) because they are of established nature.

(The Mīmaṁsakas argue) well, a root expresses action; (the root *jñā* is also a root and therefore) the root *jñā* also should express action alone and that action is the action of a man which is of the nature of knowledge. (Naiyāyikas then reply) there is no such hard and fast rule that a root expresses action only because we come across in the *Dhātupāṭha* such statement as *gaḍi vadanaikadeśe* 'the root *gaḍ* is used in the sense of cheek' (which is certainly not an action). Moreover, what *śābdabodha* do you have from the sentence *ghaṭam ahaṁ jānāmi* (I know the pot)? *Ghaṭa* (pot) is after all the object, *aham* (I) is the soul but what is revealed by *jānāmi* (I know) here needs consideration. (Any way) action is not revealed by it because (according to you) the action (i.e. knowledge) is imperceptible (i.e. *atīndriya*).[1] But if you say that the result is revealed by *jānāmi* then that (result, i.e. the knowledge of pot) alone is known as the expressed meaning of the root *jñā*. Therefore, knowledge is not of the nature of

1. Here the *anumāna* is as follows:
jñānam na vyāpāraḥ, saṁskārādivat.

action. Had the knowledge been of the nature of action the *Bhāṣyākāra* Śabara would not have stated it (knowledge) separately from action. He states "then knowledge and action also are recognised same as before and they too would have to be treated as eternal." Therefore, knowledge is different, action is different and so the view that knowledge is always imperceptible because it is of the nature of action is not true. If action i.e. knowledge is taken as ever-imperceptible, then that cannot be even expressed because invariable concomitance cannot be known.[1]

(To this the Mīmāṁsakas may say; you are right. This is what we want: where the knowledge of invariable concomitance is possible the inference can operate but where that is not possible, *arthāpatti* alone can operate and by this *arthāpatti* we postulate action i.e. knowledge in the soul because without that knowledge the result (i.e. *dṛṣṭatā*) cannot be known. Naiyāyika's reply to this is as follows: It is not true) because the very theory that the outside *kārakas* have in them some (imperceptible) action is untenable (and therefore what you say cannot be accepted).

(Then the Mīmāṁsakas ask : if you say that knowledge cannot be inferred because the invariable concomitance between *dṛṣṭa* and knowledge cannot be known, then how do you infer the soul (because there too you cannot know the invariable concomitance since it cannot be proved that wherever there is the probans such as desire etc. there is the probandum suh as the substratum of desire etc. i.e. the soul because the soul is an all-pervasive substance. (To this the Naiyāyikas say : what you say is) not true because there (in the case of inferring the soul) it is possible to know the

1. For the knowledge of invariable concomitance it is necessary that both *hetū* and *sādhya* are at one place. Here, however, the *hetū* i.e. *dṛṣṭatā* and *sādhya* i.e. action in the form of knowledge are not at one place; *dṛṣṭatā* is in the object whereas knowledge is in the soul. Therefore,. the knowledge of invariable concomitance is impossible.

invariable concomitance (between the *hetū* and the *sādhya*) in a general way which will be stated later.[1]

In the present case, however, we have already said that even in the outside *kārakas* (such as the rice etc.) we do not find the result caused by imperceptible action.

It cannot be argued that *arthāpatti* also is required for the postulation of the action of the knower alone because the perceptibility (without which the perceptibility of an object cannot be produced) of an object can be produced due to the contact between the sense-organs and the object alone (and so there is no necessity of postulating imperceptible action in soul). And what do you mean by perceptibility of an object? Does it mean 'being the object of knowledge (action)' or being of the nature of illumination revealment'? There, when (according to you) knowledge is imperceptible, how can the object of that (knowledge) such as the perceptibility of an object be known?; because unless the qualification (here, the knowledge) is known the qualified i.e. the perceptibility (with the same qualification) cannot be produced.[2]

If, on the other hand, perceptibility means 'being of the nature of illumination,' since it is unspecific i.e. common to all, all will know all things.

(Mīmāṁsakas) : No. All will not know all things because perceptibility is produced in an object by the knowledge of

1. The inference is as follows :
icchādayaḥ sādhārāḥ, kāryatvāt, ghaṭavat. What is inferred here is substratum of desire etc. in general and that substratum is equated with the soul by the process of elimination out of the nine substances, such as the earth etc.
2. This is what is intended by *Jayantabhaṭṭa* :
If the knowledge is perceptible its effect is also perceptible and if it is imperceptible its effect is also imperceptible. According to the Mīmaṁsākas, however, the soul is perceptible but the knowledge which is of the nature of action is imperceptible. Hence, the attack by the Naiyāyikas.

that person whose sense-organs come in contact with that object. If we argue this way, then?

(Naiyāyikas) : It is not the cause at all, because the object alone has illuminationness as its excellence (distinctive feature) like that of lamp etc. and there is no rule or settlement that an object like lamp etc. is seen only by that person by whose knowledge, the perceptibility is produced in that object. (Mīmaṁsākas : what about the rule in the case of knowing number two etc.?)

(Naiyāyikas) : Nor can it be compared with the case of knowing number two etc. because there we do find the rule that one in whose enumerative knowledge number two is produced he alone can have the knowledge of that number. In the case of object such as light like lamp etc., however, there is no such rule of specific relation between the object and the knower at all.

(Some learned Mīmaṁsakas hold the view that *saṁvedana* (illumination) is the result and knowledge is the action with reference to that result. To them we ask: the *saṁvedana* also is said to be whose excellence by those learned Mīmaṁsakas? If they say it is of the knower, then what is the purpose of its being associated with another action (knowledge)?

(Mīmaṁsakas) : Well, a *kāraka* devoid of action cannot produce a result.

(Naiyāyikas) : We have already replied to this point.

(Mīmaṁsakas) : But it (knowledge) is action.

(Naiyāyikas) : Then, take it as action according to your system (we have no objection). We, however, understand the word *jñāna* and *saṁvedana* as synonymous; we do not take *saṁvedana* (illumination) as the product of knowledge.

If, on the other hand, it is held that *saṁvedana* is in the object then, again, there will be the contingency of all

persons' knowing all things. And there will remain no difference between this view and that of the Bhāṭṭas.

Nor, can you say that such excellence (*saṁvedana*) is in both (such as in the soul as well as in the object) because in that case both the faults (stated above) will be there.

Moreover, by which (*pramāṇa*) that *saṁvedana* which is the cause with reference to the inference of knowledge (the action) is to be known? If you say that it is known by some other *saṁvedana* then there will arise the endless regression.[1] The theory that *saṁvitti* is self-illuminable will be reputed later.

According to the doctrine that in the knowledge from the expression *idam rajatam* (this is silver) after seeing a conch-shell the remembrance (of silver) is wiped out, how can your result i.e. the *saṁvedana* which is of the nature of remembrance of the silver can be self-illuminable? It is neither reverted as remembrance nor as experience and there can be no third variety of it and so how can that be self-illuminable? And *saṁvitti* (knowledge) is never realised as having no form.

(Mīmāṁsakas) : It is not so *samvitti* is not without any form. The form of an object itself is the form of *saṁvedana*)

(Naiyāyikas) : If so, then the object and the *samvitti* become one and the same. But we realise them differently) this is the *saṁvit* (knowledge) and this is the object and so one does not experience both as the same.

(Mīmāṁsakas) : What we intended is the *saṁvit* reveals itself in association with the form of an object).

(Naiyāyikas) : If you say that *saṁvit* reveals itself when it is associated with the form of an object then like the Buddhists

1. *Saṁvedana* is the result by which the action i.e. the knowledge is to be postulated (by *Arthāpatti*). If this *saṁvedana* is known by other *saṁvedana* which is also a result.

you too deny outside objects. Moreover, it is not proper, according to the doctrine that knowledge is self-illuminable to treat the result as *saṁvit* produced by the action (knowledge) (because it is not so). Therefore, there is no authority for action (knowledge) which is postulated on the basis of the result (*saṁvit*).

While defining *pramāṇa* (means of valid knowledge) some other qualify it with 'by which unknown meaning is known.' That too is not correct because there is no speciality for a *pramāṇa* which operates in the case of known as well as unknown objects in its being a *pramāṇa*.

(Mīmāṁsakas) : Well, what will the *pramāṇa* do when employed to (know) an already known object?

(Naiyāyikas) : What will it do when employed to (know) an unknown object even?

If you say it will produce real knowledge, let the same be produced in the case of known object also.

Once the real knowledge of an object is produced by a *pramāṇa*, there is no propriety in saying that it will produce the real knowledge. If this is the objection, our answer will be: There is no such impropriety because the *pramāṇa* will produce another real knowledge. If you ask what is the purpose of producing another real knowledge, our reply will be: producing another knowledge itself is the purpose. You should not ask the purpose of the result? Moreover, a *pramāṇa* need not follow a purpose.

Your question is towards what? It cannot be toward the *pramāṇa*, because it is inanimate. Naturally, it is with reference to a man. Even that question cannot be justified because it is seen that when an object and the means come in contact with each other knowledge is produced.

(Why don't you ask a man:) why don't you remain closing your eyes? Why do you perceive an already perceived object?

We do not find any annulment of the earlier knowledge of an object by the later knowledge of the same object so that we can prove that the means of the later knowledge is not the means of valid knowledge.

The knowledge of the already known object is also not purposeless at all because when one sees again and again, the objects to be given up such as thorns, wolf, crocodile, poisonous creatures (serpent etc.) he tries to immediately avoid them out of mental agony. Similarly, when he sees the things to be aquired such as sandalwood, fragrant, camphor, garland or necklace, woman etc. he evidently feels great pleasure.

Moreover, what is stated in the *Ślokavārttika* 1.1.2 *Śloka* 74 that 'where the knowledge (of an object) is produced, again, by the *pramāṇas* (perception etc.) operating second time onwards there too definitely the earlier knowledge of the same object was not the same (as the second time knowledge of the same object)[1] is not worthy of acceptance. It is because of the fact that certainly there is no extra-knowledge of things when the same objects are known second times by the later *pramāṇas*. What extra thing is revealed in the continuous knowledges of things? Even if hundred times one sees one's own hand nothing new is revealed there.

(Mīmāṁsakas) : When should a *pramāṇa* operating in the case of an already known object stop? We do not find any limit with reference to its stopping. The production of the valid knowledge is the limit for the operation of a *pramāṇa* and that limit is surpassed by your *pramāṇa*.

1. That what was revealed in the first knowledge, not the same is revealed in the second knowledge though the object and the *pramāṇas* remain the same. What was not revealed in the first knowledge is releaved in the second knowledge, what was not revealed in the second is revealed in the third knowledge and so on and so forth. And so the Mīmāṁsakas maintain that a *pramāṇa* produces knowledge of only unknown thing.

(Naiyāyikas) : Here is the answer to your objection. A *pramāṇa* will stop operating the moment it will come in contact with another object or when there is unmindfulness or loss or absence of any auxiliary factor of knowledge.

(Mīmāṁsakas) : (What about the fault of endlessness with reference to the production of valid knowledge?)[1]

(Naiyāyikas) : This endlessness (of the production of valid knowledge) does not destroy the basis (i.e. the first valid knowledge);[2] because it is not the case here that the first knowledge (of an object) cannot be produced unless the second knowledge (of the same object) is produced (the second knowledge cannot be produced unless the third knowledge is produced and so on).

Endlessness of production of result is said to be a fault only when it destroys the basic knowledge (here, the first knowledge of an object); but if the basic knowledge of an object is had, even if you do not want, endlessness with regard to the production of valid knowledge cannot be avoided (because as long as an object remains in contact with the senses, so long the valid knowledge is bound to be there.).

If your definition of *pramāña* such as 'by which an unknown object is known' is accepted, then evidently the perception called *pratyabhijñā* (recognition) is to be discarded.

You try to establish the validity of that perception (called *pratyabhijñā*) in order to establish distinction in the object to be known (from the earlier object) such as 'being existent at present (i.e. living at present). That, too, amounts to the fact that you are deceiving us.

It is clear that by the very first knowledge (of an object) the existence of that object is also known till there is definite

1. It is not the case that one cannot have the first valid knowledge. Hod it been so this endlessness of the production of result would have destroyed the basis of it.

cause for its destruction. Similar is the opinion of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa. He says "when an object is known, it is also known that it exists." Therefore, (better) give up your insistence that a *pramāṇa* is that by which an unknown object alone is known.

(Mīmāṁsakas) : Well if it is given up recollection also will have to be treated as valid knowledge.

(Naiyāyikas) : No. That, the recollection is not a valid knowledge is not due to the fact that it has in it an already known object, but not being caused by an object is the cause of its not being a valid knowledge.

(Mīmāṁsakas) : How do you say that recollection is not caused by an object?

(Naiyāyikas) : Because of the absence of the object, at that time, which is the object in that recollection.

(Mīmāṁsakas): How is, then, inference with reference to past rains[1] caused by object?

(Naiyāyikas) : No. Because there the subject is to be inferred and that which causes the (inferential) knowledge exists there: River itself is the subject which is inferred as having the quality such as contact with the place on the upper region where it has rained because of its having the connection with the particular flood of water. Therefore, that subject knowable through inference does exist and so this inference is not caused by the non-existence of object.

(Mīmāṁsakas) : How, then, do you say that the intuitive perception which has in it future meaning as its object such as 'my brother will come tomorrow' is caused by an object

1. For example, with reference to a wet place seeing which one inferes that there were rains here sometimes before the time he has seen the place. Here actually speaking, the rains are over, so how can inference be taken as caused by the object (rains). Therefore, of inference will be an invalid knowledge. This is the implications of the question.

(because the action of his coming will take place tomorrow and so it is present when that sentence was uttered)?

(Naiyāyikas) : There (in that intuitive perception) the brother who is living at some other place is known as qualified by the action of coming taking place tomorrow, and since he who exists is known in that way, he is the producer of the intuitive knowledge and therefore, the intuitive perception is caused by an object. Recollection pertaining to dead father etc. is seen to have been caused without depending on other object (father etc.) and so with reference to the recollection of an object existing at some other place the existence of that object is not the cause at all.

Therefore, since recollection is not caused by an object it is not a valid knowledge and so in the definition of *pramāṇa*, *pramāṇa* cannot be qualified by the adjective 'by which an unknown object is known.' When Jainism has simply said that words are *pramāṇa* with reference to an unknown object, how do you say that all the *pramāṇas* have only unknown things as their objects).

Others, (Buddhists), again, propose a general definition of *pramāṇa* such as *avisaṁvādakatvaṁ pramāṇatvam* that which does not deceive with reference to obtaining an obtainable object or being away from an non-obtainable one (i.e. that which causes to obtain an object if it is obtainable or causes to reject if it is worthy that through revealing the nature of objects).

It has been stated that a knowledge which does not deceive (with reference to obtainment of an object or reflecting a rejectable one) is the means of valid knowledge. Which does not deceive means which causes to obtain and a knowledge causes to obtain means it shows the causes of volitional effort which is the cause of obtaining an object which is capable of producing happiness and which is the cause of giving up an object which is capable of producing sorrow. When an object

is revealed by the knowledge and when, there is volitional effort in man (for that object) the object is obtained and therefore, revealing an object with reference to its obtainment itself is the action of a *pramāṇa* because when it reveals an object, it causes that object to be obtained as with reference to (some thing) to be collected, the order of the king (to his servant) itself means collecting (that thing).

It is said (in the *Dharmottarapradīpa*, p.19) that power to cause an object to be obtained (by revealing it) is the nature of a *pramāṇa*. In ordinary world also one who shows a particular thing and causes it to be obtained is termed as *pramāṇa*. And since both perception and inference have that nature of causing an object to be obtained (by revealing it), the general definition of *pramāṇa* (such as *avisaṁvādakatvaṁ pramāṇatvam*) is quite apt.

There, since perception has simply the form of a thing (without its particulars) as its object (in the first moment of its perception) and since that *(arthakṣaṇa)* is momentary, although it is not possible to obtain (that object which was revealed in the first moment) it is possible to get the continuous series of that object and so causing determination of that continuous series of momentary objects (such as *idam idānīm iha paśyami* (series) 'I see this now here') itself means perception causes an object to be obtained.

Although Inference has in it superimposed thing as its object, since it (inference) is produced by the chain of basic momentary objects it causes that (object) to be obtained as the light of a gem causes one who sees it with the idea that there must be a gem to obtain the gem.

Therefore, this is what a *pramāṇa* is. It causes that, what is determined, to be obtained. Although what is determined is unreal (because it is superimposed i.e. *sāmānya*) still because it causes to obtain the basic chain of momentary objects of that what is (directly) determined it amounts the fact that *pramāṇa*

causes to obtain what is determined, and the doctrine is *pramāṇa* is that which causes to be obtained a thing as it is determined.

Therefore, the knowledges which determine the yellow conch-shell etc. are not *pramāṇas* even though mere (white) conch-shell etc. is obtained because as it was determined (by the knowledge) the same is not obtained. In fact, yellow conch-shell was determined whereas white one is obtained. Therefore, a *pramāṇa* is that which does not deceive i.e. which causes to obtain only that what is determined as such.

This is wrong. You kindly explain simply this much whether *pramāṇa* means that which causes to obtain that which is revealed by it or that which causes to obtain that which is determined. In the case of inference, however, there is no showing (of the object at all because that is to be inferred and what is shown is the probans) and so there is no question of causing that object to be obtained. In the case of perception, on the other hand, the showing of an object is certainly there. But what is shown is not caused to be obtained because that is momentary and so which obtaining that moment has already passed.

It can also not be established that what is determined is obtained by *pramāṇa* because according to your theory what is determined is unreal and what is unreal cannot be obtained. Therefore, you have said that as is what is determined so is not the real nature of an object because what is determined has as its object the unreal things. And as is the real nature of a thing (i.e. distinguished from both its own as well as other classes of objects) so is not what is determined (i.e. it is impossible to determine a mere object as such). The obtainment of the original momentary real object is, however, simply as per the *Kākatālīya-Nyāya* (i.e. by chance). And what is obtained after going there (i.e. where the thing is placed) is not even touched by either of the *pramāṇas* (i.e., Perception & Inference).

It will also not be proper to argue that by obtaining the chain of momentary things that (real momentary object) is also obtained. Because even by taking the chain either as identical with or different from the momentary objects, the chain (of momentary objects) cannot be established.[1] This will be stated in detail in the section *Kṣaṇabhaṅgabhaṅga*.

(Buddhists) : Well, although the chain is imaginary, we have defined a *pramāṇa* as "by which a chain of momentary objects is obtained" taking into account the knowledge of oneness or someness in the chain of similar momentary objects; as it is stated that this definition of *pramāṇa* is with reference to the things with which worldly activities are done.

Actually speaking, it is mere knowledge consisting of the difference such as something is the obtainable (objects) and some one is obtainer superimposed by the desire caused by ignorance which has no beginning (i.e. the very creation) and therefore, what is obtained? or who does cause it to be obtained?

(Naiyāyikas) : All this what is stated (by you) is a kind of escaping. (We ask you) what do you mean by *saṁvṛtti*? That should be either real or unreal and in either way that cannot be the cause of worthy activities (If it is real i.e. it becomes

1. If the chain is identical with the momentary object as the *lokavyavahāra* is not possible with regard to momentary objects similarly that is not possible with reference to the chain also. If the chain is different from the real object it can be either real or unreal. If it is unreal the same contingency of the impossibility of *lokavyavahāra* will arise. If, however, it is real it should be either stable or momentary. If it is stable its constituents such as the momentary objects also will have to be treated as stable which is against your doctrine. If it is momentary, then as no *lokavyavahāra* is possible with regard to the momentary things similarly no *vyavāhāra* is possible with regard to the chain. Therefore, it cannot be established that by obtaining the chain the real object is obtained when the chain itself cannot be established.

similar to the momentary object and obviously no worldly activity is possible with that. If, on the other hand, it is unreal, since there can be no worldly activity possible with unreal things, here also no worldly activity is feasible). That the treating of the *grāhya* and the *grāhaka* as different is not caused by the impression due to the ignorance or illusion rather it is nothing but real will be proved later. Or, when the chain is postulated as illusory why not the class attribute, the whole (as against the part) etc. also are to be taken as illusory? If you say that when the class attribute itself cannot be established because of its being questioned or set aside by several objections (such as whether the class-attribute exists pervading all objects of this world or it exists pervading one class of objects only? Or whether it exists partly in one object and partly in another of the same class and so on and so forth) then the same objections could be raised with regard to your chain of momentary objects also, and therefore, it is something like depending on unfeasible hopes. Therefore, causing one to get that which was revealed is impossible and so this is not the definition of a *pramāṇa.* Moreover, this definition does not cover all the cases because it does not include the knowledge of the object about which one is indifferent but which is authoritative because it is always associated with that object (i.e. it is the knowledge of an object which actually exists).

(Buddhists) : Well, what is this object about which one is indifferent?

Due to the very fact that it is such as one is indifferent about it, no body goes to collect it and so it is to be given up because it is not worthy of being collected.

(Naiyāyikas) : It is incorrect. An object about which one is indifferent is not necessarily worthy of being rejected. This is what we experience (and can be experienced by any body).

An object which is worthy of being rejected or given up and an object which is worthy of being collected are causes of

sorrow and happiness respectively. People take effort in giving up (what is to be given up) and in collecting (what is to be collected).

Since both rejecting and collecting which are to be accomplished are not found (in the case of an object about which one is indifferent) and since (the knowledge of the *upekṣanīya* object) does not produce both (rejection and acceptance). We experience an object (*upekṣanīya*) different from them (rejectable and collectable objects).

When an object worthy of being collected is seen a positive desire or liking to collect that arises and elsewhere (i.e. when an object worthy of being rejected is seen) dislike alone arises. Whereas there (in the case of *upekṣanīya* object) both (like and dislike) are absent.

(Your reasoning that) since the object about which one is indifferent is not collectable, it is rejectable is not a reason at all. Because such is never the logic that this is (actually) neuter but one will argue that is male because it is not female or it is female because it is not male. Neuter is altogether different from both male and female because it is experienced as such. Similarly, an object about which one is indifferent is different from both rejectable as well as collectable objects because it is experienced as such.

One passing through a path does see grass and leaves but he neither goes to collect that as he goes to collect an umbrella if he sees it nor he tries to keep himself aloof from that as he does so when he sees a serpent.

Therefore, even though the knowledge of an object about which one is indifferent does not cause that to be obtained, it is authoritative and so *pradarśitāprāpakatva* cannot be the definition of that (*pramāṇa*).

(Some opponent other than the Buddhists :) Well, what function a *pramāṇa* has with reference to a collectable (or

rejectable) object the same function (i.e. showing the object) it has with reference to an object about which one is indifferent also. This has already been explained and proved by him (the Buddhist). He said as giving order (to the army) itself by the king means he is the killer (of the enemy) similarly, revealing the object itself means knowledge causes an object to be obtained.

(Naiyāyikas) : It is not true. If mere being the revealer of an object is the definition of *pramāṇa,* then that definition is applicable in the knowledge of water in the moving rays of the sun (and in that case that knowledge of water will have to be taken as authoritative).

(Opponent) : Well, there (i.e. in the case of the knowledge of water in the moving rays of the sun) since the determination turns to be opposit to what was shown by the knowledge that knowledge is not authoritative. The object of seeing is mere forms of the rays of the sun but it causes the determination of water and, therefore, such a knowledge becomes unauthoritative. Thus, a single seeing as per its difference in causing determination similar to what was shown at the first sight or in causing opposite determination or not causing determination of that (i.e. which was shown at the first sight i.e. *kṣanikatva* opposite one is stated in three ways respectively such as authority, unauthority and it is not authority. Thus, the knowledge of blue colour is an authority with reference to the blue colour because it produces the positive determination such as it is blue; he who saw the blue colour also knew there the momentariness not different from the blue colour. That knowledge is not an authority because it does not produce the determination similar to what was shown at the first sight (i.e. momentariness is not determined in the chain). When, however, the chain is known or determined as stable, that knowledge is unauthoritative because of its being spoiled by the determination opposite to what was shown at the first sight.

(Naiyāyikas): If this is the case then in this attempt it is but difficult to establish the definition of *pramāṇa.* You have also stated that with reference to obtaining (the object) the determination of the series of momentary objects is the function of *pramāṇa.* That is why, as the perception of the mere form of the rays of the sun is unauthoritative because it produces the determination of water; similarly, the perception of mere form of an object becomes unauthoritative because it produces the determination of the chain of the momentary objects which is opposite to that (*svalakṣaṇa*).

Moreover, when the imaginary chain (of momentary objects) is determined 'how is it that people take effort towards what was shown at the first moment (i.e. *svalakṣaṇa*)? (You should say) that taking both what was shown at the first moment (i.e. *svalakṣaṇa*) and the determined (chain) to be the same one takes effort to collect that. (But since there is no proof to support this, you must say that without knowing the difference between *svalakṣana* and *santāna* one takes effort. Thus, if you say that one who takes effort due to the absence of judgment gets the object then your *pramāṇa* will remain pole's apart from that getting of the object (because many moments will intervene between the first seeing and the getting). Therefore, a *pramāṇa* is not that which causes a thing to be obtained.

Moreover, getting and not getting (of an object) are caused by mere desire of a man. The knowledge of an object alone is produced by a *pramāṇa.* This is what is ascertained. Therefore, those who are stating the definition of a *pramāṇa* should state that (i.e. causing the knowledge of an object) as the adjective of *pramāṇa.* It is not proper to say that the power which causes an object to be got is *pramāṇa.*

The Sāṁkhya-system acknowledged modification of mind in the form of an object (*buddhivṛtti*) as the *pramāṇa.* The modification of mind in the form of an object (i.e. of the

form of the knowledge of an object with its specification or determination) itself which follows the revealment of the mere form of an object by the senses which have taken the shape of that object through the close connection with the self is called *pramāṇa.* Because being closely associated with that (*buddhivṛtti*) the self is the seer of a particular object.

(Naiyāyikas) : This does not appeal to us. Because that which knows (an object), which does the function that causes the determination (of that object) and which determines (the object) does not get the result of it such as the perception of that object because the mind is devoid of consciousness.[1] On the other hand, one who perceives the object does not know it, does not do the function that causes the determination of it, and does not determine it and so the *pramāṇa* and its result have different locations or substrata: the qualities such as knowledge etc. when connected with soul which are the *pramāṇa* are not in the Soul whereas the result of that *pramāṇa* such as the perception of an object is not in the mind.

(Sāṁkhya) : Since the soul is very clear or transparent, it appears modelled as the *buddhivṛtti* or the *buddhivṛtti* appears as being pervaded by the soul. (Actually speaking, they are different).

(Naiyāyikas) : If this is the case then by your own statement it is proved that whole thing is an illusion. That quality of the soul such as (*cetanatva*) is in the mind is not true and that the quality of mind (*kartṛtva*) such as the perception of an object is in the soul is also not true.

And this doctrine of yours is not very much different from the doctrine of the Buddhists according to which the knowledge having the form of an object is treated as the *pramāṇa.* Therefore, when that view of the Buddhists is refuted, your view also is (automatically) refuted.

1. Cakradhara : *Acetana* means that which undergoes a change.

The entire explanation of the doctrine process of the sage Kapila will be cut into pieces, (later on). Therefore, according to his doctrine also no *pramāṇa* is possible to be postulated.

This is why, we do not consider the definition of *pramāṇa* stated by other systems (of Indian philosophy) as flawless.

Therefore (the Naiyāyikās) consider the assemblage of the sense-organs etc. which produce flawless (i.e. real) knowledge (of things) as the faultless *pramāṇa*.

That *pramāṇa* is of four kinds. Thus the author of the (Nyāya-) sūtras says : "perception, inference, analogy and words are (the four) *pramāṇas*."

Here first of all three things are to be said with regard to what is mentioned in the *sūtra* containing the division of *pramāṇa* (such as perception etc.) These are-the general definition (of *pramāṇa*), the division (of *pramāṇa*) and the particular definition (for each of the division). There we will find four *sūtras* with regard to the particular definitions (of the four-kind of *pramāṇa*) such as *indriyārthasannikarso - tpannam* etc. Here we explain the division as well as the general definition of *pramāṇa*.

By this single *sūtra* the great sage (Gautama) has stated two things: (One) the number four in the *pramāṇas* and (two) the general definition (of *pramāṇa*).

The word *pramāṇa* being mentioned just by the side of the word-group *pratyakṣānūmāṇopamānaśabdāḥ* indicates that the *pramāṇas* are only four (in number).

(Opponent) : Well, there is no mention of words expressing number such *catvāri pramāṇām* (four *pramāṇas*), nor is there the word *eva* (only) such a *pratyakṣādinyeva* and so wherefrom could you know the number and its restriction (such as four and only four)?

(Siddhāntin) : (We can know it) from the nature of the expressive power of word. As in the sentences *Gargāṁstrīn bhojaya* (Feed three Brāhmins belonging to the *Garga-gotra*) and *Yajñadattadevadattāvānaya* (Bring Yajñadatta and Devadatta) even without the use of a word expressing number or *eva* we do understand the only three (Gargas are to be fed) and only two (Yajñadatta and Devadatta are to be brought). Similarly here also when it is stated *pratyakṣānumanopamānaśabdāḥ pramāṇāni* from the very expressive power of word we determine the number which is neither less than (four) nor higher than (four). This is how we understand the division of *pramāṇa*.

The general definition of *pramāṇa* is, however, understood from the very word *pramāṇa* which has the capacity of its derivation (such as "that by which (an object is known)" of the appropriate name (such as *pramāṇa*). From the word *pramāṇa* which is expressive of Instrumental meaning such as "That by which an object is known is *pramāṇa*" it is understood that the means of valid knowledge is called *pramāṇa*. This had already been explained.

By putting the word *sādhyasādhana* (the means of what is to be established) in the middle of the definition of *Upamāna* (analogy) such as *prasiddhasādharmyāt sādhyasādhanam upamānam* (on the basis of the similarity or common feature the means of what is to be established (i.e. assimilative cognition is analogy) the composer of the *sūtra* (Gautama) states this definition of *pramāṇa* which is common to all *pramāṇa* that the means of what is to be established i.e. the means of knowledge is called *pramāṇa*. According to this definition the means which produces wrong knowledge also becomes a *pramāṇa* and so in order to differentiate it (pramāṇa) from that which produces recollection, doubt and misapprehension three adjectives (of *pramāṇa*) such as *arthotpannam* (caused by an object), *avyabhicāri* (not varying) and *vyavasayatmakam* (determined) are taken out from the

sūtra which defines perception. Because that is common to all the four *pramāṇas*. By qualifying the result (i.e. knowledge) by the word *arthotpanna* (caused by an object) the *pramāṇa* (means) producing recollection is set aside, by the word *avyabhicāri* (not varying) the *pramāṇa* (means) producing wrong knowledge is set aside and by the word *vyavasāyātmaka* (determined) the *pramāṇa* (means) producing doubt is set aside. Therefore, it amounts to the statement that 'by which the knowledge of an object which is neither doubtful nor wrong is produced is called *pramāṇa*.' Thus, from a single *sūtra* both the general definition and the division of *pramāṇa* are known.

(Opponent) : If a single *sūtra* enjoins (two predicates such as) the division and the general definition of *pramāṇa* then it is a case of the defect known as *vākyabheda*. Because it is proper to hold that a single sentence is a single sentence because it has only one meaning (i.e. predicate).

(Naiyāyikas) : It is being answered.

With reference to the *sūtras* which always indicate many objects through the meanings of words (contained in them) the defect called *vākyabheda* produced by enjoining of many meanings (i.e. having more than one predicate) is not a defect.

With reference to the ascertainment (of sacrifice), heaven etc., however, which can be known only through the Vedic words and wherein there is no scope for other *pramāṇas* (perception etc.) the defect called *vākyabheda* etc. is certainly a defect. Because enjoining two meanings (predicates in one sentence) does not fit in there.

In the Vedic injunction *rājā svārājyakāmo vājapeyena yajeta* (a king desirous of *svārājya* should perform the Vājapeya-sacrifice) according to the view that this sentence enjoins material for the sacrifice, sacrifice is to be enjoined with regard to *svārājya* and with regard to the sacrifice the

material such as *Vājapeya* is to be enjoined and thus there arises the contingency of a single sentence giving rise to two sets of vertically opposite or contradictory triad such as *vidhāyatva, anuvādyatva* (and *gauṇatva* forming one set and *uddeśyatva, upādeyatva* and *pradhānatva* forming the other i.e. the same sacrifrice is the subject and at the same time the predicate, *upādeya* at the same time *anuvādya,* main at the same time subordinate - which is absurd) and therefore enjoining two means by a single sentence does not fit in there. Here, however, with regard to the *sūtras* which are precious in the skill of conveying meanings determined by other *pramāṇas* (perception etc.), to enjoin many meanings is their adornment and not a defect. Moreover, it (the *sūtra*) implies many meanings it is called *sūtra* (cf. *sūcanāt sūtram*). This itself is the great skill of the composers of the *sūtras* that through a single sentence and through a few letters only many things are conveyed (by them).

This *sūtra* will indicate that (other) meaning either by supplimentation (inference) or by *tantra*[1] or by repeating the word twice called *āvṛtti*[2] and here the *vākyabheda* is not a defect.

Since there is no rule regarding the sequence of stating the definitions of division and general definition as there is rule in the case of stating the definition of a particular *pramāṇa* (i.e. it should come after the division) stating both (i.e. division and the general definition) by *tantra*[1] is also not out of the way. The definition of a particular *pramāṇa* cannot be stated unless the division is stated. But the division and the

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1. Using one word with reference to many meanings is called *Tantra* here. Originally, it is a term of Mīmāṁsā-system where in performing one accessory rite with reference to more than one main rite is known as *tantra.*
2. The opposite of *tantra* is *āvṛtti.* When it is not possible to convey two meanings by using one word at a time, the same word is repeated to convey the second meaning i.e. a word will convey a meaning and it will be repeated it will convey the other meaning.

general definition of *pramāṇa* can be put in any order one likes i.e. first division then the general definition or first general definition and then the division as in the case of *siddhānta* and *Chala* (i.e. as in the case of *siddhānta* after showing the division the general definition is shown and as in the case of *Chala* after giving the general definition the division is given). Or, both (the division and the general definition) may be stated simultaneously and so by apply the principle *trantra* or of *āvṛtti* if that (i.e. division and general definition) is stated (in a single *sūtra* as it is done in the present case), there is no harm.

Let us keep aside for the time being the postulation of the device of *tantra, āvṛtti* etc. in the *sūtra*. Others do not tolerate the number four given to the *pramāṇas* (i.e. they do not agree that *pramāṇas* are four in number).

(Opponent) : Had it been a case that *pramāṇas* are neither less than four nor more than four, the Naiyāyikas could have established that *pramāṇas* are four. But that is difficult to establish. Because the Cārvākas hold the opinion that there is only one *pramāṇa* such as perception. The Buddhists say there are only two *pramāṇas* such as perception and inference. According to the Sāṅkhyas perception, inference and the words of reliable persons are the three *pramāṇas*. The Mīmāṁsākas etc. have stated that the *pramāṇas* are more (than four) in number.

Therefore, how to restrict the division that *pramāṇas* are only four in number?

(Naiyāyikas) : Here is the answer. While explaining that inference is an *pramāna* we will set aside the view of Cārvākas. That words are different from inference will be stated at the time of defining words and thus the view of the Buddhists is also not proper.

The Buddhists do not tolerate this (that the *pramāṇas* are four and only four).

They say since the objects to be known are of two kinds, the means to know them also is of two kinds. There is no other reason for the difference of *pramāṇa* than the difference of an object.

An object can be of only two kinds because it can be either perceived or inferred i.e. it can be either mere momentary form of an object (*svalakṣaṇa*) or the generality. Because there is no scope for any third type to enter into the objects the forms of which are settled as mutually exclusive.

(Naiyāyikas) : How do you determine that there is no third type of objects?

(Buddhists) : We say it is the capacity of perception. That the perception operating in the case of a blue (object) determines the blue thing as blue is acceptable to all. The same perception excludes non-blue also (from blue things) because in the knowledge of the blue thing that (non-blue thing) is not revealed. Since the blue thing is to be revealed by the knowledge of the blue thing other than that (blue) is nothing but non-blue. This is why, the same perception excludes the third category (of things) also.

Whether that (third) category also is revealed in the knowledge of the blue or not?

If it is revealed, it is nothing but blue and as such that is not (third) separate category. if it is not reveaed, it is then non-blue and as such it cannot be a (third) separate category.

Because, this is the definition of blue and non-blue: Being revealed in the knowledge of blue means blue and not being revealed in the knowledge, of blue is non-blue. Similarly, the perception when applied to its own object (i.e. momentary object) settles that (blue) to be an object of perception, (settles) that (non-blue) which is not revealed there (in the knowledge of blue) as 'to be infered,' and sets aside as before the third category also. Thus, for setting aside the third

category of objects other than the mere momentary form of an object and the generality this very way is to be adopted. Thus, by perception its own object (momentary) is determined. It is said: "(the perception) determines that (a momentary object), it separates other thing (from the momnetary object) and indicates the absence of any third category. All this is the function of a single *pramāṇa* (i.e. perception).

Otherwise, if the nature of a thing is not determined how can the people desirous of collecting or rejecting an object collect or reject an object? As it is said, (if the real nature of an object is not known) a person who in search of fire, even after seeing the fire, will going to collect fire (because the *svalakṣaṇa* of fire is the object of his perception) at the same time will not like going to collect that (because the exclusion of non-fire may also be there as the object of perception).

Although the perception which is devoid of particularised object (*nirvikalpaka*) and which has the settled function of mere revealing the form of an object only placed before a man does not cause the idea of an object with its particulars still the *vikalpas* (determined objects) following the *nirvikalpaka* themselves are to be taken as having the capacity of its function to settle the determination of the object of perception, the separating of other objects from that of the first moment and the absence of the third category (of objects). Otherwise, the wordly activity will be impossible.

Thus, on the basis of the contradiction between the objects of perception and that of other than perception known by the capacity of perception alone which determines the object the nature of which is settled by the principle of mutual exclusion, inference also finds scope for its operation with regard to the determination of the absence of a third category of objects. (This can be explained as follows). At the time of the determination of one of the two contradictory or

contrary objects the exclusion of the other is definitely revealed because they are opposed to each other as (in the case of) cold and hot (when cold is determined the exculsion of hotness is also realised). The third category of things is also opposed to that (*svalakṣaṇa*) because it is not revealed in the cognition of that (*svalakṣaṇa*, say *nīla*) (and so that is nothing but *anīla* and as such can be included in the second category only and therefore, there is no third category of objects).

(Naiyāyikas) : As you knew the objects of the second category (say *anīla*) you never knew any third type of objects. Had you known that that would have existed as the two types of objects (exist), and when that is not known how can you determine that as either contrary or not contrary?

(Buddhists) : O my dear sir, there is no necessity of its knowing separately. Because that it is opposed to (*svalakṣaṇa*) can be established just by the fact that it does not appear in the knowledge of *svalakṣaṇa*, say *nīla*).

Because contradictory means that which is not perceived when that (*svalakṣaṇa* say *nīla*) is being perceived. That 'not being perceived' itself results into contradiction. And so one need not search for separately knowing (that third category of things). Thus, among the objects (the nature of which is) settled by the principle of mutual exclusion there is no third category of things and so it is established beyond doubt that objects are of two types only. Similarly, in the autonomous pairs such as real unreal; eternal-non eternal, orderliness - simultaneosness etc. one should know that there is no third variety.

There, with reference to a perceivable object which is of the form of *svalakṣaṇa* the means valid knowledge called perception operates; with reference to an inferrable object which is of the form of generality, however, inference will operate.

In order to know two types of objects when two types of means have been established then tell us for what do you require third *pramāṇa*?

It is, however, improper to argue that in the case of an inferrable object which is of the nature of generality as inference operates, let the means called words etc. also operate then (i.e. with reference to the same object). Because with reference to the same object, it is not correct to say that many *pramāṇas* can operate because that will result in contradiction as well as purposelessness. Thus, when a particular object is revealed by a particular *pramāṇa* if another *pramāṇa* operates there and determines the same nature of object, the second *pramāṇa* becomes purposeless. As it is said: "if a *pramāṇa* reveals an object already revealed by another *pramāṇa*, it means powdering the powder (i.e. it becomes purposeless). At the same time it is difficult on the part of the second *pramāṇa* to reveal that object differently from the earlier revealing because in that case it will contradict the first *pramāma*." Therefore, the logicians do not accept the co-operation (*samplava*) of the *pramāṇas*. The operation of many *pramāṇas* with regard to a single object is called *samplava*. And that (*saṁplava*) is automatically set aside when the object that type (i.e. of third category) is set aside.

The perception as well as the inference also cannot operate with reference to the same object because inference cannot operate with reference to *svalvakṣaṇa* and perception cannot operate with reference to generality.

How can inference which depends on the knowledge of invariable concomitance operate in *svalakṣaṇa* (say *nīla*) which is different from similar *svalakṣaṇa* in the chain of *svalakṣaṇas* of *nīla* and from the dissimilar ones (say *anīla*)?

How can perception also which is always associated with the *sat*-object reveal the imposed form by determination (*vikalpa*) such as generality?

And when the situation is like this (i.e. when the objects are of only two types) with reference to what can the *pramāṇas* such as words, analogy etc. as required by you operate?

The object, *svalakṣaṇa*, however, is stamped or impressed or caught (i.e. pervaded) by perception alone and other object (than *svalakṣaṇa*) is caught by inference which requires invariable concomitance for its operation. In reality there is no object which can be known by many *pramāṇas*. That there is something called whole (as against the part) or *jāti* is a good story indeed!

And if you want the application of words and inference with reference to the object of perception then they (words and inference) too should produce the knowledge of that object similar to the knowledge produced by perception. But such is not the case. Therefore, it is said-

If the objects are the same the *pramāṇas* would produce the similar cognition. (But the object of perception is different from that of inference or words and so) there is no similarity between the cognition produced by perception and the cognition produced by either inference or words.

The light of the rays of stars and the moon is different and the light of the sun which opens the bud i.e. the world (i.e. which makes people awake).

Also, what can be known by senses is different and the object of words is different. A blind man knows things from words and he cannot see what can be seen.

It is also said,

A person whose limb is burnt by the contact with fire knows the burning differently whereas he understands the meaning of burning from the word *dāha* differently.

Therefore, when it is determined as per the way mentioned above that the objects are of two kinds only, (there is no third

type of objects and so) there is no third *pramāṇa* as well. Nor can there be any *samplava* of *pramāṇas* also.

(Naiyāyikas) : Following is our answer to your theory :

What you said that perception alone has the capacity to set aside (the possibility of) a third category of objects is incorrect.

How can this big load (of determining the *svalakṣaṇa*, separating what is no *svalakṣaṇa* and indicating the absence of any third category of objects) be born by the *nirvikalpaka*-perception which is devoid of the capacity of enquiring what precedes and what follows (i.e. say what is *nīla* and what is *anīla*)?

Vikalpās (determined cognitions), on the other hand, have the capacity of mere imposition. According to your doctrine what to talk of the determination of real object of perception through then!

Or let perception alone set aside (the possibility of) any third category of things in blue etc. the way stated above. But to determine what (object) is *pratyakṣa* (perceivable) and what (object) is *parokṣa* (inferrable) the same method cannot be applied. Because when perception operates in an object, it determines simply the form of that object, and not the perceptibility also. What is known is 'this is blue' but not 'this is perceptible'.

Thus, what is meant by perceptibility of an object? Does it mean the state of being the object of the sense-organs or the state of being the object of the knowledge produced by the sense organs?

There, the state of being the object of the sense-organs is, however, known on the basis of the principle of *anvaya-vyatireka* (reasoning of pros and cons) only and not by perception. So says (Kumārila) Bhaṭṭa :

The hearableness (of a word) is not known by perception. That is known by the principle of *anvaya* and *vyatireka* (i.e. the reasoning of inclusion and exclusion) when applied in the case of a deaf and others.

Perceptibility in the sense of being the object of the knowledge produced by the sense-organs is also impossible to know then (i.e. at the time of perception). Because at the time of the revealment of the object, the knowledge of that object is never revealed. And unless that (i.e. the knowledge of the object) is known, it is impossible to know its objectness.

(Buddhists) : How (do you say) at the time of perception of an object, the knowledge of that object is not revealed?

(Naiyāyikas) : Certainly, two forms (one of the object and another of the knowledge of that object) are not revealed simultaneously (in the perceptual knowledge of an object) because in that knowledge this is knowledge and this is object such difference is not realised. The only form which is revealed can be of the object only and not of the means (i.e. the knowledge) will be explained later.

(Buddhists) : Well, but unless the known knowledge (of an object) is acquired, that knowledge is not capable of revealing that object. So it has been said (by Diṅnāga) that unless an object is known by perception, that object cannot be revealed. The knowledge of which is not revealed.

(Naiyāyikas) : No. If the knowledge of object is revealed then there is no possibility of the perception of that object, becasue *upalambha* (knowledge) itself is revealed and since no second form (i.e. the form is revealed there (in the knowledge) how can the object be revealed there? (What is revealed there is the knowledge and not the object).

And if according to you a known knowledge should reveal an object, then not more than two courses are open. Because that knowledge will either be revealable by another

knowledge or it should be self-illuminable. If it is revealable by another knowledge then there will arise the contingency of endless regression and this endless regression is the destroyer of the main purpose (i.e. the revealment of the object).[1] And therefore, this world will be as good as blind and dumb (although people have eyes to see and the organ of speech to speak).[2]

Nor can this knowledge be self-illuminable because it is also knowable like blue, and yellow things and the like. In details, at the time of refuting the *Vijñānavādin's*, view, we will refute their theory that knowledge is self-illuminable.

Nor can you doubt that if the knowledge of an object is not revealed (by another knowledge or by itself) these will remain no difference between a man in whom that (knowledge) is produced and a man in whom that is not produced and as such either the man in whom knowledge is produced will be ignorant or the man is whom the knowledge is not produced can be treated as all-knowing. Because by mere production of the knowledge in a man, a man becomes the knower. When a knowledge is produced it is produced as the revealer of an

1. The endless regression will be as follows : The knowledge of an object if revealed by another knowledge will reveal the object. That another knowledge if revealed by another knowledge will reveal the first knowledge. Similarly, that knowledge also if revealed by another will reveal the second knowledge and so on and so forth. Thus, the endless regression. It is the destroyer of the main purpose because somewhere (say at the time of sleep) this process will stop and the last knowledge (before sleep) will remain unrevealed. And if that is unrevealed, the immediately preceding knowledge cannot be revealed; and if that also is not revealed it cannot reveal its immediately preceding knowledge also. And finally, the immediate knowledge of the object also will remain unrevealed and as such it cannot reveal the object. Therefore, it destroys the main purpose.

2. This is what is meant. Two things are at the root of wordly activities : perceiving the objects and expressing one's experience through words. But due to the *anavasthā* stated above, the objects will not be revealed; so what is the purpose of having the eyes and the speech-organ. It is as good as having nothing.

object and therefore, how do you say there is no difference between a man in whom knowledge is produced and a man in whom knowledge is not produced?

(Nor can you argue that when by mere production of knowledge in man, a man becomes a knowner, similarly, when joy or sorrow is produced in the soul, it can be said that knowledge of joy or sorrow is produced there and as such the man in whom joy or sorrow is produced should be called the knower of joy or sorrow, and not the enjoyer or sufferer of joy or sorrow). Because when the knowledge of (an outside) object such as blue thing etc. is produced in the soul, the man is called the knower (of that object) and when the knowledge of (the inside) objects such as happiness and sorrow is produced in the soul, the man is called the enjoyer or sufferer and so there (i.e. in the case of the knowledge of happiness or sorrow) too there is no over-application (of the definition of a knower).

Therefore, since at the time of knowing an object because of the non-revealment of the knowledge of that (object) the perceptibility of that object caused by the objectness of that (knowledge of the object) is not revealed. And when that (perceptibility of the object) is not revealed, the separation of imperceptible object (from the perceptible one) is not possible. Nor is it possible (on the part of perception) to indicate the absence of any third category of objects. And then, how is the perception an authority of establishing that the objects are of only two types (such as perceptible as well as imperceptible)?

What you said that inference also can work with reference to the establishment of your theory that the objects are of only two types is based on (the *hetu* i.e.) the contradiction with the perception known by perception alone. And the capacity of indicating contradiction on the part of the perception has already been challenged by us. And unless that (contradiction) is not known, the inference based on

that (contradiction) cannot work. Thus, since it cannot be established that the objects are of two kinds only, better you give up this insistance that the means of valid knowledge are also two in number which is based on that (establishment of the two kinds of objects).

Now, accepting that the objects are of only two kinds, when due to the difference in the assemblage (i.e. the factors causing result) and in the result, the difference in the means of valid knowledge can be established, how do you deny (the existence of other *pramāṇās*)?

Different are the factors and results of perception and inference; (similarly) different are the factors and results of words (as the means) and analogy. We will speak about it later.

Therefore, when due to the difference of the factors and the result, the difference of *pramāṇa* can be established and so the *pramāṇas* are not only two in number.

By this, that the number of *pramāṇas* as explained by the *Sāṁkhya*-system such as 'the *pramāṇas* are three in number' is also set aside. Because it is going to be stated later that there is the fourth *pramāṇa* such as analogy to be established on the basis of the difference in the factors (producing result) and the result.

That the Buddhists who reject the application of many *pramāṇas* in one object discarded the *samplava* (of *pramāṇas*) is mere fancy of the illusion of their mind. Because if *samplava* is not accepted, the authoritativeness of inference itself cannot be established.

Unless the invariable concomitance (between the probans and probandum) known the probans cannot make the probandum known. And the knowledge of invariable concomitance requires to be preceded by the knowledge of the two related (i.e. the probans and the probandum). And the knowledge of the (two) related which are of the form of

generality (say, smokeness and fireness) is to be acquired by inference. If you hold the opinion that by the same inference the related two also known then the interdependency between perception and inference is quite obvious.[1]

If you say that the knowledge of invariable concomitance which is preceded by the knowledge of the related which can be had by another inference, it cannot be possible even in hundreds of *manvantara*.[2]

Therefore, the perception which makes the invariable concomitance known between that probans and the probandum has to be accepted with reference to the generality (say, fireness and smokeness) also and if it is so *samplava* (of the *pramāṇas*) is inevitable.

(Opponent supporting the Buddhists:) This objection is by (Naiyāyikas), who are not in proper know of the doctrine of the Buddhists.

They (the Buddhists) talk of the operation of words and inference with refrence to the object of *vikalpas*. When the related (two) i.e. generality can be established by those *vikalpas*, there is neither endless regression nor *samplava*.

This is explained as follows :

The *vikalpas* having their forms associated with the image of the *nirvikalpaka - pratyakṣa* acquired by being produced immediately after the *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* behave like the *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*. This working of the inference is with

1. Without knowing the invariable concomitance inference cannot work and without the working of the inference the probans and the probandum cannot be known. And without knowing the probans and probandum, the invariable concomitance cannot be perceived.

2. That is, it will result in endless regression. Because if the invariable concomitance is to be known by another inference, that other inference will also require the knowledge of invariable concomitance. To know this invariable concomitance again another inference is to be employed. That inference will also require the knowledge of invariable concomitance, and so on and so forth. Thus, *anavasthā*.

regard to the universal (say, smokeness and fireness) which is taken as objects by those *vikalpas,* which is imaginary and which is of the nature of being excluded from those other than that (*vastusvalakṣaṇa*). And as the knowledge of gems is indirectly based on the light of the gems, based on gems, similarly a *vikalpa* is based on the *vastusvalakṣaṇa* and so it (*vkalpa*) leads one obtain that (*vastusvalakṣaṇa*). And it (*vikalpa*) does not touch the object which can be known only by *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa.* Therefore, where is the *samplava*? Or where is the endless regression?[1]

(Naiyāyikas) : All this is mere deceiving people. You want invariable concomitance to be based on the relation of identity and on the cause-and-effect relationship. (We ask you:) is that invariable concomitance a property of the real object or of the form imposed by the *vikalpa* i.e. of the universal which is unreal?

It cannot be a property of the imposed form (i.e. the universal which is unreal). Because a real object is produced by a real object and a real object must be of the nature of a real object and so the invariable concomitance is to be accepted as the property of the real object. By the *vikalpas* a real object is never touched whereas the invariable concomitance of the real objects is determined. Wonderful indeed (is your theory)!

Moreover, this is your statement that the invariable concomitance and identity of two real objects is the identity relationship etc. (i.e. the cause-and-effect relationship) and the two universals (say, fireness and smokeness) imposed by the *vikalpas* are the probandum (*jñāpya*) and probans (*jñapaka*) respectively. Thus, somewhere (i.e. in the real

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1. That is, the related two (i.e. smokeness and fireness) are known directly by *vikalpaka pratyakṣa* and not by *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* and so there is no fault of mutual interdependency or endless regression and once the related two are known, the inference alone can operate and not the perception and as such there is no *samplava* (of *pramāṇas*).

objects) is the invariable concomitance and somewhere else (i.e. in the unreal universal say, smokeness) is the means to know the fireness. Somewhere (i.e. in the fireness) is the knowledge and somewhere else (i.e. in the real object) is the volitional effort and obtainment. All this is nothing but deceiving.

Moreover, it is not possible on the part of the *vikalpas,* which are devoid of the touch of the real object, to have the image of the *nirvikalpaka pratykṣa.*

Though the *vikalpa* has in it the nature of determining the object such as 'this is pot, this is blue etc.' and the nature of clearly revealing the object with its particulars, still since it has no association with the real object (i.e. since it does not have the real object as its object but only the generality as its object) those natures are of no use (for establishing its authoritativeness) because the inauthoritativeness (of *vikalpa*) is not removed.

The invariable concomitance determined by *vikalpa* which is not a *pramāṇa* is, really speaking, as good as not determined and therefore, the inferential knowledge got by that (undertermined concomitance) is nothing but false.

(Buddhists) : This is what is intended by us because it is explained that invariable concomitance is the object of *vikalpajñana.*[1]

(Naiyāyikas) : Alas! What is the point in taking effort to prove that the invariable concomitance is also real (because it is between the two real objects)?[2]

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1. All the functions of the inference and that which is to be inferred are possible by the invariable concomitance as well as the universal which are the objects of *vikalpajñāna.* This is what is intended by us. See further Pramāṇavārttika - Svopajñavṛtti p. 2.

2. That is, no harm will be caused if the invariable concomitance is taken as imaginary because after all we have to establish invariable concomitance between two universals say smokeness and fireness and not between two individual momentary real objects. Therefore, better directly accept concomitance between smokeness and fireness.

And as without accepting the operation of *pratyakṣa* with regard to the generality the knowledge of invariable concomitance is impossible and thereby the inference is impossible similarly, a person who has known the concomitance (say, between fire and smoke in the kitchen) cannot have the second perception of the probans (say, the smokeness) and for that reason also the inference is impossible on the part of those (Buddhists) who deny the *samplava* of *pramāṇas*.

Indeed, the individual part (say, a particular smoke) cannot be the probans (but the universal of smoke alone can be the probans). And without inference that universal cannot be known. Therefore, the same contingency of endless regression will be there (in case the two universals are to be known by another inference) and the same contingency of interdependency (if they are to be known by the same inference which is going to come into being later).

The same will remain the way and order to set aside the capacity of *vikalpas* (such as the capacity of revealing the related two i.e. the probans and the probandum).

Therefore, without denying the inference which should be preceded by the perceptual knowledge of concomitance (between say, smoke and fire in the kitchen) and the perceptual knowledge of probans (say, smokeness in the mountain) how can the *samplava* (of *pramāṇas*) be denied?

Moreover, even if it is established that the objects fall under two categories (such as perceptible and inferrable), in spite of that the perception and the inference can mutually operate with refrence to the same object. Because :

An object, even if it is not perceptible can be the object of perception and, even if it is perceptible can be the object of inference according the difference of place and time.[1]

1. Thus, the fire which is perceived in the kitchen becomes the object of inference in the mountain, and the smokeness.

(Buddhists) : Well, when the real object is momentary, how do you say, the same real object becomes the object of inference? To this, the Naiyāyikas say: We are going to refute this theory of yours called *kṣaṇabhaṅga* later.[1] Moreover, in order to establish that *pratyakṣa* is a *pramāṇa* because whatever it reveals, the same is obtained by man, as you had postulated the chain of momentary objects. Let the same chain be postulated in order to justify the sameness of the object of perception as well as that of inference of both the perception as well as the inference which will lead to *samplava* only.[2]

Moreover, that (the Buddhists) with a mind to refute the category of generality adopted the refutation of *samplava* will be answered by supporting the category of generality.

By (my showing) the defects in your arguments, the objections raised by you are automatically turned down. And therefore, that more than one *pramāṇas* can operate with reference to one object, then is something like whole and that there is the category of universal is certainly a good (.e. factual) statement.

You said that the *samplava* (of *pramāṇas*) cannot be accepted because in that case there will arise the contingency of a *pramāṇa* causing contradictory knowledge and being purposeless. But the contingency of a *pramāṇa* being purposeless has already been avoided by mere refuting (the necessity of) the adjective (in the definition of *pramāṇa*) such as 'being the revealer of that object which is not yet known.'

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1. Nyāya Mañ. ii. 25.
2. This is what is meant : As although the *svalakṣaṇa*, the object of perception and that which is to be obtained are different, in order to prove the sameness of both, a chain of the same momentary object is postulated and thus as it is proved that *pratyakṣa* is the means of valid knowledge since what was shown by it, the same is obtained similarly, although the object is momentary, with reference to the chain of an momentary object what harm is there if it is accepted that the same chain can be the object of both perception as well as inference?

Nor is there any chance of its (of the *pramāṇa*) producing a contradictory knowledge. Because it does not produce the successive knowledge contrary to the first knowledge like the knowledge of "this is not silver" (which is contradictory to the earlier knowledge of 'this is silver' after seeing a conch-shell).

When a person sometimes determines or discovers some particular property (together with already known properties) in an object having its form qualified with (i.e. possessed of) a heap of several qualities, where is the contradiction?

You had also doubted that if perception, words and inference have the same object they will produce the similar cognition. To this some have said that it is but true that in spite of object remaining the same the difference in the means can cause difference in the cognition like the cognitions of objects which are placed at a distant place and those placed near the perceiver.

Others, however, think that difference in the cognition is not caused due to the difference of means; but (it is caused) due to the difference of objects only. When an object is known as placed near and when it is known as (placed) far away (i.e. beyond perception) they are (to be taken as) different. From a long distance an object possessed of its generality alone is known, whereas from close one perceives all its qualities. Therefore, the cognitions produced by perception, inference and words are different because their objects (*prameyas*) are different.

The perceptual knowledge touches an object along with its (i.e. of the object) particular qualities; whereas the inferential knowledge (touches) mere the generality of it as per the knowledge of invariable concomitance, as per the knowledge of invariable concomitance.

From a word, on the other hand, the knowledge delmitted by the word alone is produced with reference to the meaning

of that word. Because with reference to the meaning of a word there can be no knowledge to word-meaning bereft of the association with the word.

(Buddhists) : (If this is so that the objects of different *pramāṇas* are different and therefore, the knowledges are different) then where is the *samplava* of those (*pramāṇas*)? Because (you yourself have) shown that there is difference in the object (of each *pramāṇa*).

(Naiyāyikas) : True. But, keeping in mind the (sameness of a thing to be known) we are advocating *samplava* of *pramāṇas*. Moreover, we are going to discuss these two views (such as the difference in the means causes the difference in the cognition and the difference in the object causes the difference in the cognition) later. In any way, it is established that there is *samplava* of *pramāṇas*. The *Bhāṣyakāra* of the *Nyāyasūtra* has given the example of that (= *samplava*). (He has said:) "(A person desirous of fires first) comes to know from the words of a reliable man that there is fire (at a distant place). When he approaches towards (that place of fire) he sees the smoke and infers thereby that 'there is fire.' When he reaches that place, he perceives that fire' etc."[1] (That is, with refernece to the same fire all the three *pramāṇas* such as word, inference and perception could operate and thus the *samplava* of *pramāṇas* is established).

Sometimes, however, we find the restriction (of the application of *pramāṇas*). For example, for a Vedic sentence like "One desirous of heaven should perform the *Agnihotra* sacrifice" from word alone we get the knowledge (of heaven) and not by perception and inference. After hearing the sound of the clouds, the knowledge of the cause of that (sound) i.e. of the clouds is by inference only and not by either perception or words. (Similarly) "here are my two hands"-this knowledge is had by perception alone and not by words and inference.

1. G. Jha Edn. p. 11, line 13.

Therefore, it is resolved that normally the different *pramāṇas* can operate with regard to a single object, but sometimes they are restricted also to certain (types of) objects.

Thus, this *samplava* (of *pramāṇas*) which is saved or protected from the entire fear from the attach of the bundle of objections raised by the Buddhists is hereby established. And all the long-settled desires to establish that there are only two *pramāṇas* (i.e. perception and inference) and only two (types of) objects (such as perceptible ones and imperceptible ones) in the minds of the Buddhists remain unfulfilled.

Thus, we examined the view of the Cārvākas, the Buddhists and the Sāṁkhyas that *pramāṇas* are less (than four).

Now the view (of the Mīmāṁsakas) that the *pramāṇas* are more (than four) is being examined.

According to Prabhākara there are five *pramāṇas*, the perception (inference, words and analogy the four) plus *arthāpatti* (presumptive testimony). *Anupalabdhi* being added they are six in number according to the Bhaṭṭa school (of Mīmāṁsā). With *sambhava*[1] and *aitihya*[2] they are eight according to some (Purāṇa tradition). The well educated (Cārvākas (say that) one cannot limit the number of *pramāṇas* (i.e. they are innumerable).[3]

The followers of the Bhaṭṭa-school, however, explain the *Arthāpatti* as follows:

1. *Sambhava - pramāṇa* is described as that by which one knows that a smaller number is included in the greater one. For example, the number nine is included in number ten.
2. *Aitihya-pramāṇa* is said to be that by which one comes to know some idea believed through centuries. For instance, there is ghost on the tree.
3. *Śrutārthāpatti* is concerned with the *śabdapramāṇa*, whereas other *Arthāpattis* deal with the actual objects. This is their main difference.

The postulation of some other meaning without which no seen or heard object is possible is known as *arthāpatti*. *Dṛṣṭa* (= seen) means known by either of the five *pramāṇas* such as perception etc. (= inference, analogy, Absence and *Arthāpatti*). *Śruta* means a meaning known from words - either Vedic or popular words. From that (meaning) to postulate another meaning without which that heard meaning cannot be possible is called *arthāpatti*. Thus, since it (the *arthāpatti*) arises out of six *pramāṇas*, it is of six kinds.

Although by the word *dṛṣṭa* meaning known the purpose is served (i.e. all the arthāpattis could be covered), still stating *śrutārthāpatti* separately is due to the fact that it (*śrutārthāpatti*) is different from the other five *Arthāpattis* which deal with the objects (*prameyas*) because it concerns with a part of the *śrutipramāṇa*.[1]

The *arthāpatti* preceded by perception is of the following type : to postulate the burning power of fire because without that the directly experienced effect of burning caused by the contact of fire cannot be possible.

The arthāpatti preceded by inference is of the following type : to postulate the power of movement of the Sun without which the movement of the sun inferred on the basis of the probans such as reaching another place (in the sky)[1] is impossible.

The *arthāpatti* preceded by analogy is of the following type : to postulate the capacity of being revealed by the knowledge of analogy on the part of the cow without which the knowledge of the cow possessed of the similarity with the *gavaya* known by analogy is impossible.

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1. Say, in the morning the Sun was seen in the East, but in the evening he is seen in the West. This is based on the empirical observation.

Therefore, these (three) *arthāpattis* are different *pramāṇas* because they deal with the power which is beyond perception.

Because it is impossible to perceive power, it is impossible to know the invariable concomitance (between power and object etc.) which depends on perception and therefore, power cannot be the object of inference.

The *anvaya (vyāpti)* (sequence of positive factors) and the *vyatireka* sequence of negation) depend upon the (perceptible) forms of things. Whereas the power in them which is minute (i.e. beyond perception) can not be known through those *anvaya* and *vyatireka-vyāpti*.

There is no possibility, at all, of (the operation of) words and analogy (with regard to the power) and as such the (power) is the object of the *arthāpatti* only.

The *arthāpatti* preceded by *arthāpatti* could be exemplified as follows : after knowing the expressive power of a word without which it is impossible to know the meaning from a word, to postulate the eternal nature of that word without which it is difficult to know the expressive power of that word is called *arthāpatti* preceded by *arthāpatti*. This *Arthāpatti* will be stated later in the *sabdaparīkṣā*-section.[1]

The *Arthāpatti* preceded by absence has been exemplified by the *Bhāṣyakāra*[2] (Śabarasvāmin) as follows : to postulate the outside existence of living Caitra without which it is impossible to know the absence of living Caitra in the house.

(Naiyāyikas) : Well, establishment of unseen by seen can be done by inference only. (There is no necessity of positing *arthāpatti* for that).

1. *Nyāyamañjarī*, pp. 189-200.
2. *Śābarabhāṣya on.* 1.1.5.

(Mīmaṁsakas) : No. It is not inference because there is absence of necessary factors for inference. The knowledge which is produced by the factors such as the knowledge of the existence of the probans in the subject, etc. is called inference. This is the doctrine of the Naiyāyikas, (known to us)! That (*sāmagrī*) is not found here. (Accepting that this can be included in infrence in that case Caitra qualified by the outside existence or the outside existence qualified by Caitra can be the probandum. But with reference to this probandum what can be the probans? This requires consideration. Is Caitra qualified by his absence in the house the probans? Or, the house qualified by the absence of Caitra or the absence itself of Caitra in the house or the non-perception of Caitra there? None of these is found in the subject. Neither the house, nor Caitra, nor the absence of Caitra nor is the property of either Caitra or of his outside existence. Therefore, since none of these is found in the subject, none of these can be the probans.

Moreover, there will arise the contingency of the inclusion of probandum (in the probans) and so because of this also, this (Arṭhapatti) is not inference. It can be explained as follows: Since there is the absence of Caitra in the house whose living is known from his horoscope, it is postulated that Caitra is somewhere outside. (The house).

Otherwise, if he is dead the probans (i.e. the non-existence of Caitra in the house) will become *anaikāntika* (straying reason). Moreover, non-existence (of Caitra), when known, indicates the existence (of Caitra) out-side; it does not indicate that if it is not known, like smoke (with reference to the inference of fire). The knowledge of non-existence is always preceded by non-operation of all the means of valid knowledge to know the *pratiyogi* (counter-correlative). In the case under consideration, however, there is the means of valid knowledge (such as words in the horoscope of Caitra) to know the existence (of Caitra). Life

is called existence somewhere. But, when the means of valid knowledge such as *jyotiśśāstra* (to know the existence of Caitra) is not non-operative (i.e., when it is operative) how can the non-existence of Caitra be known? In fact, it is known and so it (the non-existence) causes the means of valid knowledge (such as the words) to have separate object such as outside existence of Caitra and his non-existence at home. Therefore, since it is the fact that the knowledge of non-existence (of Caitra in the house) is preceded by the settlement of outside existence of living (Caitra), the probandum (such as the outside existence of living Caitra) is included in the probans i.e. the probandum is known before the probans is known.

In the case of inference, however, at the time of the knowledge of the probans such as smoke etc. there is not even the slightest touch of the inclusion of the probandum such as fire inferrable by the smoke.

(Naiyāyikas) : Well, is the inclusion of the *upapādya* in the *upapādaka* not a defect with regard to the *arthāpatti*?[1]

(Mīmāṁsakas) : We say it is not a defect. (Because) the *Arthāpatti* operates in order to settle the existence and non-existence pertaining to the single object (Caitra) known by the two *pramāṇas* such as words and *Anupalabdhi* respectively and naturally it touches two objects such as existence and non-existence (of an object). Otherwise (i.e. if *Arthāpatti* were not there, it would be impossible to justify the co-existence of the two contradictory aspects (such as existence and non-existence of the same object). Therefore, the knowledge on the basis of the *Jyotiśśāstra* that (Caitra) exists somewhere without the knowledge of the particular place (of his

1. In *Arthāpatti* also, the *upapādya* is known before the knowledge of *upapādaka*. Because, knowing that unless living Caitra exists out side, his absence in the house cannot be justified and as such his outside existence is postulated. Thus, at the time of knowing the *upapādya*, the *upapādaka* is also known.

existence) has amounted now to the knowledge that since Caitra is not found in the house, he must be outside. Therefore, because of this difference *Arthāpatti* is not inference. Also because it is impossible to know the invariable concomitance (between non-existence of Caitra and his existence outside), *Arthāpatti* cannot be inference.

It is impossible to know for a person the non-existence (of Caitra) in the house and (his) existence outside (the house) simultaneously as co-existing like (the co-existence of) fire and smoke. First, the knowledge of invariable concomitance can be had by *arthāpatti* such as without the outside existence of Caitra, his non-existence in the house is impossible and after that inference can operate if you say, you are at liberty to say so. (We have no objection).

(Naiyāyikas) : (There is no necessity of resorting to *arthāpatti* in order to know the concomitance) one can have the knowledge of concomitance (directly by perception) when Caitra is found at the door outside the house.[1]

(Mīmaṁsakas) : But, how can this (i.e. the direct knowledge of concomitance) be possible in the case of establishing the (outside) non-existence (of, say, Caitra) by existence (of, say, Caitra in the house)?

In the case where after knowing the existence of Caitra in the house one understands his non-existence out-side the house because without that his existence in the house is impossible, there it is impossible to know the concomitance (between his existence in the house and non-existence outside the house) because of the vastness or infiniteness of places (outside the house).[2]

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1. Because one can see both the non-existence of Caitra in the house and his presence at the door out side the house.
2. Knowledge of non-existence is impossible without the knowledge of the substratum. It is impossible to know all the places of this world outside the house. And unless all the places outside the house are known the non-existence of Caitra cannot be known and unless that is known the invariable concomitance cannot be known.

(Naiyāyikas) : Then, what about the determination of non-existence of smoke (in a place) where there is no fire?

(Mīmaṁsakas) : Here is the answer. When it is possible to know the *anvayasahacāra* (sequence of positive factors) of smoke and fire, there is no need of the knowledge of *vyatirekasahacāra* (sequence of negative factors). For persons who are satisfied by the knowledge of the probandum got on the basis of the knowledge of the invariable concomitance easily acquired by repeated observations (of the co-existence of smoke and fire at various places), what is the necessity of knowing the non-existence of smoke where there is no fire?

In the present case, however, even at the time of determining the *anvaya-sahacāra* (of existence of Caitra in the house and his absence outside) it is difficult to know the existence of the probandum (such as non-existence of Caitra outside) because (the non-existence of Caitra) exists in infinite places.

If you say that by *anupalabdhi pramāṇa* the knowledge of that (non-existence of Caitra out the house) can be had, it is not true. Because it is impossible to know the non-existence of Caitra prevailing all the places of the world outside the house, through the *anupalabdhi - pramāṇa* which has taken into account only a few places.

(Naiyāyikas) : If I determine his non-existence by travelling all those places (of the world) outside the house by not finding him, then?

(Mīmaṁsakas) : (Even then) it is impossible. Even if you travel all those places you cannot know his non-existence. Because, by the time you leave Kauśāmbi, there is the possibility of his entering Kauśāmbī.

Therefore, this is not the place for those who are not all-knowing. So, by *arthāpatti* alone the outside non-existence of Caitra can be known.

(Naiyāyikas) : We can know that (outside non-existence on the basis of inside existence) by inference as follows:

Other places are devoid of Caitra because those places are different places compared to the place where Caitra exists, like the place adjacent to the place of Caitra.

(Mīmaṁsakas) : It is not tenable, because it can be set aside by the counter-inference as follows:

Other places are not devoid of caitra because those places are different from the place adjacent to the place of Caitra, like the place where Caitra exists.

Therefore, it is established that *Arthāpatti* determines the non-existence in all places other than the house without which the existence of the man (Caitra) having limited size and existing in a particular place is impossible.

After hearing the sentence with expectancy such as "A fat man does not eat during the day time," the knowledge of the part of the sentence (such as "then he eats at night") is called *śrutārthāpatti*.

Here, after hearing such an incomplete sentence (from meaning point of view) the already acquired knowledge of (Caitra's) eating at night should be produced by other *pramāṇas,* because perception etc. have no scope. Perception which can produce the knowledge of his eating at night cannot operate because (his eating) is beyond perception. Nor can inference, because even if one does not have the knowledge of invariable concomitance one can have the knowledge of that (eating at night). There is no scope for any doubt regarding the operation of Analogy etc. Therefore, the knowledge of his eating at night can be had from words only. And words unless heard are not capable of conveying this sense (of his eating at night). Because, a single sentence is devoid of conveying both positive and negative meanings at-a-time (such as "the fat man does not eat during day time" and "He eats at night)". Here, the

words *rātri* 'night' etc. (i.e. *rātrau bhuṅkte* 'he takes food at night') are not found mentioned and as such what is not the meaning of a word (found mentioned) cannot be the meaning of a sentence.

Nor can the meaning such as 'he eats at night' be taken as either difference or relation existing in the meanings of the words of the sentence 'the fat man does not eat during day time.' Had it been so, even if it was not the meaning of the mentioned words of the sentence it would have been the object in the knowledge of the sentence 'the fat man does not eat during day time'.

Therefore, the knowledge that "he eats at night' is caused by the postulated words. But by what *pramāṇa* that sentence (he eats at night) is postulated requires consideration.

The sense-organ (i.e. ears) does not have the capacity to reveal the unheard or unuttered words. The inference also is not capable of postulating that sentence because even without knowing the invariable concomitance one can know the meaning (he eats at night).[1]

Moreover, (though in the case of ordinary speech we can hear someone saying 'he eats at night' and thus the knowledge of concomitance is possible, still) in some cases (i.e. in the case of some incomplete Vedic sentences) the knowledge of invariable concomitance also is impossible because the probandum (i.e. the postulated Vedic injunction) is always beyond perception. There the injunctive sentence is postulated on the basis of the five *pramāṇas* such as *prakaraṇa* etc.[2]

1. If one has the knowledge of invariable concomitance before hand by observing several cases where the fat person who is not taking meals by day does take meals at night, he can infer the eating at night. But if does not have that knowledge, it is impossible to get the knowledge (of eating at night) by inference. Because although he can his eating but it is not possible to infer his eating *at night*. Since it is not possible to have the knowledge of concomitance between the probans and probandum.

2. *Liṅga*, *Vākya* etc.

The injunctive Vedic sentence is postulated by the Mīmaṁsakas every where in *prakaraṇa* etc. As it is said (in the *Tantravārttika* on 3.3.14) that "in all these *pramāṇas* (*prakaraṇa* etc.) the postulation of injunctive sentence is approved (by the Mīmaṁsakas)." And since that (postulated sentence) is ever beyond perception it is difficult to know the invariable concomitance between the probans (and probandum).

Moreover, it is impossible to infer the existence of the sentence "he eats at night" when that (existence) is the probandum. Because a reason which possesses both *bhāvadharma*[1] and *abhāvādharma*,[2] becomes a non-reason if it is affected by either of fallacious reasons such as *asiddhatva*, *viruddhatva*, and *vyabhicāritva*. Here, we do not get any reason by which we can infer that "he eats at night" has existence like the mountain having fire. Neither the sentence "the fat man does not eat during day" nor its meaning is capable of being the reason to infer the sentence "he eats at night."

Unless the sentence "he eats at night" is heard how can it be known that the reason exists in that sentence? And once that is heard what is the purpose of knowing the existence of the reason in the subject (i.e. the sentence 'he eats at night')?

(Naiyyikas) : Well, let the meanings of the words of the sentence "the fat man does not eat during day" be kept aside as the reason (to infer the sentence "he eats at night"). Even by *Arthāpatti* it cannot postulate the sentence "he eats at night." Because the meanings of words are of the nature of universals and so without the particular individual they (meaning) may not fit in; but it is not true that they will not fit in without another sentence. Therefore, the heard sentence (i.e. the fat man does not eat during day) itself

1. It means "the existence of probans in the subject where there is probandum".
2. It means "no-existence of probans in a place other than the subject where there is no probandum."

postulates the part of the whole sentence (because) without that it cannot conclude its own function such as conveying the complete idea. This is what is called *śrutārthāpatti*, which has as its object a part of the whole *śabdapramāṇa*.

(Prābhākaras) : Well, why don't you postulate the meaning (his eating at night) on the basis of the meaning (fatness without eating during day)? Because fatness is the effect of eating and since it is seen, it will postulate its cause 'eating' like the smoke will postulate its cause 'fire.' That (meaning "his eating") when desired at a particular time (i.e. during day) will, automatically, pertain to the time (i.e. night) different from that time (i.e. day). Therefore, what is the point in postulating the sentence ("he eats at night)? After all, a sentence also is not meant for any unseen for result, it is meant for the understanding of meaning only! So, what harm will be there if directly the meaning itself (i.e. eating at night) is postulated? What for this via-media (of postulation of sentence and then getting the meaning)?

(Mīmāṁsakas) : O boy! you appear to be not conversant in the discipline of the word-testimony. (Don't you kow that) the sentence "the fat man does not eat during day" which produces incomplete knowledge will become inauthoritative?

Moreover, as is the perception etc. which ceases after having seen a part of an object placed before (us) so is not the word-testimony. Because, without conveying the meaning of the (whole) sentence which is complete with all its necessary parts the function of a sentence does not cease. And an expression is authoritative if it conveys so much knowledge (i.e. complete idea). A sentence is called a sentence because it expresses its meaning. Therefore, first of all, one should complete the part of the (whole) sentence by supplying the part of the word-testimony. Otherwise, without that (part of the sentence) how can one have the knowledge of the meaning?

Generally, by *śrutārthāpatti* a Vedic sentence is postulated with reference to the Vedic injunction. If (according to you) directly the meaning is postulated then (that postulated meaning) cannot be taken as Vedic (because that is postulated by a person and that will not be the meaning of a Vedic sentence). On the strength of the meaning of the *mantras* expressing *Aṣṭakā* - rite, an injunctive sentence (to enjoin these *mantras* to the Aṣṭaka-rite) is postulated. That by the *pramāṇas* such as *liṅga* etc. an injunctive sentence is postulated is also (by *śrutārthāpatti*). A sentence expressing the result of *Viśvajit* - sacrifice is postulated on the basis of the mere injunctive sentence 'One should perform the Viśvajit - sacrifice." On the strength of the mention of the result in the sentence "One desirous of *brahmavarcas* should keep separately the food meant for the sun," the sentence enjoining the Saura - sacrifice is postulated.

In the sentences enjoining the *Vikṛti-yāga* such as *Aindrāgnis* etc. since there is mention of only the sacrifice we postulated all the sentences, enjoining auxiliary rites found in the original (Darśapūrṇamāsa-) sacrifice. (All these postulations done by *śrutarthāpatti* only).

Therefore, since it is not possible to have the knowledge of invariable concomitance (in all these cases mentioned above); it is nothing but *śrutārthāpatti* which is hereby established without any hindrance. By that *(śrutārthāpatti)* a part of the whole sentence is postulated.

According to the view, that instead of postulating the sentence let the meaning be postulated directly, it will not be possible to say that the postulated meaning is Vedic (and as such it will be inauthoritative). Thus we explained this *arthāpatti* arising out of the six *pramāṇas*.

(Naiyāyikas) : When one scrutinises the nature of this (*arthāpatti*) (one finds that) it does not differ from inference. A thing cannot indicate another thing unless it is in

invariable concomitance (with that thing). After seeing a particular object one does not get the knowledge of any object whatsoever. Moreover, even the concomitance, unless it is known, cannot be the cause of knowledge. The children, just-born, do not get that knowledge (of five by seeing the smoke. Although there is the invariable concomitance between five and smoke).

Where it is impossible to have knowledge of invariable concomitance in a particular (probans) even there we do have the knowledge of that (concomitance) in a general way.

Moreover, the statement that without (eating at night), (the fatness of the person who does not eat during day) is not possible is a negative reasoning. And once this negative reasoning is known it postulates the positive reasoning such as where there eating at night there is fatness of one who does not eat during day. And when it is an established fact that both positive and negative reasonings are the property of the probans, how do you say that *arthāpatti* is not inference? A probans which is said to be *kevalavyatireki* (i.e. having only the negative reasoning) is based on the positive reasoning only. We will explain this later on.[1]

Those *arthāpatti's* preceded by perception etc. which you described in order to postulate (the entity such as) power have no object whatsoever because there is nothing like imperceptible power (in this world).

The produced effect (say, burning of the hand) from the object as it is (say, fire) associated with the auxiliary factors cannot postulate that imperceptible power (of fire).

(Mīmāṁsaka) : Well, without the power a *kāraka* cannot be treated as *kāraka*. For example, as a person who wants to cut a tree picks up the axe so he would have picked up a shoe also (to cut the tree, but he does not do so. He picks up the axe

1. Nyāyamañjarī, p.111.

only, therefore, it is clear that the axe alone has in it the capacity to cut and not the shoe. That is why, he does not pick up that).

If the power is not accepted, since the nature of being a substance is common to all the things, there will arise the contingency of the production of all effects from all objects always. Thus, if power is not accepted in the poison and fire with reference to killing (by poison) and burning (by fire), then what is the reason that when they are deterred with the *mantras,* although, one feels that it the same poison or fire, they become ineffective (i.e. the poison doe not kill and fire does not burn)? It is certain that the *mantra* does not remove the proximity of the favourable factors (of killing and burning) because we know that the same proximity is there (i.e. say, the poison is in the body, hand is touching the fire). The power (of poison and fire), however, is deterred (by mantra) and that is why, although there is the form of poison and fire intact and although there are favourable factors present still no effect is produced. Moreover, in spite of the sameness of the taking (of medicine etc.) and earnings when we find difference in the result, you too have postulated some imperceptible cause (of this difference in result) such as *dharma* and *adharma.* So, in the same manner you should accept imperceptible power (in objects).

This is incorrect. To your statement that people pick up only an axe to cut a tree and not a shoe, the following is the answer.

We, to-day, are not capable of proposing any new cause-and-effect relationship of things. But, we simply follow the already existing (cause-and-effect relationship), and use accordingly. Even if we want, water will not remove cold or fire will not remove thirst. In the case of cutting (a tree) on the strength of the positive and negative reasoning or on the basis of the activities of the elderly (i.e. reliable) persons

we understand that the axe alone is the cause (of cutting the tree) and when we want that (cutting of the tree) we pick up only that (i.e. axe) and not the shoe etc.

You cannot argue that when the form of the axe is just in contact with tree, it will produce the result (i.e. the division) because as it requires its form it also requires the favourable factors (such as lifting up and striking) and it is not possible that it will always be associated with the favourable factors (and therefore, although it has the form it does not always produce result). In the group of favourable factors *adharma* and *dharma* also are included. And when those (i.e. favourable factors) are required for the production of result how can the result be there?

The postulation of *dharma* and *adharma*, however, is unavoidable because without that the difference in the result cannot be explained. And (it is to be noted that) they are imperceptible not because they are power but just on the strength of their form or nature.

That, in spite of the like, mind, atom etc. contact with poison and fire no effect (of killing and burning) is produced when *mantra* is applied is not caused by the obstraction of the power, rather it is caused by the entrance of another factor (such as the deterrent factor).

(Mīmāṁsakas) : What did the *mantra* do entering (i.e. coming in contact with poison and fire)?

(Naiyāyikas) : It did nothing. It simply produced the deterrent factor. Some factor, after all, is the cause of some effect. (Factor bereft of different factor produces the effect).

(Mīmāṁsakas) : But, there is no change in the form of poison and fire (then why should it not produce the effect?)

(Naiyāyikas) : If so, then why does the unconsumed poison not kill man?

(Mīmāṁsakas) : There, the contact of poison with the mouth (i.e. the helping factor) is required (to produce the effect of killing).

(Naiyāyikas) : Then, let it require the absence of *mantra* also. As at the time of testing of an accused by asking him to bold an extremely hot iron rod in his hands merits (*dharma*) of that man make the fire ineffective; in the same way, *mantra* as well when uttered into (the fire) makes it (fire) ineffective. According to the *śakti* - doctrine also what is the function of the *mantra*? Is it destroying of the power or its obstruction?

You cannot say that it (*mantra*) destroys the power because we see that when the *mantra* is removed, again effect occurs. Then, you should say it obstructs. In that case, as you say power is obstructed, we can say let the form be obstructed.

(Mīmāṁsakas) : Then, what happens to the form?

(Naiyāyikas) : What happen to your power?

(Mīmāṁsakas) : It is indifferent with reference to the production of the result.

(Naiyāyikas) : The same thing happens in the other case also. There is the form since it is seen.

(Mīmāṁsakas) : The power also is there since we can infer it by observing the effect again.

(Naiyāyikas) : Moreover, when you accept power do you accept it as continuously present in the object or as being produced one? If you say it is continuously present in the object then an object should always produce the effect. If you say, it requires favourable factors to produce the effect then let the form itself require those factors. What is the necessity to go for power?

If you take power as being produceable then is it produced by mere form or it is produced by the factors

favourable for its production? If you say it is produced by the mere form then again there will be the contingency of always-production of effects because the power will be produced always. If, on the other hand, you say that it (power) is produced by the helpful factors, then let the effect be produced (directly) by the helping factors; what is the use of the intermediate power?

If you say, unless a *kāraka* is powerful it cannot produce the effect, then (your) power is also an effect and so another power is required to be postulated in order to produce that power and this postulated power also is an effect and therefore, it also requires some power to produce it and so on and so forth; thus the endless regression!

(Mīmāṁsakas) : It is said-The unseen (power) is postulated in order to establish the seen (effect) and for the destruction of the seen (effect) of another power is to be postulated and for that, again, another power and thus if we exhaust ourselves in postulating a series of powers there will be the destruction of the effect (i.e. effect will never be produced). Therefore, only one power is postulated and so where is the contingency of endless regression?

(Naiyāyikas) : Here is the answer. If without the unseen (power) the seen (effect) is not possible you are at liberty to postulate that unseen (power). But if the effect can be produced even without that what is the use of its postulation? We have already shown how without power effect is produced. And even if you want to postulate the unseen (power) you should postulate in such a way that there would not arise any contingency of endless regression, like (the postulation of) *dharma* (merits). Moreover, the function (of a *kāraka*) is also taken by you as imperceptible like the power. When by postulating either of these effect is produced, what is the point in postulating the both and making it?

(Mīmāṁsakas) : Even if a *kāraka* is powerful but if it is not engaged in action it cannot be called a *kāraka.* (So, the postulation of both is necessary).

(Naiyāyikas) : How do I know then (i.e. before the taking place of effect) that (a *kāraka* is) powerful.

(Mīmāṁsakas) : I can know it after (the taking place of) the effect.

(Naiyāyikas) : The effect will be produced by the action (of the *Kārakas* involved).

(Mīmāṁsakas) : But even if a shoe etc. is engaged in action, no cutting of the tree is seen.

(Naiyāyikas) : Then, you must say that the action is seen and it is not imperceptible. Because even before (the taking of) the effect you could know the nature of its being engaged in action. Because (according to you) the action (of a *kāraka*) which is inferred on the basis of the effect cannot be known unless effect has taken place. The effect, however, can be produced by either of them (the function or the power) and so it (the effect) cannot postulate both. Enough of the discussion! Let us come to the main topic.

Therefore, since there is nothing like imperceptible power your *arthāpattis* as explained above have no object whatsoever.

Or, even if there is imperceptible power, it is the object of the inference only; because it is possible to have the knowldge of invariable concomitance in a general way such as an effect must be preceded by its cause. Here, when the form (of fire) alone cannot be the cause of burning (because in the presence of *mantra* it does not burn) some (cause) is to be inferred and let that cause be the power.

While establishing the permanency of phonemes, you have talked about the *arthāpatti.* That, *arthāpatti* will be refuted in the *sabdaparikṣā*-section.

The *arthāpatti* preceded by negation is nothing but inference. Because one can know the outside existence (of Caitra) on the basis of his being alive and still not found in the house. The absence of Caitra in the house is the subject; That is possessed of Caitra as existing outside is the property which is to be established (i.e. inferred), the reason for which is the absencehood of living person (Caitra) in the house, like such absence in the house known earlier. For example, smoke is the subject; that (smoke) is possessed of fire is to be established (i.e. inferred) because of its being a smoke is the reason like the smoke known earlier.

Therefore, your objection that the house (where the Caitra absence is there) cannot be the probans to infer his outside existence and so inference has no scope. Here is simply making much ado for nothing.

The defect pointed out by you such as the inclusion of probandum at the time of knowing the probans itself has also no base. What is your object of inference here? Is it the mere existence (of Caitra) or the existence qualified by the out-side place? The mere existence is, however, already known his horoscope and so it cannot be an object of any other means of valid knowledge. The existence qualified by the place outside, however, can be the object of inference. But, how do you say, that (existence qualified by the place outside) is included in the probans? The means of valid knowledge (i.e. the *anupalabdhi - pramāṇa*) by which one knows the absence of Caitra in the house simply sets aside the application of all other *pramānas* by which that (*pratiyogin* i.e. Caitra) could be known in the house only and it does not bother about the existence or non-existence of it (*pratiyogin*) out-side.

It is of no consideration, whatsoever, while knowing the absence of (Caitra) in the house, whether he is dead, or alive or, whether he is far away or standing in the court-yard.

But when he is known as living (his absence in the house) can be the probans because in that case there is no fallacy.

Nor can you argue that the knowledge of the adjunct (such as he is living) itself is the knowledge of the probandum (qualified by that adjunct). In fact, living is different, and his outside existence is different which is the object of our inference.

(Mīmāṁsakas) : Well, the knowledge of the absence of living (Caitra) in the house itself is the knowledge of his existing outside house.

(Naiyāyikas) : No. It is not so. From the knowledge of the absence of living (Caitra) in the house, his outside existence is known. The knowledge of that (absence of living Caitra in the house) itself is not the knowledge of (his) outside existence. Because the knowledge of smoke itself which in the substratum of fire is not the knowledge of fire.

(Mīmāṁsakas) : Well, fire is different from smoke.

(Naiyāyikas) : Similarly, here also, the existence (of Caitra) is different from his absence in the house and his being alive.

(Mīmāṁsakas) : Since both the mountain and the fire are already is known there (i.e. in the case of the inference of fire on the mountain) simply only this much which was not known earlier is inferred that mountain possess fire.

(Naiyāyikas) : Similarly, here also what is to be inferred is the mere existence of Caitra outside not known earlier. If, however, you do not consider that additional entity (i.e. outside existence of Caitra) as the *prameya*, then since the absence of Caitra in the house and his being alive are already known by the respective *pramāṇas* (such as *anupalabdhi* and the Horoscope) the *arthāpattipramāṇa* becomes purposeless. Therefore, since the inference has a different *prameya* (i.e. Caitra's mere outside existence) and since that is not included then (at the time of knowing his absence in the house) there is no defect called *prameyānupraveśa* (if inference operates). Moreover, the same defect of *prameyānupraveśa* can be shown in the case of *arthāpatti* also.

There too it is accepted (by your school) that from the same thing[1] another thing is postulated. "A seen or heard object is not fitting in and so (in order to justify or suit that meaning) another object is postulated". This is what is stated in your text (i.e. *Śāb.* Bh. 1.1.5). Where this is the usage that something is understood on the basis of something (say, Caitra's existence outside the house is known from the knowledge of his absence in the house) there with reference to the knowledge of that (absence) in the house the inclusion of that (the knowledge of Caitra's outside existence) is certainly a defect. Because, as in the case of (the knowledge of) the reason which of the nature of probandum its substratum (i.e. the tree) is automatically known (because without tree the existence of Sissoo is impossible). Through the knowledge of the reason in the sentence "This is tree because it is Sissoo" the probandum (i.e. tree) is established and after that (to know the tree) any other *pramāṇa* will become purposeless.

The followers of the Prābhākara-school, however, explain the difference of *arthāpatti* from Inference in a different way. In Inference, "not being otherwise possible" is an adjunct of the probans. (For example) without fire, the existence of smoke is impossible. Here (i.e. in the case of *arthāpatti*) on the other hand, it is reverse. The probandum (*gamya*) is impossible without the probans. The *gamya* is (Caitra's) outside existence. This (outside existence) is impossible without the absence of living Caitra in the house. When he has gone out of house and when he is living, he must be existing outside. They (*Prābhākaras*) interpret (the passage of) the *Śābarabhāṣya* also in the following manner:

Seen or heard object means the postulater of the object i.e. it postulates another. Because that postulation (which is through the *prameya* i.e. it is impossible otherwise. The to be postulated object is otherwise impossible and that is *gamya*.

1. To be postulated

Because the postulation is impossible otherwise since the object of postulation is impossible otherwise (i.e. the impossibility of the postulation is through the impossibility of the object of postulation).

(Naiyāyikas) : This also is mere (an attempt to) show the difference (between what has been said by the Bhāṭṭa-school and what has been said by your school). In fact, there is nothing new to be imagined. (Moreover, even if it is accepted what you say) unless the *gamya* is known, how can you know the impossibility (*anupapadyamānatva*) of that (*gamya*)? And once *gamya* is known what is the purpose of knowing the impossibility of that *gamya*? Because the probandum is already established (i.e. known).

(Prābhākaras) : If we say, sometimes before the impossibility of *gamya* was known; then?

(Naiyāyikas) : What a great difference (you are showing of *arthāpatti*) from Inference!! In that case, it would have been taken as the knowledge of invariable concomitance before.

Moreover, if you say, (Caitra's) outside existence is impossible without his absence in the house, then you will have to say the possibility such as when his absence is in the house what is that (*upapatti*)? he exists outside. Now, whether that (i.e. his outside existence) is a product or knowledge? If it is knowledge, that can (be said) in the case of inference also. A probandum cannot be known unless there is probans. And when there is probans, the knowledge of probandum is possible. So, equal is the position.

That (Caitra's) outside existence is produced by his absence in his house is impossible to say. If his absence in the house is established (known) before, his outside existence should be produced (at least) after a moment. Because, a cause which exists before (the effect) alone is capable of producing the effect. Therefore, (in the present case since both the absence in the house and his outside

existence are simultaneous) in the same moment, (you will have to say that) although he is living, he is neither in the house nor outside.

Therefore, this (view) is insignificant.

Similarly, that some say that the difference (of *arthāpatti* from Inference) is caused by both knowledge (i.e. the *gamya* is known) and production (i.e. *gamya* is produced); (for example) as by smoke fire is known only similarly, by (Caitra's) absence in the house his outside existence is produced also is also replied (by the same argument of ours).

The argument that since it is impossible to know the invariable concomitance (between the Caitra's absence and his existence outside) it is impossible include *arthāpatti* in inference is also not proper because it is possible to know the concomitance when Caitra is seen standing at the door of the house (not found in the house).

Having raised this very point himself he did not answer it. On the other hand another example was shown conversely. For example, postulating outside absence of Caitra on the basis of his presence in the house.

He should have given a similar example (where the invariable concomitance cannot be had in the case of inferring the outside existence of Caitra on the basis of his absence in the house) there (i.e. what you have stated this *arthāpatti* preceded by absence is not possible).

Having made a statement that there are six types of *arthāpatti* and having named an *arthāpatti* preceded by absence that you are running away like a deer in a dense forest leaving this variety of *arthāpatti* which is afraid of the look of the *upanaiyāyika* lion sitting very close is the most ungentlemanly behaviour of yours.

How can other women even look at you who are running away leaving the girl (without any protection) who has only you as her protector?

The postulation of the absence (of Caitra) on the basis of his presence in the house is the *arthāpatti* which is preceded by the perception (of Caitra in the house). In that case also to know the invariable concomitance is not difficult. Because a substance which is not all-pervading exists in a limited place only and so one can easily know that since it is here it does not exist elsewhere.

Moreover, what about the case of *vyatirekasahacāra* where you determine the absence of smoke on the basis of absence of fire? What course you adopt there the same course can be adopted there also.

It is not proper to argue that depending on the *anvaya-sahacāra* alone to be known by seeing several times at several places the co-existence of probans and probandum one can know the invariable concomitance — as it is said in the *Ślokavārttika*[1] that "with reference to only that person (= a Naiyāyika)[2] who infers the absence of smoke in the absence of fire, this is a defective. According to my view,[3] however, by observing mere absence in a place or two the co-existent ones (i.e. smoke etc.) cause inference."

We will show later[4] that one who has not known the *vyatirekasahacāra* of probans and probandum cannot know the probandum, definitely. As without the knowledge of the *anvayasahacāra* of probans and probandum in the subject no inference is possible so unless *vyatirekasahacāra* is also known no inference is possible. In establishing the absence of Caitra outside the house whatever application of inference you had shown before[5], the same can be aplied here also. The counter application of the inference there is contrary to perception etc. and as such it is a fallacy. Therefore, enough of elaboration!

1. *Arthāpatti Śloka* - 40
2. Cakradhara however takes him as a Buddhist.
3. The view of the Mīmāṁsakas.
4. *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 111 (Pt. I)
5. *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 35 (Pt. I)

The pitiable *srutārthāpatti* also is not different from Inference. Because it is impossible to postulate a part of the entire sentence and also because there exists the object (such as the fatness which is the effect of) eating out) which is the probans. For example, after having seen the smoke in the cave of a mountain as you infer its cause such as the fire; similarly, after definitely knowing from the sentence the fatness the effect of eating, you can infer its cause such as eating. What is difference here? Because it is established by observation at several cases that fatness is the effect of eating. A cause is sometimes known by perception and sometimes it is known (i.e. inference) from a statement. There is no much difference in it.

(Mīmāṁsakas) : Well, when the statement is incomplete it cannot produce any proper knowledge.

(Naiyāyikas) : From the sentence "Fat Devadatta does not eat during day" does one not have the knowledge of his fatness?

(Mīmāṁsakas) : We do not say that one does not get such knowledge. But the knowledge is incomplete.

It cannot be argued that such a sentence which produces incomplete knowledge is inauthoritative and so it is proper to complete that sentence first.

It is incorrect. What is incomplete? The sentence or its meaning or its knowledge?

A word which is independent of meaning has no expectancy whatsoever like the unuttered words. A meaning, on the other hand, being expectant may postulate another meaning. Where is the chance for the postulating of words? Even the knowledge can be expectant with regard to the meaning and not with regard to sound which has ears as their means. Therefore, in order to satisfy the expectancy of knowledge it is proper to postulate only the meaning of

words. Moreover, the postulation of words is also meant for the knowledge of meaning only and therefore, let there be (direct) postulation of that meaning. What is the need for another step?

The argument that if directly meaning is postulated, that (meaning) will become non-Vedic (is also incorrect). Because according to that view (of postulation of words) the meaning will be more non-Vedic since the postulated words are different from the Vedic words.

If you say Veda is of two types such as (1) directly heard and (2) inferred, we say Vedic meaning can be of two types such as (1) directly attested and (2) inferred; what is the point in postulating another step? Therefore, the postulated meaning can be Vedic on the very strength of its being postulated by the meaning of the heard Vedic expression. (Therefore) the *arthāpatti* which requires (the postulation of) a part of expression (to complete the meaning) is not at all worth-accepting and also because the view of postulation of a part of an expression is refuted (by as above).

Therefore, what you have said that since it is impossible to know the invariable concomitance (between fatness and eating at night) because (eating at night) cannot be perceived (so *śrutārthāpatti* cannot be included in inference) is also refuted (by this).

Moreover, it is easier to get the knowledge of concomitance in a general way if (the direct postulation of) meaning (is accepted). Because it is seen that some sacrifices are not associated with the mention of result.

Prābhākara, however, explains the statement of the *Bhāṣya* such as *dṛṣṭaḥ śruto vā* etc. that this statement of cognition is nothing but another popular paraphrase of the same cognition and thus they refute the variety of *śrutārthāpatti*. They hold that whatever portion is heard has the capacity to express the meaning of the entire sentence (i.e. the heard

sentence 'Fat Devadatta does not eat during day" has the capacity of expressing "he eats at night" also) and considers that meaning as arising out of words. A sentence has the longer and longer function like an arrow in making one understand the sentence meaning such as the *kārya* (that which is to be done) which is associated with many *kārakas* such as the main actions which are situated very near and the subordinate actions (rites) which are situated at a distant place (i.e. in another sentence). Such a knowledge one gets in such a sentence the function of which has not ended, but he does not get such a knowledge if that function has ended; because of the absence of *kārakas* to produce such a knowledge.

People know the meaning of words from the usage of elderly persons. Having observed those elderly persons using such a sentence, they determine the capacity of a sentence to denote that meaning. The constituent words of that sentence are the causes of the meaning of that sentence. And when we consider the causality of the meaning of a sentence (the knowledge of the sentence meaning) we find that sometimes unexpressed words also become the causes of the sentence-meaning as in the case of the sentence *viśvajitā yajeta* (one should perform the Viśvajit - sacrifice) the word *svargakāma* forms a part in the *śābdardha,* though not mentioned in the sentence.

Sometimes, some expressed words also do not take part in the *śābdabodha* because it is not favourable to the sentence-meaning as in the case of the sentence *ubhayaṁ havir ārtim ārcchet* (If (both) the oblations are spoiled) (where *ubhayaṁ* is not intended). Sometimes, what is heard in a particular form is changed in another form according to the sentence-meaning as the sentence *prayājaśeṣeṇa havīṁṣyabhighārayati* is changed as *prayājaśeṣam haviḥsu abhighārayati* (The remains of *prayāja* is to be poured on the oblations).

Therefore, according to the whole meaning of a sentence realised immediately after listening to a sentence both uttered or unuttered words become the causes of the sentence-meaning and so when the meaning of an unuttered part of a sentence is obtained through the uttered part of the whole sentence, where is the necessity of postulating *śrutārthāpatti*).

For the same reason, that postulated meaning is not intervened by any intermediate step for its being treated as *śābda* (produced from words) because directly that can be treated as *śābda.*

(Bhāṭṭas) Well, when the causes (i.e. the words) are not heard how do we understand their meanings in them? And when we do not understand the meaning what sort of sentence-meaning do we postulate?

(Prābhākara Mīmāṁsakas) : Here is the answer. Even in the heard words, the words by themselves do not become causes but according to the sentence-meaning. The same will prevail in the case of unheard words also.

We do not hear the instrumental case-ending in the root *yaj* - 'sacrifice,' nor the accusative in the word *svarga* 'heaven', nor the *kvip* (zero) suffix in the word *agnicit* 'one who set up the fire' nor the stem in the word *adhunā* now', nor the actual case-suffixes in a compound and forms with secondary suffix. But we do understand the meaning of those (elided parts).

Similarly, in the sentences like 'One should perform the Viśvajit-sacrifice' etc. on the strength of the meaning of *yajeta* (i.e. *niyoga*) we will know the meaning of (of subsidiary state) the word *svargakāma,* etc. Since any enjoining is governed by *niyoga* (the meaning of the sentence), even without postulating a *śruti* (a Vedic sentence) the *liṅga* etc. will enjoin things directly when all the materials haven been taken by the function of *niyoga.*

(Bhāṭṭa) : Well, if this is accepted then to any extent the function of words is possible and so a word expressive of primary sense will be equal to a word conveying a secondary or suggestive sense.

Not only this, (Jaimini) states that when there is a conflict among the six *pramāṇas* such as *śruti, liṅga* etc. the earlier will be stronger than the following one. How can that be true?

(Prābhākara Mīmāṁsakas) : It can be answered as follows. Even if it is accepted that the function of a word can go to any extent, since there is difference in the types, this is not a fault. Because it is not the case that the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence is produced by totally removing the causality of words. And since that is not removed there will remain difference in their individual forms.

Different is the knowledge from the word *siṁha* in the sense of the young of the lioness and different knowledge is produced when that word refers to Devadatta.

As the word *Gaṅgā* becomes the cause in the meaning of the sentence 'he bathes in the Ganges' so it does not in the sentence 'the *ghoṣas* live on the Ganges.'

The six *pramāṇas* such as *śruti, liṅga, vākya, prakaraṇa, sthāna* and *samākhyā* also are not at par with reference to enjoining (some material in a rite) because there is difference in them caused by immidiateness and farness of meaning (i.e. a *śruti* becomes directly the *viniyojaka* whereas a *liṅga* is delayed by one step and so on).

Moreover, even if one postulates an enjoining *śruti* by the six *pramāṇas* such as *śruti, liṅga* etc. since that (postulated *śruti*) is equal to a *śruti* how can one will be set aside by the other? Therefore, in postulating that (*śruti*) there exists the nearness and remoteness of those *pramāṇas* (*liṅga* etc.) Then, same rule can apply in postulating meaning as well. Therefore, what is the point in postulating that (*śruti*)?

In the modelled sacrifices such as *Aindrāgni* etc. the sentences enjoining the accessory of the model sacrifice are not inferred, rather by the function of the expectancy of know-how, the accessory rite itself is obtained. (After all) *codaka* means that the injunction in a modelled sacrifice requires many a time accessory rites.

(Bhāṭṭa) : Well, if in both the cases (i.e. in the model and the modelled sacrifice) there is no difference in knowing the accessory rites, what is, then, the difference between directly mentioning all the accessories (i.e. in the model-sacrifice) and a transfer statement?

(Prābhākara Mīmāṁsakas) : There is (certainly) no difference when the *niyoga* is known. Simply, in the case of model sacrifice (*upadeśa*) the rites are to be performed as per the injunctions whereas in the case of a modelled sacrifice the injunction of a rite is to be understood as per the necessary performance of accessory rites. This alone is the difference between them.

(Bhāṭṭa) : Well, if it is accepted that an injunction is understood as per the necessary performance of accessory rites (i.e. whatever is necessary will be brought from the model-sacrifice) then since there is no necessity of husking of Kṛṣṇala for the preparation of *caru* out of it, the rite of husking etc. will not be brought here in the modelled sacrifice and as such there will be no rejection (of husking etc.) and so it will not tally with the discussion (of Jaimini in his 10th Chapter).

(Prābhākara Mīmāṁsakas) : No. There will not arise any such contingency because the entire group of accessory rites will come to the modelled sacrifice. Because a *codaka* does not operate in part.

(Naiyāyikas) : Therefore, there is no need of elaborating the topic of other system of knowledge which came by the by.

Very little of the doctrine of the Mīmāṁsakas is explained above. Who are we to determine the propriety and impropriety of it?

That the *śrutārthāpatti* is to be refuted stands intact. And its refutation can be done in the way stated by us (Naiyāyikas) before or in this way (suggested by the Prābhākaras).

Similarly, by accepting the (significative and suggestive) power of words, (Ānandavardhana) who considers himself to be a possessor of pedantry and who proposed *dhvani,* (a variety of poetry) in which the implied one is conveyed through the power of implication i.e. *vyañjanā*) is also refuted hereby.

Getting of negative knowledge from a positive statement and of positive knowledge from a negative statement - for example, (from the statement such as) 'O pioms man! you wander freely' (one gets the knowledge of 'don't wander here, you may be killed')[1] and (from the negative statement such as) "O passer-by, please do not enter into my house" (one gets the knowledge : please do enter my house)[2] - is due to the capacity of words only which express the nature of things that could be known through other means, as the case demands.

Or, such a discussion is not proper with the poets. Because, even the learned ones well-versed in *śastras* get puzzled in this complex system of the meaning of sentences.

Therefore, enough of this discussion which could be had only with the learned (ones)! This system (of meaning of

1. The whole verse in the *Gāthāsaptaśati* runs as under: "O pious man, you wander freely. That dog is killed by the ferocious lion who lives in the bush on the bank of the river Gotā. (The idea is: you don't roam here freely. You may be killed.")
2. The whole verse runs as under: I, the young lady, am alone in my house with my dumb and blind mother-in-law. My husband had gone long ago. Please do not enter my house" (i.e. do enter my house).

sentence) is very complex one and even the logicians are unable to handle it properly.

Therefore, let us come to the main point. There is not even a slightest difference of *arthāpatti* from Inference. This is what we conclude.

(The Mīmāṁsakas of the Bhāṭṭa - school) say (if not the *arthāpatti*) let *anupalabdhi* be a separate means of valid knowledge.

Where no means to know the existing object can operate, there, in order to know the absence of the existing object the absence of the knowledge of the existing object is said to be the means to know that negation.

'Here, there is no pot'-in this sentence since there is no means (*pramāṇa*) which can operate in order to know the pot', there is the absence of the knowledge of pot and that absence of the knowledge of pot determines the absence of pot. There the non-production of the function of the knower (i.e. the knowledge), the object of which is the pot, itself is to be denoted by the word *dṛśyādarśana* is called *pramāṇa*, and the knowledge that there is no pot is the result (of that *pramāṇa*).

Or, the function of the knower (i.e. knowledge) which determines the absence of pot, which is produced by the absence of the knowledge which determines the pot and which is of the nature of the knowledge 'there is no pot' as the *pramāṇa* (means) and the knowledge of not going to collect the pot will be the result.

As it is said (in the *Ślokavārttika*)[1] - "The non-production of perceptual knowledge (in the knower) is called *anupalabdhi*. That (non - production) is either non-change of the Self (i.e. the state of not having the knowledge of pot). Or, the

1. *Abhāva*-section Verse - 10.

knowledge of the other object (such as the absence of the pot).

The absence of pot is conveyed by the word *anyavastu* (in the above-mentioned verse).

There, 'it is not there' - this knowledge is not caused by perception because there is no association of senses with the object (negation). Because the association could be either of the nature of contact or inherrente. Nor there is any (of the six varieties such as) *saṁyukta - samavāya* etc. Nor is it possible to establish *saṁyukta-viśeṣaṇatā* because the absence of pot cannot be an adjective of the place. Neither an unconnected thing nor an not inherent thing can be an adjective. Because it is observed that a stick can be a qualifier only when it is connected (with the man) and a white colour etc. can be a qualifier only when it is inherent. A negation, however, is not connected with anything since it is not a substance. It can never be inherent since it is different from quality etc.

If it is argued that eyes with the help of the sense-relation such as *saṁyukta-viśeṣaṇatā* will reveal the negation (of pot) then, because there is no difference, it will reveal its juice etc. which is in the fruit that comes in contact with the eyes.

If you say juice is unfit to be revealed by eyes, then let it not reveal even the negation. Because (negation also is unfit to be revealed by eyes and so) being unfit (to be taken by eyes) is the same as in the case of juice.

Or if this is your theory that there is the rule that if something is perceivable it is perceived if something is not perceivable it is not perceived then let perceivableness be regarded as the sense-relation; what is the necessity of announcing six sense-relations? Therefore, the knowledge of the absence of a pot is not a perceptual knowledge.

(Naiyāyikas) : Well, both the ground and the absence of pot we see when our eyes are open and when they are closed

we do not see either of them. When this is the position there that if eyes are open both the place and the absence of pot are known and if eyes are closed none of them is known, how is it that the knowledge of place is perceptual whereas the knowledge of absence of pot is not perceptual?

(Mīmāṁsakas) : We do find the difference. Because there is no sense-relation. Unless eyes come in contact with objects they cannot produce perceptual knowledge. This proposition of *tadbhāvabhāvitva* (i.e. *tat sattve tat satvan, tadabhāve tadabhāvaḥ*) is an dispensable antecedent; as the knowledge of the hot touch of fire after the knowledge of the shining colour of the distant fire complexed with a bundle of huge flames. There, with regard to the knowledge of hot touch of fire inferred on the basis of its colour as the opening or closing of the eyes is a dispensable antecedent similarly, here also, with reference to the knowledge of the absence of pot which has the invariable relation with the perception of the ground, the *anuvidhāna* of *anvaya* and *vyatireka* of the senses is due to the knowledge of the place. The knowledge of the absence of pot is not perceptual. As it is said (in the *Ślokavārttika* - *Abhāva* - section verse no.27).

"After having perceived the ground and having remembered the correlative (i.e. the pot) the mental knowledge of the absence of pot is produced without the help of the sense-organs."

This is why, it is observed that sometimes even when (a negation) is far away (i.e. beyond perception) it is known. (For example) some one just sees the village Gaura-mūlaka and goes to some other place where he is asked whether Garga is in the Gauramūlaka - village or not. He just remembers the Gauramūlaka village which was seen by its mere form. In spite of the absence of Garga in the village being very far, he immediately knows the absence of Garga in the village. There, there is no scope for the eyes coming in contact with the village (because the village is far away)

and so that knowledge of the absence of Garga in the village is not perceptual knowledge.

Nor can this negation be known by inference. Because neither the place nor the not finding of the pot could be a probans for such inference. The place cannot be the probans because the absence could be known by even such person who has not known the concomitance, (between the place and the absence of pot), because such a probans is *vyabhicāri* (since even at the time of the absence of the absence of pot (*sādhya*) i.e. at the presence of pot, the ground (the *hetu*) exists); (and also) because the probans does not exist in the subject (since both the probans as well as the subject are the same i.e. the ground). Also because it is impossible to know the invariable cocomitance (between the absence and the place) because of infiniteness of the substratum of that (absence).

Nor can the not finding of the pot be the probans (with refrence to the inference of the absence) because it is not in the subject (i.e. the place). Not finding of the pot is the property of the pot and not of the place.

It cannot be argued that since the place not finding of the pot (on the ground) is engaged in causing the knowledge of the absence of the pot, not finding of the pot can be taken as the property of the place. Because it will result into interdependency such as when the not finding of the pot is known as existing in the place it will produce the knowledge of the absence of the pot and after the knowledge of the absence of the pot is produced the not-finding of the pot will be known as in the place. And unless the knowledge of the absence of the pot is obtained it is impossible to know that not-finding of the pot exists in the place. And once that knowledge of the absence of the pot is obtained, what is the purpose of knowing the existence of the proban in the subject because the knowledge of the probandum is already obtained.

Moreover, how can this probans of not finding of the pot cause the inference of absence of pot unless its invariable concomitance with the absence of the pot is known? And the knowledge of the concomitance depends on the knowledge of both the absence of the pot as well as the not finding of the pot as in the case of (the knowledge of the concomitance between) the smoke and the fire (with reference to the inference of the fire).

There, how the probandum such as the absence of the pot can be known while knowing the invariable concomitance requires consideration. If you say by the same inference (it will be known) then it will result in the defect of interdependency (such as to know the absence of the pot one has to depend on the same inference and for the operation of the inference one has to depend on the knowledge of the absence of the pot). But, if (you say that) the knowledge of that absence of the pot will be had by some other inference, there will arise the contingency of endless regression (such as even for that other inference it is necessary to have the knowledge of both the probans and the probandum (here, the absence of the pot) in order to know the invariable concomitance between them. There too the absence of the pot must be known by some other inference and so on and so forth). Thus, the endless regression). The probans such as 'not finding of the pot' (finding) also is of the nature of the absence of the availability and so when that is taken into consideration to determine the nature of that (non-availability), this very process is to be followed.

Therefore, even going so far one has to know some *pramāṇa* which is capable of determining the knowledge of absence in order to establish the knowledge of that (absence for the operation of inference). Instead, from the *anupaladhipramāṇa* itself when one can get the knowledge of that absence, that (absence) cannot be an object of inference.

Nor can one even doubt that the knowledge such as 'here there is no pot' can be caused either by word testimony or analogy or *arthāpatti*. Therefore, it is proper (to say that) the negation is an object of *Anupalabdhipramāṇa* (i.e. an object of the knowledge produced by *anupalabdhi*) because it cannot be included in either of the *pramāṇas* which produce the knowledge of an existing object.

Moreover, as is the object to be known so should be the means of its knowing.

Because when the object is of the nature of existent entities, the *anupalabdhi* cannot be the means to know that object. Similarly, when negation is the object to be known the means which produces the knowledge of an existent entity cannot be the means to know that negation.

You have not denied the entity to be known called negation as the Buddhists do. Therefore, you should accept the means (to know that negation) which is of the nature of *anupalabdhi*.

(Naiyāyikas) : Here is the answer. It is true that (we) accept the entity called negation. But it (i.e. the absence) does not search for any other means in order to produce its own knowledge because its nature can be known by perception etc.

The absence (of, say, pot) which exists on the ground just at hand can be known by mere eyes (i.e. perception). If that absence is beyond the reach of perception sometimes it can be known by other means (such as inference etc.) also.

Thus, one whose function of eyes has not ceased does have the knowledge of both the ground and the absence therein. Therefore, the knowledge such as "here there is no pot" is a single knowledge like the knowledge from the sentence "here there is curd in the pot" (In other words, as in the knowledge "here there is curd in the pot" both the pot

and the curd are the objects and as both of them appear in the same knowledge, similarly, in the knowledge from the sentence 'here there is no pot" both the place and the absence of pot are the objects and both are known by the same *pramāṇa*).

There (according to you) the knowledge of ground above is produced by perception the other entity (such as the absence) is produced by some other *pramāṇa* (*anupalabdhi*). Wherefrom is this division got?

"Here is fire on the mountain)" - in this case the knowledge is, definitely, not produced by perception. Because after seeing the smoke and after remembering the invariable concomitance between smoke and fire the knowledge of fire is produced and so, the knowledge of fire is intervened by the knowledge after seeing the smoke as in the case of a perceptual knowledge). It is not the case here (in knowing the absence of pot). The knowledge of the absence of pot is realised without any intervention like the knowledge of the ground immediately after seeing the ground.

Nor can you say that as the fire on the mountain is beyond perception, the absence also cannot be seen. Because the knowledge of that absence can be had if the eyes are functioning and that cannot be had if the eyes are not functioning. There, even if one is engaged in seeing it is impossible to see the fire which exists on the mountain. Here, however, one who is engaged in seeing, alone, can see the absence of the pot. Therefore, the knowledge of the absence of the pot is a perceptual knowledge because it follows only when the eyes are functioning.

Nor can it be argued that as in the case of inferring the hot touch (of fire) after seeing the colour of fire which is placed at far distance, the state of the presence of the function of eyes is a dispensable antecedent, in the same way the state of the presence of the function of the eyes is a

dispensable antecedent with regard to the knowledge of the absence of the pot. Because there, it is known many a time that eyes are devoid of the capacity of knowing with touch and it is also known that to know the touch there is another means such as the sense organ of skin which recognises the touch. And the state of having the invariable concomitance between the colour and (hot) touch of that sort is already known before and so that hot touch is an object of inference only. And, therefore, it is proper to say that the function of the eyes is dispensable antecedent there. In the present case (of knowing the absence of pot), however, such is not the situation.

Nor is it a fact that if in one case the state of the presence of the function of the eyes is a dispensable antecedent, then in all cases it will be so. If this is accepted, even the colour cannot be known by eyes.

(Mīmāṁsakas) : Well, how do you say that the absence which has no colour and which does not come in contact with the eyes is known by eyes?

(Naiyāyikas) : When we say the absence is known by eyes (we mean) it is the object of the knowledge caused by the eyes, and we do not mean that it is known by the eyes because it has colour. Because even the atoms which have colour are not perceptible and the colour even though it has no colour is perceived by eyes. Also, not all whatever is connected with the sense-organ, is perceived because even though sky comes in contact with the eyes it is not perceptible.

(Mīmāṁsakas) : Well, if even unconnected (object) can be perceived by eyes then there will arise the contingency of perceiving Bibhīṣaṇa etc. who is far away.

(Naiyāyikas) : Here is the answer : This rule that what is not connected with the sense-organ cannot be perceived is applicable to the case of existent entities only. The absence, however, even unconnected with the eyes can be perceived.

The narration of the six types of association (of sense-organ with the objects) is also keeping in view the existent entities. Because whatever connected (with the sense-organ) is perceived by any of these six kinds of association. That the sense-organs produce the knowledge of objects by coming in contact with the objects is also keeping in view the existent objects. Therefore, since the absence is not an existent entity the eyes, even without being connected with that (absence) produce the knowledge of that absence and therefore there is nothing wrong in it.

Nor can such a doubt be raised that let one know all the absences existing in other places also since being unconnected is common to all absences. Because the knowledge of absence depends on the knowledge of the substratum (of that absence). And the substratum can be known only if it is close (to eyes).

Or, the eyes will produce the knowledge of absence through the relation called *saṁyukta - viśeṣaṇatā* as the inherence (is perceived by eyes through the same relation of *saṁyukta-viśeṣaṇatā*) according to the view of those who consider the inherence as perceptible.[1]

Bhāṭṭa (Mīmāṁsakas) : Well, what you are doing is :

You are giving the example (of inherence), which has not yet been established by you and accepted by us, for absence which is also not established.

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1. According to some Naiyāyikas 'inherence' is not perceptible because according to them since inherence is one and eternal, all the related ones in this world must be perceived before the inference is perceived. This is impossible because some substances cannot be perceived and therefore, they take inherence to be not perceptible. According to some other Naiyāyikas, to perceive the relation called inherence it is not necessary that all the relating objects must be known before. If the relating ones are perceptible, the inherence also is to be taken as perceptible. This is the second view.

(Naiyāyikas) : It is not so. You too will have to accept the relation (such as inherence) between a substance and a quality. Because when the difference between a substance and quality is established one and when they are never found unconnected one has to accept definitely some relation (between them and what else can be such a relation except inherence?). Therefore, enough of talking outside the main point!

The objection that since there is neither connection nor inherence the absence cannot be a qualifier of the place is also wrong. Because it will be shown very soon on the strength of our experience (such as the usage *gaṭābhāvavat bhūtalam*) that there is a relation called *viśeṣyaviśeṣaṇabhāva* other than the connection and the inherence.

Another objection raised by you was if *saṁyuktaviśeṣaṇabhāva* is accepted as the relation (to perceive the absence) then there will arise the contingency of perceiving the juice (say, of a fruit) by eyes. The same objection can be raised with regard to the relation called *saṁyuktasamavāya* in perceiving the colour (say, of fruit).[1]

(Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas) : Then let there be no relation called *saṁyuktasamavāya*, what goes from us?

(Naiyāyikas) : Then, do you want to say that let eyes perceive the colour without being connected with the eyes? Therefore, (you will have to accept that) there is no other relation between the eyes and the colour except *saṁyuktasamavāya*.

(Mīmāṁsakas) : Well, the function of knowing an object itself can be the relation of the eyes (with the object) or the capability (of an object to be perceived by eyes, is the relation). Because of that (function or capability) alone the

1. Because *samavāya* is one. So, if colour could be perceived, the juice should also be perceived by the eyes.

eyes are accepted as the perceiver of the colour and not because of the (relation called) *saṁyuktasamavāya.*

(Naiyāyikas) : (All right) Then why not the same function or capability be accepted of the eyes with regard (to perceiving) the absence? You accept the sense-organs as the producer of knowledge by coming in contact (with the object to be perceived) because they are *kārakas,* at the same time you deny the relation (between the eyes and the object).

This is self-contradictory. Therefore, (if your view is accepted then) you must say that there are six types of capability (of the sense-organs) as per the (six types of) relations. Nor can you stop by mere postulating (six types of) capability: Where there is capability (of objects) there is also the connection (with the object). But it is not true that wherever there is connection (of eyes with the object) there is capability definitely (of things).[1] Therefore, the objection (that if *saṁyuktaviśeṣaṇabhāva* is accepted as the connection) as one perceives the colour, he should also perceive the juice - cannot disturb the mind of ours who understand the things in the above manner. Even though there is contact (of eyes) with juice (in the fruit), since (eyes) have no capacity to see it, they cannot perceive it.

Even if one accepts that the capability (of things to be perceived by eyes) is the relation, one cannot say absence does not have capability (to be perceived by eyes). Which of its (= of the absence) property (as similar to that of an existing object) is not accepted by you (Bhāṭṭa)?

Or, better say that this entity of absence itself is not there because it is devoid of all qualifications required for its usage. Or, else you accept the absence as an object of the perceptual knowledge.

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1. For example, eyes are connected with juice but they cannot perceive it.

Moreover, the statement (in the *Ślokavārttika Abhāva*-section *śloka* 28) that -.

"After seeing the village by its mere form and after being asked about the absence of some one, he immediately remembers that (village) and affirms the absence of that person by *anupalabdhi-pramāṇa* alone" - is also not correct. Because at the time of knowing the form of the village *Gaudamūlaka* devoid of other things itself it is possible to know collectively the absence of all things not existing nearby that village. Now, it is (just) remembering the absence of Garga in that village and it is not the direct knowledge of that absence which is beyond the range of perception. Thus, (when he was asked) the speaker of the truth said after remembering (the absence) that at that time (when he saw the village) Garga was not there. At this moment, however, he is doubtful whether Garga is there or not. Because it is quite possible that Garga might have come from somewhere and he might be there.

(Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas) : Well, that person had not realised the knowledge of all absences in the *Gaudamūlaka* - village (and so how can he remember any particular absence?)

(Naiyāyikas) : Even though the absences were not realised (at that time) it can be postulated on the strength (of the remembrance of the absence of Garga), like the remembering of invariable concomitance in the case of very familiar probans (say, after seeing the smoke one immediately gets the knowledge of fire and on the strength of this knowledge of fire we postulate the remembrance of invariable concomitance between smoke and fire). Thus, when asked by a particular person (about the absence of a particular person) he remembers the absence of that person and gives the answer to all of them.

(Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas) : Well, if you say collectively he knows the absence then he should remember all the absence together.

(Naiyāyikas) : It is not like that. Whatever is the cause of remembering such as the particular question (regarding the absence of a particular person), he remembers that (absence) above and not all for which there is no cause of remembering (i.e. for which no question is put). In some places i.e. in the case of realising the phonemes which are realised in a sequence all the phonemes together are remembered after realising the last phoneme. And in some places if things are realised at a time (in a bundle), the remembrance can take place in order and so this (above-mentioned) fault has no scope in the case of collective knowledge. Moreover, when you have said that mere form (of the village) is known (by the person), you, too, have accepted this collective knowledge. Because by the mention of the word 'mere' the knowledge of the absence of everything other than the village is established. You, yourself, have made such statement (in *Ślokavārtika Abhāva.* 15).

"In the case of an existing entity one determines that "this is this only." (But) it is not possible without the knowledge of the absence of things other than that."

Therefore, at the very time of knowing (perceiving) the *Gaudamūlaka* (village) (the perceiver had) the knowledge of the absence of Garga etc. not existing near by (that village). One need not think that the present knowledge of the absence of Garga which is beyond perception in the village is caused by *anupalabdhi.* Therefore, absence is known by perception only.

The other objection put by you that the knowledge of the absence of pot such 'here, there is no pot' cannot be inferred is desired by us. Some absence, however, which exists at a distance is inferred as well; for example, when the rain is

falling on the root of the crops sprinkled by the flows of water in the darkness one infers the absence of the contact between cloud and air. Or, for example, inferring the outside absence of Caitra on the basis of his presence in the house, as exemplified in the section discussing *arthāpatti*.

Another objection raised by you that an object to be known is known by a similar means because it is an object to be known as in the case of an existing entity is also not an effective reason.

The absence of veil on eyes (cataract) becomes auxiliary cause of perception. And the absence of probandum in the counter-example is an auxiliary cause of inference on the basis of that probans. The absence of faults or demerits in the words of people is also an auxiliary cause (for the operation of word-testimony).

Therefore, from absence also, since it is included as one of the helpful factors, knowledge of an existing entity is possible. Sometimes absence itself is taken as the probans for knowing an existing entity. (For example), the absence of rains is the probans to infer the contact between air and clouds.

Therefore, it is not proper to say that absence is known by *anupalabdhi* only. (The rule that) as is the demon so should be the offering should not be applicable here.

In this matter the Buddhists say that had there been an entity called absence one can think of the means (by which that absence can be known). But (the fact is) that itself is difficult to get.

Absence is not realised independently as the form of an existing entity such as pot, but it is realised as a composit of place, time, and the counter-correlative. Thus, such is the knowledge "this is not here now." Although it is known like this, had this absence been connected with them (place

etc.) who could have denied the existence of this entity? In fact, it is not connected with them. Neither with the place nor with the time nor with its counter-correlative has it got any connection because no relation such the contact or inherence etc. is possible.

Nothing can be an adjunct unless it is connected.

(Naiyāyikas) : Well, let there be *viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyabhāva* as the connection. What is the need of any other connection?

(Buddhists) : No. Because the knowledge of *viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāva* is based on some other relation. Either connected or inherent object can be an adjunct like "Devadatta having a stick" (where stick is an adjunct because it is connected with Devadatta) and "blue lotus" (where the colour 'blue' is an adjunct because it is an inherent in lotus). Therefore, actually there is no independent relation called *viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāva.* Moreover, we find it is to be reversed as per the intention of a person. Sometimes an adjunct becomes prominent idea and sometimes a prominent idea becomes an adjunct and so this relation (of *viśeṣyaviśeṣaṇabhāva*) is imaginary one and not a property of a real object.

There is no relation of absence with its counter-correlative at all, because the counter-correlative and its absence cannot be found at a time. When there is a pot, there is no absence of it or when there is the absence of it there is no pot.

If you say the relation called opposition will be the connection, we ask you what is the meaning of that opposition? If already established absence of pot coming near the pot counteracts, then it can be said that the absence is opposition with the pot like the pot and a hammer. But it is not so. Because they are not at one time. Or, even if it is accepted that they are at the same time, one must experience the co-existence of the pot and its absence like the pot and the hammer i.e. the object to be destroyed and the destoyer.

By causing what effect (to the pot) can the absence of pot oppose the pot? If you say it is in opposition without causing any effect on the pot then there will arise the contingency of its over-application. If you say it produces another absence (of pot), the contingency of endless regression (cannot be avoided).

The hammer etc. cannot be the cause of the absence of pot, because when an existing entity itself is momentary, it does not require its cause of destruction.

If an existing entity is momentary what is the need of its causes of destruction? And if it is not momentary (i.e. permanent) what is the need of its causes of destruction?

Therefore, in producing the series of dissimilar (i.e. dissimilar to those of a pot) potsherds the function of the *kārakas* such as the hammer etc. (is to be accepted). When (hammer) has come in contact with the pot a series other than the series of pot is produced and it is not true that the absence is produced from that (hammer). If that (product of other series of potsherds) is different from the pot, what happened (to the pot) that the pot is not available as before? If you say that since pot is in opposition to the series of pot sherds (it is not found), it has been already refuted (that causing what effect it is in opposition and so on and so forth).

If you say that (series of potsherds) is not different from the pot then you will have to accept that the pot is the product of the hammer (which is far from the truth).

(Naiyāyikas) : (We say that) the postsherds produced by the hammer themselves are the absence of pot.

(Buddhists) : Alas, when the potsherds are further broken the pot should be come up because the absence of pot is destroyed thereby.

Moreover, if you say the postsherds are absence without causing any effects to the pot then the same potsherds can be called the absence of cloth (because they do not cause any effect to the cloth also). Moreover, if it is said that the postsherds do effect the pot and as such they are absence of pot then it should be refuted in the above mentioned manner (i.e. in that case, there will arise the contingency of endless regression).

Moreover, this absence can either be produced or it is not produced. If it is produced it will be an existing entity like pot etc. And if this absence is not produced then it will be eternal.

Now, whether this eternal absence has single object as its counter-correlative or all objects as its counter-correlative. If it has single object as its counter-correlative then we do not find the reason why should it be restricted to a particualr counter-correlative. If it has all objects as its counter-correlative then because this absence which is opposed to all objects is eternal and since it is always in proximity, there will arise the contingency of all the three worlds being vanished together. Therefore, there is no absence either eternal or non-eternal.

(Naiyāyikas) : Well, if absence is not accepted then the existing entities cannot maintain their distinctness and so there arises confusion in all the activities of people. As it has been said (in the *Ślokavārtika Abhāva* verse no. 4).

"Thus there will arise the contingency of calling milk as curd (if pre-absence is not accepted), curd will be called milk (if annihilative absence is not accepted), pot will be turned as cloth (if mutual non-existence is not accepted), there will be horn on hare (if absolute absence is not accepted), there will be consciousness in the Earth etc. and limiting form in the self (if absolute absence is not accepted)."

If absence is accepted the existing entities will have distinctness because of the mutual absence.

(Buddhists) : This is a wrong statement. Because the existing entities by themselves are of the nature of being distinct. (On the otherhand), there will definitely be confusion if you say that the chance of mixing of existing entities will be avoided by accepting absence.

As an existing entity is distinct from another existing entity similarly one must accept that an existing entity is distinct from an absence also. But how can that be possible? Because even the absences are to be established as distinct from each other. If the distinctness (of the absence) is by the absences themselves, what harm is caused by the existing objects (that they should be taken as distinct by themselves)?

If, however, you say that the distinctness of the absences is caused by something else, (we ask) what is that something? If you say that the distinctness is caused by the existing entities, there will arise the contingency of inter-dependency (such as for the distinctness of the absenses one will have to depend on the distinct existing entities and for the distinctnes of the existing entitles one will have to depend on the distinctness of their mutual absences).

If you say that the distinctness of the absences are caused by some other absences it will be difficult to avoid the contingency of endless regression (because for the distinctness of those absences also one will have to depend on some other absences and so on and so forth).

(In fact), since the nature of absence remains the same in all absences, the difference in the absence is caused by the counter-correlative only. The counter-correlatives such as the existing entities being distinct from each other distinguishes their absence and so, on the contrary, it is proper to say that the distinctness of absences, depends upon the existing and not the *vice versa*. Therefore, even out of the fear that (if

absence is not accepted) there will arise the confusion in the settlement of all objects (for the use of people), it is not proper to accept absence.

(Naiyāyikas) : Well, if absence is refuted what will be the meaning of the negative particle?

(Buddhists) : It is not accepted by us that the existence of an object depends on the expressive words. We, the Buddhists, are famous in this world for being experts in postulating *vikalpa* alone as the meaning of a word.

Sometimes, a negative being connected with nominal stem produces the knowledge the object of which is of the nature of *niṣedhaparyudāsa*- (i.e. differentiated by negation). And sometimes being connected with the verb it produces the knowledge, the object of which is of the nature of prohibition of the beginning of the action conveyed by the root (of the verbal form).

(Naiyāyikas) : Well, if in this manner you are refuting the absence, what about the eleven types of *Anupalabdhi* (accepted by you)?

Svabhā vānupalabdhi (non-availability of the actual form of an object) for example, "Here there is no pot because it is not found."

Kāraṇānupalabdhi (non-availability of cause) for example, "Here there is no smoke because fire is not found here."

Vyāpakānupalabdhi (non-availability of pervader) for example, "Here there is no Sissoo because no tree is available here."

Kāryānupalabdhi (non-availability of effect) for example, "Here, there are no proper causes of smoke because smoke is not found."

Svabhāvaviruddhopalabdhi (availability of contary nature) for example, "Here there is no cold touch because fire is available here."

Svabhāvaviruddhakāryopalabdhi (availability of effect opposed to the actual nature) for example, "Here, is no cold touch because smoke is available here."

Viruddhavyāptopalabdhi (availability of contrary concomitance non-enternality is opposed to enternality) for example, "The destruction of the produced entity is not eternal because it requires some cause for its production".

Kārya-viruddhopalabdhi (availability of something opposed to the effect) for example, "Here there is no the cause of cold (cold touch) the capacity of which is not obstructed because fire is available here." *Vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhi* (availability of something contrary to its) for example, "Here there is no touch of ice (i.e. cold touch) because fire is available).

Kāraṇaviruddhopalabdhi (availability of something opposed to its cuase) for example, "The person has got no effect (of cold) such as horripilation, striking of teeth etc. because here is fire nearby.

Kāraṇaviruddhakāryopalabdhi (availability of effect to that contrary to the cause) for instance, "This place is devoid of people who are striking their teeth etc. because here is smoke."

(Buddhists) : True, we do desirable eleven types of *Anupalabdhi.* But those are that which produces effect) the causes of the usage of *asat* (i.e. different from) and not of the knowledge of absence.

(Naiyāyikas) : Well, you have said that *anupalabdhi* is included in *svabhāvahetu* (and *kāryathetu*). And in the *svabhāvahetu* identity of probandum and probans is necessary. Dealing with *asat* (is your probandum). Which is of the nature of the usage of words which convey the ideas. Naturally it is different from *anupalabdhi.* So how can this (*anupalabdhi*) be identical with that (dealing with *asat* unreal) (Therefore, how can *anupalabdhi* be included in the *svabhāvahetu?*)

(Buddhists) : What you say is true. But by that (*anupalabdhi*) the dealing with *asat* is not established rather, the fitness (of usage of *asat*) to deal with the unreal object is established. The fitness is, however, not anything else than that (*anupalabdhi*). (Therefore, the probandum and the probans are identical). So, there is no harm if *anupalabdhi* is included in the *svabhāvahetu*.

(Naiyāyikas) : Well, the fitness (of dealing with the *asat*) is of the nature of an existing entity whereas *anupalabdhi* is of the nature of absence; then how (fitness) is identical with *anupalabdhi*?

(Buddhists) : It is not so. The knowers of *anupabalabdhi* do not say that *anupalabdhi* is of the nature of absence which is of the nature of negation of the knowledge of an existing entity. They say that either the object (earth) other than that (pot) which is (earth) distinguished by negation (of pot) or the knowledge of such object (earth alone is the nature of *anupalabdhi*.

This is why this objection also that since *anupalabdhi* is of the nature of absence it will require some other *anupalabdhi* to know this absence (and since this is also of the nature of absence it will require some other *anupalabdhi* and so on and so forth) and thus the endless regression does not stand. Because the *anupalabdhi* which is of the nature of either the knowledge of the other object (say the earth) (or the other object itself) which is self-illuminating.[1]

(Naiyāyikas) : Well, if, on the basis of mere *anupalabdhi*, the use of *asat* is accepted then there will arise the contingency of calling *asat* anything which is not seen.

(Buddhists) : No. *anupalabdhi* has an adjective such as *anupalabdhi* of that which can be seen. The usage of *asat* is

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1. The object (say earth) is also self-illuminating in the sense that according to the Buddhists the object is nothing but the knowledge shaped according to that object.

based on the *anupalabdhi* of that which is included in the factors to produce the knowledge of that (in other words, of that which can be seen) and not on the *anupalabdhi* of any thing. There,

Since the perceivability of a pot seen before is already determined, on the basis of the *anupalabdhi* (of that pot) the usage of *asat* is possible. In the case of the sky-flowers which are absolutely not found since the fitness of perceivability is determined (by saying that, had the sky-flowers been there they would have been seen like any other flower) (and therefore, the usage of *asat* with regard to the sky-flowers is possible). In the case of Ghost etc. since it is impossible to determine the fitness of perceptibility (of Ghosts), on the basis of its *anupalabdhi* it is not possible to determine the absence (of Ghosts etc.).

There too in the expressions "This Caitra is not a Ghost' and the like for negating the identity (of Ghost in Caitra) the criterion of being perceptible is of no use. Because the form other than the Ghost such as Caitra is directly known by perception. For determining that nature (of Caitra), what use is that adjective[1] of?

Therefore, since on the basis of *anupalabdhi* the usage of *asat* is established there is no *prameya* called absence like an existing entity.

(Naiyāyikas) : Here is the answer (to your above argument): There can arise only two types of knowledge such as "Here is a pot" and "Here there is no pot." There what you say that (both the knowledge are) of the nature of mere *vikalpa* which is either objectless or which have itself (i.e. the knowledge itself as its object) (is incorrect). Because that (either objectlessness of the knowledge or having *ākāra* (the shape of the object) itself as the object of the knowledge) is common

1. That is, the adjective of *anupalabdhi* such "non-availability of that which is fit to be perceived" is of no use.

to both in the case of the knowledge of absence and in the case of the knowledge of an existing object.[1] Therefore, either both the knowledges should be taken as authority or both should not be taken as authority. Your argument that the knowledge of an existing entity is authoritative whereas the other (i.e. the knowledge of the absence of an existing entity) is not authoritative is your mere will. And when the knowledge of the absence of an existing entity has all its features of the knowledge of an existing entity one must think what the object (of that knowledge of absence) could be.

Well, your statement that where there exists the knowledge of the ground devoid of the pot, there is absence of the knowledge of pot is incorrect. What do you mean by this "being devoid of pot." Whether it is identical with the ground or different from the ground? If you say it is identical, since even at that time when there is pot on the ground one should get the knowledge of its absence because the ground exists. But if you accept it is different from the ground then we differ only in terming it (i.e. you call it *viviktatā* whereas we call it *abhāva*, the substance being the same).

Moreover, one must consider whether this "being devoid of pot" is identical with the pot or different from the pot. If it is identical, it is nothing but the pot. If it is different from the pot it is nothing but what we call absence.

Therefore, when in the knowledge "Here, there is no pot" the ground devoid of pot is the object, that in the knowledge "Here" the object is the ground is beyond dispute. Because at the time of the knowledge of an existing entity such as "Here there is pot" also that (place) is the object of that knowledge.

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1. This is the idea : Whether it is knowledge of an existing entity or the knowledge of absence of an existing entity, both are of the nature of *vikalpa* according to the Buddhists.

In the case of the knowledge "There is no pot," however, what is reflected in the knowledge is not mere the place as in the case of the knowledge "Here there is pot." Because something other than that (place) must be accepted as the object of that knowledge. That something other than the place which is the object of that knowledge-call it the devoidness of pot or the absence of pot-does not make any difference in the fact.

(Buddhists) : Well, the knowledge "there is no pot" is mere imagination (according to us). (And so it is *asat* and therefore it cannot be an object of knowledge).

(Naiyāyikas) : No, since (this knowledge) is produced after *darśana* (i.e. *nirvikatpakajñāna*) it is at par with the *vikalpa* of an existing entity (which is also produced after *nirvikalpakajñāna* of an object).

(Even according to you) the *vikalpas* are produced in accordance with its *nirvikalpakajñāna.* (Similarly,) the *vikalpas* of absence are to be produced as per the *nirvikalpakajñānas* of the absence.

(Buddhists) : Well, we do not consider *vikalpas* (imagined things) as authoritative.

(Naiyāyikas) : Then, the *vikalpas* of an existing entity also should not be considered as authoritative.

If you say that since the *vikalpas* of an existing entity behave like as if they are *being seen*[1] they are taken as authoritative *nirvikalpakajñānas* as per their following *nirvikalpakajñāna,* then here too (in the case of the knowledge of absence) let those *vikalpas* (of absence produced after *nirvikalpakajñāna*) be taken as authoritative as per their following the *nirvikalpakajñānas* of absence.

If you say that the *vikalpas* of an existig entity are said to be authoritative because they help one obtain that object, then

1. See Nyāy. Ma. p. 31.

here also (on the same ground such as) by helping one obtain (that absence) let the *vikalpas* of the absence be taken as authoritative.

If you ask what is that object which is obtained by (the *vikalpas* of absence), then we ask you what is that object which is obtained by the *vikalpas* of a *sat*? If you say that the blue object is obtained, then we too say that people do obtain the absence.

When the blue object is obtained it is obtained as being separated from that yellow colour which is pervaded by the absence of blue colour. This obtainment of the blue colour of the nature stated above amounts to the obtainment of the absence of other thing (such as yellow etc.). If this is not accepted it is impossible to obtain the blue colour. All this has been accepted by you while describing the opposition (which is of the nature of mutal distinctness) the purpose of which is the characteristic feature of an object (in order to keep the objects mutually exclusive).

When there is absence of enemies one feels happy and when there is absence of friends one feels unhappy. After having observed the absence of thorns one puts one's step on the way. After knowing the absence of pot before its coming into existence (the potter) is seen interested in (collecting) the materials of the pot. After having determined the absence of disease (the patient) given up (the taking of) medicine. Having observed all these activities based on the absence, who, human being, can deny absence?

(Buddhists) : Well, anything, if it is not a cause of knowledge, cannot be the object of that knowledge? But absence which is devoid of all capacities (such as producing a knowledge, being fit to be expressed by a word etc.) is uncapable of producing knowledge. And so how can it be an object of knowledge?

(Naiyāyikas) : Here is the answer : Buddhists cannot consider anything as the cause. Because if they consider so the causes must exist for two-three moments and in that case their doctrine that everything is momentary will go to gods. Because an object is produced, it produces the knoweldge of an object and by that produced knowledge the object is known all these action cannot take place at one moment. Therefore, (according to you) even a *sat padārtha* cannot be said to be a cause. Your another view that the objects give shape to its knowledge (so it becomes the cause of knowledge) is going to be reputed by us later. Thus, as the *sat-padārtha* (is an object in the knowledge) without being the producer of the knowledge) similarly, let the absence also be there in the knowledge as an object although it is not a cause of the knowledge. We, however, consider even the absence as the cause of knowledge like any existing entity.

The definition of absence is not "the state of being devoid of all capacity." Rather it is "the state of being knowable by the knowledge such as it is not there." Because that which is known by the knowledge (it is there of a *sat-padārtha*) is called *bhāva* (existing entity) and that, which is known by the knowledge (it is not there of an *asat-padārtha*) is called *abhāva* (absence). It is stated in the Nyāyabhāṣya (p. 2) that both, an entity (*bhāva*) the knowledge which is to be known by the knowledge such as it is there and an entity (*abhāva*) which is to be known by the knowledge such as it is not there are the entities.

(Buddhists) : Well, if, like a *bhāvapadārtha*, this absence also is accepted as the producer of knowledge, it will not be distinguished from the existing entity.

(Naiyāyikas) : O clever fool! There is difference in the knowledges (i.e. the knowledge of an existing entity is difference and that of absence is different). Then, how can you say that the two objects (such as the existing entity and the absence) in those two knowledges cannot be

distinguished from each other? Moreover, O fool! Although both colour and juice cause the knowledges of colour and juice, how do they differ from each other? If you say, since there is difference in the knowledge of there two objects, (they differ from each other), an existing entity and the absence can also differ from each other although the nature of both such as "producing knowledge" is the same because their knowledges differ from each other. Moreover, you too have accepted (in the *Pramāṇavārthika* 2.1) that unless there is difference in the object the difference in the knowledge of that object is impossible.

Both (Perception and Inference) are authoritative with reference to the objects (because they function till the object is obtained).

(Diṅnāga) has said that the difference in objects is established on the ground of the difference in the shapes (of objects) in knowledge (i.e. in the knowledge (perception) of a *sat-padārtha* the shape is clear (because it is the reflection of svalakṣanas) and in the knowledge (Inference) of *asat-pardārtha* the shape is not clear (because it is a reflection of *sāmānya*). Because in one object it is impossible for both clear as well as unclear shapes to be these.

Therefore, one has to accept that the knowledge that something exists is based on *bhāva* and the knowledge that something does not exist is based on *abhāva*. Or else you should sit tight on your theory of *Vijñānavāda* alone. A position in between these two is not proper. That absence also has the capacity to help one get a particular object has already been shown before.[1]

One cannot deny the power of this absence to produce the action such as the knowledge of its own. But if you say that the result such as obtaining the object etc. is produced by something else (such as the knowledge of that object, or the

1. p. 55.21 ff.

desire to get that object, etc.) then (we can say that) that result is not produced even by an existing entity.

Similarly, the *śaktivāda* narrated before in this chapter (such as *arthakriyāsāmarthyam prāmāṇyam*) is also contrary to the perceptual experience and therefore, any attempt to establish *śakti* will result into mere drying up of our throats (i.e. we will simply go on arguing without coming to a settlement).

Moreover, your other objection that since there is no relation between the absence and the ground and so the absence cannot be known) is also wrong because there is the relation called *viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāva* of the absence with the ground. But the rule that wherever there is connection there is *viśeṣyaviśeṣaṇabhāva* is required in the case of an entity (*bhāva*) because there is the relation called contact say in the case of *ghaṭavat bhūtalam* there is the *viśeṣaṇaviśesybhāva* and not in the case of absence. In the case of the bhava this rule is not applicable because there is not a hard-and-fast rule that whatever is connected is an adjunct since if some one crushes a stick by his leg or holds it on his head, nobody takes him to be *daṇḍi* (an ascetic). (In fact we do not say this. What we say is what is an adjunct is always connected. Not is it the case that whatever is an adjunct is certainly connected. Although generic quality is an adjunct it is not based on some other relation. Therefore, even being devoid of some other relation the relation called *viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāva* is ascertained as an independent relation like the invariable concomitance and the *vācyavācakabhāva* because we know it as such. Since both (the *viśeṣya* and the *viśeṣaṇa*) can be both and since sometimes either of these will appear as either *viśeṣya* or *viśeṣaṇa* although one has the reverse knowledge as per the intention of the speaker, it is of no fault. Therefore, the relation called *viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāva* itself is the relation between the space i.e. the ground and the absence. Similarly, with time also the same relation is to be understood. The agent and the action

in the object, therefore *viśeṣyaviśeṣaṇabhāva* is to be accepted. Although there is no contact between the agent and the action which exists in the body of the agent (and still we say *Devadattaḥ gamanakriyāvān* and although there is no contact between (the) and the action of splitting (and still we say *Devadattaḥ kāṣṭham bhinatti*), (we have to accept) in these case a relation called *viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāva*[1]. In the same way (the same relation will do) in the case of absence also.) With the counter-correlation it (= the absence) has the relation called opposition. This alone is the meaning of opposition that the absence and its counter-correlative do not exist together. This is why, by the destruction of one (pot) all (pots) are not destroyed because the absence of one pot has only one pot as its counter-correlative.

With reference to your other argument "whether (the absence) is produced or is not produced (we say) we accept absence as produced one. Although it is produced it cannot be argued that in that case it will not be distinguished from an existing entitly (which is also produced one) because we have shown that there is difference in the knowledge (of an entity (*bhāva*) and the absence) as in the case of juice and colour (both are produced still, both are known as distinct). The nature of it (= of the absence) being produced is ascertained on the presence and absence of its cause. Because, as a pot requires its causes such as the mud-ball, the rod (to move the wheel) etc. similarly the absence also requires its causes hammer etc.

Even according to the doctrine that hammer does not produce the absence of a pot but it produces series of dissimilar pot-sherds, it requires to be accepted that the hammer destroys the power which produces the series of

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1. But *Granthibhaṅga* says in the case *Devadattena gamyo grāmaḥ* since, the relation between the *action* in Devadatta and the village can be neither *saṁyoga* nor *samabāya*, therefore *viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāva* is to be accepted there.

similar pots. Otherwise, even after the fall of a hammer like the series of the dissimilar potsherds the series of similar pots should also be produced. If you say the pot is possessed of the power to produce both the series of similar pots and dissimilar potsherds, then before the contact of the hammer with the pot the pot should produce the series of potsherds and even after the contact with the hammer, it will produce the series of pot. At random it will be seen. And if the pot itself is accepted as having the nature of producing dissimilar momentary potsherds also the hammer etc. will become purposeless.

If (a pot) itself has the capacity to produce dissimilar potsherds, there is no use of hammer etc. And if (the hammer) does not produce dissimilar potsherds, even then it is of no use.

And if after the fall of the hammer another series (i.e. dissimilar series) is produced, what happend to the momentary pot that it does not appear as before.

(Objection) : Well, it results into its (= of the pot) *abhavana.*

(Reply) : The same fact we are telling. (Simply you are telling it in a different tenn).

What harm did *ghañ* (abstract-noun suffix) cause to you? Or, what good thing is done to you by *lyuṭ* (abstract noun suffix)?

(Objection) : Well, we have already said that nothing happens (to the pot by the hammer); simply 'it does not exist.'

(Reply) : It is improper that "it does not exist" itself means it is the absence of that (pot).

(Objection) : Well, (what we say is) 'that is not' but (we do not mean) the absence of that (pot).

(Reply) : It is not true. Because the words *saḥ* and *na* and the knowledges from the words *saḥ* and *na* have different objects. In the knowledge from *saḥ* the remembered pot etc. are the object. But in the knowledge from the word *na* the absence is the object. Therefore, enough of refuting the fruitless and twisting arguments of those who are expert in bluffing.

Therefore, since the absence is explained thus as a *prameya*, your *anupalabdhi's* are not fit for the use *arthakriyākāri bhinna* of *asat* (non-existing entity). It (*anupalabdhi*) cannot be included in the *svabhāvānumāna*.[1] It is shown that absence is a separate *prameya* those (*amepalabdhis*). Let *Kāraṇānupalabdhi* etc. be included in inference, but that the *svabhāvānupalabdhi* is nothing but perception is established (hereby). Moreover, the good (lady) *viruddhavyāptopalabdhi* in the harem of the eleven types of *anupalabdhi*-exemplified as "the destruction of even produced object is not eternal because it requires some cause for its production (such as hammer)" has been criticized right now. Others willl be criticized in detail in the section dealing with the refutation of the *kṣaṇabhaṅga* - theory.

The good Mīmāṁsakas (Prābhākaras) do not accept 'absence' (as a separate entity). By this mistake of theirs even we are ashamed.[2]

When they say "pot is not known (seen) and not its absence" it amounts to the saying that seeing and not seeing themselves the existence and non-existence of objects are established respectively. This is incorrect. By seeing and not

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1. p. 53.
2. Prābhākaras accept knowledge and words as having object outside unlike the Bauddhas. But surprisingly enough, they do not accept absence although the knowledge of the absence of something is a knowledge. Therefore, how this kind of folly has occurred by them even we are ashamed of this. And the Bauddhas said so, we could understand because they do not accept objects outside.

seeing, existence and non-existence (of objects) are determined, but the seeing and not seeing themselves are not the existence and non-existence.

By mere not seeing (of an object) the usages based on the absence of that object are not possible as it is not possible to say that there is no water under the ground since it is not seen.

With reference to the not seeing of a sky-flower, a ghost and the underground water we do not find any difference (i.e. as one says there is no sky-flower because it is not seen one can as well say that there is no ghost and there is no water under the ground which is not correct.

(Mīmāṁsakas) : (We say) always not finding determines the absence of a thing and as such (the negation of sky-flower) is distinguished from the negation of water under the ground (because water can be seen after digging the ground).

(Naiyāyikas) : (Your reason such as) 'always not finding' cannot cover (the case of) ghost like sky-flower because the existence (of ghost) is known from the literature and reasoning.

Therefore, your statement that in the case of an object (say ghost and God)[1] which is never seen, however, 'not seeing' itself is the negation[2] (of that object) is a hollow statement.

[Mīmāṁsaka : Well, if you say that always not finding is not the cause for the usage of negation (as in the case of ghost) then on the same ground we can say that let the negation of sky-flowers also not be determined on the basis of its always not being found.]

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1. Mīmaṁsākas do not accept god and ghost because they are never seen.
2. In the case of a thing which is never seen for the usage of absence of such objects *upalabdhilakṣaṇa prātatvā* (*dṛvayats*) is not required as its cause. On the basis of its not finding itself the usage of negation of such object is accepted.

(Naiyāyikas) : In the case of sky-flower, however, the absence of it is determined by the *anupalabdhi* qualified by the adjunct (such as *yogyānupalabdhi*)[1] and not mere its *adarśana* (is determined).

If you do not accept absence (destruction) which is the counter-correlative of an existing entity there will arise the contingency of accepting these (existing entities) as permanent; because these (existing entities) are not momentary according to you (i.e. they are accepted by you as *sthira*." They are *sthira*; at the same time you do not accept *dhvaṁsābhāva*. Naturally then these entities are to be accepted as eternal). Moreover, what does the hammer do (to a pot)? If you say it produces the pot-sherds, then since the pot remains undestroyed (according to you even after striking of the hammer) why does it not do its own function (such as carrying water etc.)?

If you say that since the pot is not seen (therefore, how can it do its function?) (then we ask you).

Just at the earlier moment the permanent pot was seen. What is the reason that it is not seen now in spite of the presence of all the causal factors such as the eyes etc.? Therefore, (you have to accept that) the not finding of the pot at that time is caused by its absence (destruction).

According to your opinion the knowledge of negation is self-manifesting and it is not without an object. Like the knowledge of an existing entity (it (= the knowledge of negation) does have an object).

In the house (i.e. the school) of Buddha as the words are considered to have *vikalpas* as their objects not so with you[2]

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1. That is, had sky-flower been there it would have been seen like any other flower in the garden. This is the adjunct. *Yogyānupalabdhi* is defined as *pratiyogisattvaprasañjanaprasañjitāpratiyogikatvam.*
2. i.e. you consider words referring to out-side objects.

and so you should tell us what the meaning of the negative particle is.

You have rejected the popular conviction as well as the statement in the authoritative text regarding the sixth means of valid knowledge (such as the *anupalabdhi*). But you have not been able to reject the negation (because you cannot say that the knowledge of negation has no object). (By your argument of not accepting negation) you have neglected the statement of the *Śābarabhāṣya*.[1] What a skill in handling the logic!

Enough of stating more. The attack does not suit in this connection. The folly of even the great people requires to be pardoned by people like me.

Therefore, the negation indicated by the knowledge such as 'it is not (there)' is, hereby, established.

This negation is of two types such as *pre-absence* and the *absence caused by destruction.* Others say: it is of four types : mutual absence and total absence and the above-mentioned two. Some others hold that it is of six kinds such as conditioned *(apekṣābhāva)* and the absence of capacity (*sāmarthyābhāva*) and the above-mentioned four. Out of these.

The absence before coming into existence (of an object) is called pre-absence. Whereas the destruction of an object after its coming into existence is called *absence caused by destruction.*

Actually speaking, the other varieties of absence do not differ from the pre-absence. This pre-absence when delimited by a thing other than its own inherent cause is called the *mutual absence.* When the same pre-absence is devoid of time, space etc. it is called the absolute absence. When this (pre-absence) is delimited by or depends upon the place and time

1. 1.1.5. : *abhāvo 'pi pramāṇābhāvo nāstityasyā - saṃnikṛṣṭasyārthasya,*. That is the statement of Śabara which reveals the means (*anupalabdhi*) to know the *prameya* i.e. absence.

it is known as *apekṣābhāva* (dependent absence). If the (entity called) capacity or power is already established before, after its destruction one gets the knowledge of its absence. If this is not known earlier there will be hardly any difference of this *absence of power* from the pre-absence. As a matter of fact absence is of two kinds only such as either the destruction of what has come into existence or non-production (i.e. pre-absence) of an object. The other varieties are said to be based on different adjuncts.

Therefore, it is established that this is the entity called absence and it is also established that one gets the knowledge of this absence through the sense-organ (i.e. through *pratyakṣa*). Therefore, the sage Gautama rightly said that there are four kinds of means of valid knowledge.

(Objection) : Well, still now it is not established that there are only four kinds of valid knowledge because in addition to these there are two more means of valid knowledge such as inclusion (*sambhava*) and traditional belief (*aitihya*). *Sambhava* means the knowledge of the part is possible through (the knowledge of) the whole, a *droṇa* (a particular means of rice etc.) is included in the *khāri* (a bigger measure of rice); a hundred (is included) in a thousand. A continuity of a saying the author of which is unknown is called *aitihya.* (For example) 'On this banian tree there lives a ghost.' This cannot be taken as the verbal testimony. Because the author of the statement, who is expected to be an *āpta* (if this is to be taken as the verbal testimony) is not determined or definite.

(Reply) : This is incorrect. This *sambhava pramāṇa* which you have stated is not different from Inference. The knowledge such as a *droṇa* is included in a *khāri* is an inferencial knowledge because the invariable concomitance (such as wherever there is *khāri* there is droṇa and wherever there is no *droṇa* there cannot be *khāri*) is possible. But the *Aitihya pramāṇa* is not true because who knows whether there

is ghost on this banian tree or not; who has seen when how the body of the ghost is?

Even if it is accepted that *Aitihya* is true it is not different from the verbal testimony because it is of the nature of a statement (of a believable person). The mention of the word *āpta* in the Sūtra (*āptopadeśaḥ śabdaḥ*) is not for the definition. This will be stated later.[1]

The cunning Cārvāka, having stated *athātaḥ tattvam vyākhyāsyāmaḥ* (now we will explain the essence of our *śāstra*), has explained the word *tattva* as "the impossibility to restrict the number and the definition of the means of valid knowledge as well as the entities to be known. And in order to establish this impossiblity to restrict the number of the means of valid knowledge has tried to show, (in the following manner), the differences in the knowledge which cannot be produced by (any of four or six or eight) means of valid knowledge such as perception etc.

A person who is in the dark or who has closed his eyes does have the knowledge such as this is the hand with curved fingers or this is the hand with stretched fingers separated from each other. This knowledge is not produced by the organ of touching. Nor can this *tvagindriya,* being on the hand, produce the knowledge of the hand (As the eyes though existing in the eye-ball, do not produce the knowledge of eye-ball).

At night some one sees the flame of a lamp from a far distance and comes to know there is light spread on the place around the lamp. When a multitude of lotuses is moved by the wind one gets the knowledge that wherever this wind goes that place becomes full of fragrance even if that place is very far.

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1. Nyāya Mañ., p. 137.

This poor (Udbhaṭa) who is expert in postulating such unique (as he thinks) knowledges does not know the nature of perception and inference.

The knowledge of the stretched fingures separated from each other is got by Perception (i.e. by *tvagindriya*). The *tvagindriya* is not incompetent to produce that knowledge because it is spread throughout the body. (All right. But a sense-organ cannot produce the knowledge of its substratum as the eyes cannot produce the knowledge of the cavity where it is situated. This is true only in the case of eyes because it is not spread throughout the body but not in the case of *tvagindriya* it is not true because it is spread throughout the body). People who have drunk ice water feel very cold touch inside upto the navel. (Here, as they feel the touch they come to know the place also upto which the water has reached. This proves that the *tvagindriya* produces the knowledge of its substratum also).

As the connection (between the fingures) is known by the *tvagindriya*, the absence of connection (of fingures) is also known by the same *tvagindriya*. This is why, because of the knowledge of the particular action (such as curving the fingures), that the fingures are bent or curved is known.

The knowledge of the fragrant place because of wind going from the clotuses and the knowledge of the light around the distant lamp are, however, Inferencial produced by the knowledge of invariable concomitance. Therefore, which knowledge requires some other (i.e. outisde the four means of valid knowledge) means of valid knowledge (for its production)? Thus, the atheists who possess such a knowledge which is devoid of the critical faculty regarding the capacity of the Inference has, for nothing, beaten the drum that with regard to the means of valid knowledge no restriction is possible in respect of its number.

The limit for our means of valid knowledge (i.e. four) accepted by all is definately there. It will be stated later on that the objects to be known (i.e. *prameyas*) also can be restricted by definition.

To explain the word *tattva* (in the *sūtra athāto tattva* as the impossibility of restriction of the number of *pramāṇas* and definition of *prameyas* is to expose before the learned one the ignorance of that (Udbhaṭa).